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Partial specifications allow approximate models of systems such as Kripke structures, or labeled
transition systems to be created. Using the abstraction possible with these models, an avoid-
ance of the state-space explosion problem is possible, whilst still retaining a structure that can
have properties checked over it. A single partial specification abstracts a set of systems, whether
Kripke, labeled transition systems, or systems with both atomic propositions and named tran-
sitions. This thesis deals in part with problems arising from a desire to efficiently evaluate
sentences of the modal µ-calculus over a partial specification.
Partial specifications also allow a single system to be modeled by a number of partial specifi-
cations, which abstract away different parts of the system. Alternatively, a number of partial
specifications may represent different requirements on a system. The thesis also addresses the
question of whether a set of partial specifications is consistent, that is to say, whether a single
system exists that is abstracted by each member of the set. The effect of nominals, special
atomic propositions true on only one state in a system, is also considered on the problem of the
consistency of many partial specifications. The thesis also addresses the question of whether
the systems a partial specification abstracts are all abstracted by a second partial specification,
the problem of inclusion.
The thesis demonstrates how commonly used “specification patterns” – useful properties spec-
ified in the modal µ-calculus, can be efficiently evaluated over partial specifications, and gives
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This thesis looks at a number of problems that arise in the field of three-valued model checking.
Model checking is an approach to property verification of systems. Models are structures that
abstract what is considered to be the important information of a system. A formal language is
chosen, and the property to be verified, or refuted, represented as a sentence in this language.
Assuming the choices of model and formal language give a decidable system, we may then
automate the verification process.
Citations for ideas mentioned in this chapter are deferred until later chapters.
1.1.1 Difficulties of model checking
Model checking as an approach to system verification obviously requires caution in its use. One
needs to be sure that the model and sentence pair actually represent in a meaningful way the
property we wish to verify upon the actual system. There are two implicit, related, mappings
here. Given a choice of how we wish to construct the model determines how the property should
be correctly represented in the formal language. Similarly, deciding that a sentence of a formal
language represents our property directly imposes restrictions on how we choose our model.
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Usually one makes a model of the system, and then writes a sentence representing the property
taking in mind the nature of the system/model translation. In this thesis, we will want to
identify the property with the set of logically equivalent sentences in the formal language that
represents it. This distinction between a property and an individual sentence that represents
it will become important later.
A common problem with model checking as an approach to verification is known as the “state-
space explosion” problem, where an incremental increase in the complexity of the system being
considered, such as introducing another variable, introduces a multiplicative increase in the size
of the model, its size may double, or worse. This then means that models are exponentially
large in the description of the system.
1.1.2 The approach in this thesis
In this thesis, the formal language in which we will allow properties to be described will be the
modal µ-calculus. Within this language many common specification languages such as PDL,
CTL, LTL and CTL∗ can be embedded.
Three values
This thesis follows work done to try to avoid the state-space explosion problem. This work used
a system of logic with three truth values, where a third truth constant, beyond the usual “true”
and “false” is added. By viewing this third value as representing “maybe” or “don’t know” or
“irrelevant” it may be possible to construct a more abstract model that still contains enough
information to allow the property to be verified. This is to say that we may be able to conclude
that the property is in some sense independent of instances where the third truth-value is used.
For example, the status of an element of the system may be relevant to verification of the
property in those instances when a related element is in a particular state. Thus, information
about the first element may be in some cases abstracted away into this third truth-value. Having
done this, we may find that previously different parts of our model now resemble each other,
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and simplification is possible.
We may think of models that do not contain this third truth value as being fully specified
models, and those that do contain the third value as abstract models. We may think of the set
of abstract models as a partially ordered set, where the fully specified models are the maximal
elements, and there are models which are more, or less, abstract than others.
Modal models
In this thesis an attempt has been made to remove the third truth value, in favour of models
where we encode modality, things which must happen, and things which may happen. When
must is a subset of may, this corresponds to the three-valued model, and a third value can
be used as a short-hand, but we want to remember that it is just a short-hand. The reasons
for this approach are that it allows a more general structure which encompasses three-valued
models as a subclass, and also a philosophical aversion to the idea of three truth values. This
approach also allows us to model systems that are potentially inconsistent, where the demands
of what must and may happen conflict.
Implementations
Given an abstract model, either modal or three-valued, we can define a set of two-valued
models which we call implementations. The models in this set represent all the possible ways
of resolving the ambiguities in the abstract model. In most cases there will be many different
implementations of a single abstract model. We will say that a property is valid upon an
abstract model if it is true upon all the implementations of the abstract model, similarly we
shall say that it is satisfiable on an abstract model if there is any implementation that satisfies
it. In most cases one would be concerned with checking that a property was valid on the
abstract model.
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Approximation, and minimization
The problem with the approach of abstract models is the time taken to perform a validity or
satisfiability check on such an abstract model. This complexity is exponential in the sentence
size, and polynomial in the size of the model. This means that in many cases, where we
are checking small sentences on large models, an abstract model may well produce a saving.
However, the thesis will focus on a special class of sentences which allow a property to be checked
in linear time for both the model and the sentence, this class has the important property that
every modal µ-calculus property on non-abstract models has an equivalent sentence in this class.
This case is obviously preferable. These sentences are called“semantically self-minimizing”, and,
for every property describable by the modal µ-calculus there exists a sentence representing the
property of this type. It is thus useful to know whether a particular sentence chosen to represent
a property is semantically self-minimizing or not.
This thesis will look at problems associated with semantic self-minimization, and also at a
number of problems on the interaction of sets of abstract models.
1.2 Objectives of the thesis
We give here the original objectives which guided this research.
1. Improve the grammar of [GH05]. This grammar produces sentences which are certified
to be semantically self-minimizing.
2. Determine what can we say about the specification patterns of [pat] using this gram-
mar. The original grammar failed to correctly identify many as being semantically self-
minimizing.
3. Determine the general complexity of deciding if a sentence has a semantic self-minimization
property.
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4. Investigate if we can efficiently evaluate semantically self-minimizing sentences over a
conjunction of models. This problem turned out to be more difficult than imagined, and
so led to the revised objective below.
4′ Investigate the computational complexity of the many-model problems of consistency,
common implementation, and thorough refinement. Also investigate what difference al-
lowing nominals, special propositional atoms true at only one state in a model, makes to
the complexity.
Succeeding in understanding these objectives would give a good understanding of the usefulness
of Modal Labeled Transition Systems in model checking, in relation to other methods.
1.3 Results of the thesis
The main results of this thesis are:
 A classification of common specification properties into two classes, those which are self-
minimizing and those which are not. For those which are not, an alternative, equivalent
sentence of similar size, which is semantically self-minimizing, is given.
 An improvement of a grammar which generates a subset of the self-minimizing sentences.
 That the problem of determining if a given sentence of the modal µ-calculus (or CTL)
is semantically self-minimizing is difficult (EXPTIME-hard, and in 2EXPTIME), and so
may not be worth the time, that is to say, if it is not demonstrated to be semantically self-
minimizing by the aforementioned grammar. Depending on circumstances, the optimal
work flow may be not to test if the sentence is semantically self-minimizing, and assume
that it is not. We also look at the problem when the language is restricted to propositional
modal logic, and just propositional logic.
 That the question of whether, for a given finite set of abstract models, there exists a single
model for which every model of that finite set is an abstraction, is EXPTIME-complete.
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 That determining if one abstract model is an abstraction of another is PSPACE-hard,
and in EXPTIME.
A more general evaluation of how the above research objectives have been met is in the final
chapter.
1.4 Organization of thesis
The thesis is organized as follows
 In Chapters 2 & 3 an overview of the historic roots of three-valued logic, and modern
background and related work is given.
 In Chapter 4, we give an improvement of a grammar defining semantically self-minimizing
sentences. Using this grammar, common specification properties identified in [pat] are
analysed. For those that prove not to be semantically self-minimizing we give an equiva-
lent one, of similar size, which thus allows fast validity checks.
 In Chapter 5, the complexity of determining whether a sentence is semantically self-
minimizing in general is addressed. It is here that we observe the high complexity of
determining semantic self-minimization.
 In Chapter 6, problems relating to sets of abstract models are looked at. Specifically,
we ask, given a set of abstract models, is there a single fully specified model that is an
implementation of them all? We also consider the complexity of determining whether all
implementations of one abstraction are also implementations of a second abstraction.
1.5 Statement of Originality
Unless otherwise stated in the text, the work described in this thesis was carried out solely by
the candidate. None of this work has already been accepted for any degree, nor is it concurrently
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submitted in candidature for any degree.
1.6 Publications
The publications listed below contain work that appears in this thesis. As the papers were
written with co-authors, I have listed my contribution to each.
 “Efficient Patterns for Model Checking Partial State Spaces in CTL ∩ LTL”– [AH06]
Did all research.
 “On the complexity of semantic self-minimization” – [AH08]
Did all research.
 “Complexity of decision problems for mixed and modal specifications” – [AHL+08b]
Did hardness result for modal TR, and suggested upper bound strategy.
 “EXPTIME-complete Decision Problems for Mixed and Modal Specifications”– [AHL+08c]
First proved the CI hardness result, later independently proved by co-authors.
 “20 Years of Mixed and Modal Specifications” – invited column [AHL+08a].
Chapter 2
Historical Background
In this chapter we give a brief overview of the historical background to the ideas in this thesis,
specifically, many-valued logic and modal logic.
We shall first note how logics with extra truth values differ from classical logics, then look at
the starting points of work on many-valued logics, proceeding then to modal logics.
2.1 Classical and Many-valued logics
Classical Logic is the framework within which most of European thought on truth has been
based for over two millennia. Classical logics are those which are bivalent, that is to say
restricted to boolean truth values, and which obey the properties given in Table 2.1. If a logic
does not have one of these properties it is termed a Non-Classical Logic, although the term
Classical logic is sometimes restricted to just propositional and first-order logic.
Whilst the principles in Table 2.1 seem obvious, and research and thought into Classical Logic
has produced great results, it also quickly becomes clear that there are parts of human experi-
ence resistant to being brought into such a framework, not everything is necessarily frameable
in terms of True and False.
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I Law of the Excluded Middle; Elimination of Double Negatives
II Law of Non-Contradiction
III Monotonicity of Entailment; Idempotency of Entailment
IIII Commutativity of Conjunction
V De Morgan Duality
Table 2.1: The Salient Properties of Classical Logic
2.2 Aristotle
One of the earliest known formalisms of Classical Logic is Aristotle’s Organon, the name given to
his collected writings on Logic. In the book ‘Prior Analytics’ [Aria] the axioms of the Excluded
Middle, and the Law of Non-Contradiction are explicitly stated. However, Aristotle’s logic is
restricted to sentences of the forms
 All Ps are Q
 Some Ps are Q
 No Ps are Q
 Some Ps are not Q
and so these axioms cannot be expressed in this restricted logic. Despite these limitations,
Aristotle’s conception of logic was the dominant form of logic until the 19th century, when the
field started to be considered by mathematicians. Kant stated in the Critique of Pure Reason
that Aristotle’s theory of logic completely accounted for the core of deductive inference.
2.2.1 Sentences outside true and false
Aristotle recognized that there are situations where these axioms do not hold. In a different
book of the Organon, ‘On Interpretations’ [Arib] Aristotle explicitly mentions two classes of
sentences which violated these laws.
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True and false
The first class, in Ch.VII of loc. cit., consists of those sentences which could be considered to
be both true and false simultaneously. He writes
When ... the reference is to universals, but the propositions are not universal, it is
not always the case that one is true and the other false, for it is possible to state
truly that man is white and that man is not white, and that man is beautiful and
that man is not beautiful; for if a man is deformed he is the reverse of beautiful,
also if he is progressing towards beauty he is not yet beautiful.
A detailed analysis of this problem would require a diversion into the theory of universals, so
we shall simply note here that Aristotle does allow both “P is Q” and “P is not Q” to be true,
this contradicts the Law of Non-Contradiction.
Neither true nor false
The second class, more relevant to our purposes here, is given in Ch. IX of loc. cit. This
example gives a sentence to which neither a value of true nor false could reasonably be defined.
He writes
Let me illustrate. A sea-battle must either take place to-morrow or not, but it is
not necessary that it should take place to-morrow, neither is it necessary that it
should not take place, yet it is necessary that it either should or should not take
place to-morrow. Since propositions correspond with facts, it is evident that when
in future events there is a real alternative, and a potentiality in contrary directions,
the corresponding affirmation and denial have the same character.
Thus Aristotle gives a proposition P such that neither P nor not P is true. This contradicts
the Law of the Excluded Middle.
2.3. Eubulides 29
It is worth noting the strong connection Aristotle introduces between the sentences which are
neither true nor false, and the passage of time. Also to be noted is that the sentence does not
talk about an inevitable or impossible event in the future, Aristotle makes it clear that the
inability to assign true or false arises from the fact that there are two different possibilities. If
there was no real alternative or possibility, the sentence would be true, or false respectively.
This prefigures the approach we shall take in this thesis, of uncertainty, or an unspecified future,
along with a temporal logic.
In fact we can here now summarise most of the background to this thesis. Let S be a sentence
referring to future events. Then give a truth value to S as follows.
 True if S is inevitable
 False if S is impossible
 Maybe if neither of the above apply
We define a new truth value “Maybe”, that represents our lack of knowledge about the future.
It may be argued that the universe is determined, and thus that every S is either inevitable
or impossible, but such detailed knowledge about the universe is beyond us in any practical
sense.
2.3 Eubulides
There is a third class of sentences known to the Ancients which did not fit nicely into the
classification of “true” or “false”. These were the self-contradictory sentences, a subclass of
paradoxes. The classic example is
This sentence is false.
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The first known statement of this form is attributed to Eubulides of Miletus. This supposed
problem of the ‘Cretan Paradox’ is sometimes mistakenly classed as being of this form. This
“paradox” comes from Epimenides, who is recorded as making the statement
All Cretans are liars.
Now, there are two types of liars, those who sometimes lie and sometimes tell the truth (normal
people), and those who never tell the truth (the pathological type). If Epimenides is talking
about the first type, the problem is resolved if he is telling the truth at this point. This
would make him a liar, but still capable of telling the truth if he wishes, for example with this
statement. Alternatively, if liars of the second type were meant, then the problem is solved
under a small assumption that there has at some point been a Cretan that has made a true
statement. In that case the statement is false, and Epimenides is lying.
To return to the self-denying sentence, this sentence can not be true, as it asserts that it itself
is false, it being true would make it false. Similarly, it can not be false, for then its negation
would be true. As its negation is “This sentence is true”, we again contradict ourselves. It has
been this paradox, along with others such as the paradox of the heap (again apparently due to
Eubulides), which states that
One grain of sand is not a heap.
Adding a single grain of sand does not make a heap.
By induction, no heaps of sand exist.
which has driven a lot of thought into many valued logic.
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2.4 Avicenna
Modal, and temporal modal logics have a long history, seeming to originate in the works of
Avicenna, and then carried on in the Arab logical tradition for 200 years.
Avicenna was one of the first to author a proper criticism of Aristotle, and to formulate his own
logical system, which overcomes a number of failings of Aristotle’s. Avicenna fully recognises
the necessity of modal, and temporal modal logics, and lays the foundations for them. His work
is continued by other Arab authors.
It would be nice to be able to go into this subject here, but translations from Arabic of the
relevant works seem hard to find.
It is known that these works diffused into the West, and influenced western thought, but
without being able to consult the original sources, tracing this evolution is difficult. However,
it is certain that the fundamentals of modal logic, for instance the identity“EX = ¬AX¬”, where
“EX” represents “it is possible that”, and “AX” represents “it is necessary that”; were formulated
by the Arabs.
Avicenna did however believe in the Law of the Non-Contradiction for propositional logic. See
page 6.
2.5 Ancient transition systems
A transition system consists of states, and transitions between them. These transitions may
be of different natures, and thus labeled accordingly. These are related to modal logic, as they
provide a universe in which to define a modal semantics.
The idea is ancient, and is demonstrated in the Cabalistic diagram of the Sefirot, see Fig. 2.1.
Here states correspond to the ten names of God, and transitions to the 22 different Hebrew
letters. The diagram is a labeled transition system. It represents an abstract model of reality,
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Figure 2.1: Diagram of the Sefirot.
and thus reasoning about it can be applied to the universe itself. Alchemy was heavily influ-
enced by Cabalistic ideas, with the transformations performed by the alchemist a projection of
spiritual, mystical, transformations in the higher reality.
Thus, there is good reason to argue that the Sefirot, and the theory surrounding it, can be
considered as an example of labeled transition systems with an accompanying logic.
2.6 These ideas in a modern framework
We shall here quickly examine, from a modern computer science perspective, the questions
raised above.
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A fundamental idea of theoretical computer science is that of a decision procedure. Aristotle
states that we can assign neither true nor false to “Tomorrow there will be a sea-battle.”, but
in fact we can. The decision procedure is straight forward:
Suppose the date is n. Then to determine whether “Upon the date n + 1 there will be a
sea-battle.” we do the following:
 Wait until the end of day n+ 1.
 Determine whether indeed a sea-battle had taken place.
The procedure is guaranteed to halt. Thus the question of Aristotle is decidable, is resolvable,
into either true or false. This may seem a stupid response in this context, but the idea of being
decidable within a known period of time is one we usually accept.
We can of course phrase other questions, ones that can not be answered within a day, or
indeed any pre-known period of time, and whether they involve sea-battles or halting of Turing
machines is neither here-nor-there, these questions are undecidable.
So, Aristotle’s sentence is not neither true nor false, it is one or the other, we just do not yet
known, as the decision procedure “has not yet returned”. However we can still reason about
the future. For instance, given
If there is a sea-battle tomorrow then A; if however there is none, then B.
we may conclude that “A or B” will hold tomorrow, whereas we may make no such conclusion
about the statements “A” or “B” themselves. We can reach this conclusion by enumerating the
possibilities, either there will, or will not be a sea-battle, we look at the consequence of each
case, and reach our conclusion. Thus we may assign a truth value of “maybe” to sea-battle
property before the decision procedure returns. We can then evaluate the rest of the sentence
by enumerating the two possibilities that the “maybe” value may take. If we always get a
given truth value as a result result, then we may conclude that the sentence represented by
“maybe” does not in fact have any consequential effect upon our query. Thus, an Aristotelian
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intermediate value, as a place-holder, makes a lot of sense for reasoning about an unknown
future.
The use of a third truth value to represent a non-returning decision procedure is also taken up
by Kleene, as we shall see later.
What seems to be less sensible to me are attempts to use a third truth value to evaluate a
sentence such as “This sentence is false.” These attempts seem to me to be part of a doomed
program to rationalise human language, one which seems to miss the point somewhat. I shall
illustrate here what seems to me to be the problem with this approach of reifying new kinds of
truth. Assume that we assign some third value “maybe”, say, to the sentence
This sentence is false.
Where we argue somehow that the sentence being “maybe” is somehow consistent with it being
false. The question then arises what value
This sentence evaluates to either false or maybe.
should have assigned. It would seem that we may need an infinite series of intermediate truth
values.
This sentence evaluates to a value that is semantically and syntactically equivalent,
in every possible sense, to false.
It is more difficult to see how this, too, could be “maybe”. Finally, consider one more sentence
This sentence can not be evaluated to result in any definable truth value.
The problem, in my view, is that a human language sentence only has to be understood, not
evaluated, and that these concepts are different. Understanding of language involves reasoning,
but also on-the-fly contextual axiomitisation, and, probably to a large degree, the ignoring
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of statements not immediately understood. Trying to force human language into a formal
semantics seems to presuppose that the mind is the result of a complex, hidden, yet still formal
system. The program seems to resemble trying to evaluate formally the meaning of a painting.
It is for this reason that in this thesis, this “semantic” aspect of many-valued logic is ignored,
we shall focus on “syntactic” aspects, that is, a third value as a place-holder, bearing in mind
the implicit notion of resolution. We mention some references in the section on related work,
but do not develop any ideas from there.
2.7 Summary
In this chapter we have taken a quick look at the history of some of the ideas in this thesis.
We have traced the idea of the insufficiency of “true” and “false” back to Aristotle. The example
that concerns us “Tomorrow there will be a sea-battle” can also be seen as demonstrating the
necessity of a modal temporal logic.
We have looked at paradoxes, which have also been motivation for the development of many-
valued logic, but which are not a feature of the research pursued here.
Chapter 3
Background and Related Work
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we give the necessary background work for this thesis, within its historical
context. The background can be divided into two main parts:
 Classes of three-valued models.
 Logics for reasoning about models in these classes.
In this chapter there are problems introduced by the fact that there are two very different uses
of many valued logic. The philosophical interpretation of the third truth value determines many
choices we shall have to make. These two interpretations are
 A lack of knowledge. Here the third truth value is in some senses a placeholder, that
could possibly be later filled in.
 A real extra value of truth. These interpretations usually stem from attempts to resolve
paradoxical sentences.
Only the first of these interpretations is pursued in this thesis, although some of the relevant
background work was conceived with the other interpretation in mind. The first interpretation
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should perhaps mean that we interpret on a model with three values that “true” means “the
value placed here must be true”, “false” that “the value placed here must be false”, and “half”,
our third value, means “the value placed here may be either true or false”. None of the three
truth values are in fact truth values, but descriptions of what truth values may be placed there.
It is under this influence that this thesis tends to use modal structures, where this descriptive
nature is made clearer.
Given the many three-valued logics we need to consider, we give a brief history of them here,
which shows how they have evolved.
We first look at possible semantics for a proposition-less three-valued logic, where sentences are
generated by the grammar
φ ::= 0 | 12 | 1 | ¬φ | φ ∧ φ | φ ∨ φ (3.1)
where 0 denotes falsity, 1 truth, and 12 the third truth value.
3.2 History by person
In this section we shall look at the history of three-valued logic, organised by person, in chrono-
logical order.
3.2.1 Peirce
The first modern consideration of this subject is due to Peirce, who, over three pages in a
notebook, dated to before 1910, defines a number of operators upon three logic values. These
pages are reproduced in [FT66]. These operators can be used to give a semantics for sentences
of (3.1), we choose one for ∧, and another, possibly the De Morgan dual, for ∨. Peirce gives
only one negation operator, called bar. We illustrate the bar operator, and Peirce’s Z operator
in Table. 3.1. The Z operator is naturally considered to be a form of conjunction, as it behaves




x 1 12 0
x¯ 0 12 1
(b) Peirce’s Z op-
erator
Z 1 12 0
1 1 12 0
12 12 12 0
0 0 0 0
Table 3.1: Two of Peirce’s operators [FT66]
as conjunction on the usual two truth values.
As noticed by Peirce, the presence of a third truth value allows many different binary operators,
but there seems to be only one sensible negation operator, the bar operator defined by Peirce.
We want to preserve that ¬0 = 1 and ¬1 = 0. Thus the only freedom of choice we have is
in the value of ¬12. If we want to be able to eliminate double negatives, we must set ¬12 = 12.
Other possibilities introduce a strange asymmetry to the situation, for which I can not think
of a philosophical justification.
For binary operators however, our choices are much greater. A binary operator on two truth
values can be extended in 35 different ways to be a binary operator upon the three truth values,
as there are five new entries in the truth table, each of which can take one of three values. If
we are starting from a commutative operator, and wish to preserve this commutativity, then
we are restricted to 33 possibilities. Which operators to choose for ∧ and ∨ thus depends upon
the philosophical interpretation we wish to apply to the third truth value.
3.2.2  Lukasiewicz
The first published consideration of many-valued logic was by  Lukasiewicz[ Luk20], who was
interested in the possibility of using extra truth values to create a modal logic capable of
expressing concepts such as “it is necessary that” and “it is possible that”. This approach
to modal logic is not one that has been greatly followed up, possibly as nested subjunctive
expressions do not easily work in this formalism. However, the field of many-valued logic
created by  Lukasiewicz has proved fruitful in other ways.
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 Lukasiewicz defines a whole family of many-valued logics, of which three-valued logic, the one
which interests us here, is the simplest.
Definition 3.2.1. A finite  Lukasiewicz system Lm (for positive integer m) is defined over a set




m− 1 | 0 ≤ k ≤ m− 1
}
The infinite  Lukasiewicz system L∞ is defined over the set of truth values W∞ with
W∞ = [0, 1] = {x ∈ R | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}.
Within these systems are defined strong and weak conjunction operators, & and ∧, and a
negation operator ¬. The strong and weak conjunction operators are defined by
a & b = max{0, a+ b− 1} (3.2)
a ∧ b = min{a, b} (3.3)
and a negation operator ¬ given by
¬a = 1− a. (3.4)
From these, using the usual de Morgan duality one can define two disjunctions the strong |,
and the weak ∨. We get that
a | b = min{1, a+ b} (3.5)
a ∨ b = max{a, b}. (3.6)
Again using the standard rule of logic that ‘A implies B’ is identical to ‘not A or B’, one could
define two implication operators, but it appears that in practice  Lukasiewicz uses only one, ‘→’,
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constructed from the strong disjunction |, which thus is given by
a→ b = min{1, 1− u+ v} (3.7)
Example 3.2.2. The  Lukasiewicz system L2 is defined over W2 = {0, 1} is the usual system
boolean logic, where the weak and strong forms of conjunction co-incide.
Example 3.2.3. The  Lukasiewicz system L3 is defined over W3 = {0, 12 , 1}. The  Lukasiewicz
system L4 is defined over W4 = {0, 13 , 23 , 1}. The weak and strong forms of conjunction a
For the system L3, the truth tables for the various operators are presented in Table 3.2. One
can see the correspondence between Peirce’s bar operator and ¬ in L3, and Peirce’s Z operator
with the weak conjunction ∧ in L3.
(a)
& 1 12 0
1 1 12 0
12 12 0 0
0 0 0 0
(b)
∧ 1 12 0
1 1 12 0
12 12 12 0
0 0 0 0
(c)
| 1 12 0
1 1 1 1
12 1 1 12
0 1 12 0
(d)
∨ 1 12 0
1 1 1 1
12 1 12 12
0 1 12 0
(e)
→ 1 12 0
1 1 12 0
12 1 1 12
0 1 1 1
(f)
¬ 1 12 0
0 12 1
Table 3.2: Operators for L3
Example 3.2.4. We illustrate here the evaluation of two sentences of L3:
(12 & 12) → 12 = 1
(1 | 12) → 12 = 12
The difference between the strong and weak conjunctions is how they evaluate 12 applied to 12.
The strong conjunction requires that at least one operand be 1 for the result not be 0, whereas
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the weak conjunction gives the result of 12 when both operands are 12. The strong conjunction
is thus “more rigorous” in the demands it places on its operands.
In this logic, when extended to propositions, the third value truly is a separate entity. Thinking
of it as “it might be true, or it might be false”, does not seem to work well. This is in part
because the idea of “might be true, might be false”, seems to imply that there may be a method
for finding out, and that the third value can, or may at some point, be resolved into either true
or false.
3.2.3 Kleene
Three-valued logic was later used and developed by Kleene [Kle52], who used three-valued logic
to reason about partial recursive functions, and introduced a strong and weak semantics for
three-valued logic. We can use this logic to compute the values of a partially recursive function
in a least-fixed point fashion. For some input values the least fixed-point value will be 12, but
for others it will eventually be resolved to 0 or 1. In the context of “Tomorrow there will be a
sea-battle”, we can phrase this in such a manner, and know that the least fixed-point will be
either 0 or 1, but will not be resolved in such a way until tomorrow. These semantics are based
upon the idea of regular truth tables.
Definition 3.2.5. A table for a 3-valued logic with values 0, 1 and 12 is regular if a given column
(row) contains the value ‘1’ in the ‘12’ row (column) only if that column (row) consists entirely
of ‘1’s; and likewise for ‘0’.
Note that the operators  Lukasiewicz describes are not all regular, as his strong “‘or” operator
assigns the value ‘1’ to ‘12 | 12’, but then assigns ‘12’ to ‘12 | 0’. However, the weak  Lukasiewicz
operators correspond to the strong Kleene semantics, and are thus regular.
This restriction to regular tables gives that there are only two ways of extending the conjunction
operator, and hence disjunction and implication operators. The weak semantics is given by
always giving a result of ‘12’ whenever any of the operands is ‘12.’ The truth tables defining the
strong semantics are given in Table 3.3.
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(a)
∧+ 1 12 0
1 1 12 0
12 12 12 0
0 0 0 0
(b)
∨+ 1 12 0
1 1 1 1
12 1 12 12
0 1 12 0
(c)
→+ 1 12 0
1 1 12 0
12 12 12 12
0 1 1 1
(d)
≡+ 1 12 0
1 1 12 0
12 12 12 12
0 0 12 1






Figure 3.1: Hasse diagram of the information order
Example 3.2.6. A couple of sentences evaluated under Kleene’s strong semantics are given
for sake of illustration:
(12 ∧+ 12) →+ 12 = 12
(1 ∨+ 12) →+ 12 = 12
3.2.4 Comparison of semantics
To allow an overview of the large number of possible semantics, we define a partial order of
information ≤I [BG99] upon the set of three truth values.
Definition 3.2.7. The partial information order ≤I , is defined as the reflexive partial order on
this set where
12 ≤I 0, 12 ≤I 1
and 0 and 1 are incomparable.
This order, depicted in a Hasse diagram in Fig. 3.1, gives a philosophical meaning to the third
truth value, as somehow representing less information than the usual ‘true’ and ‘false’. With this
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the following interesting connection between the  Lukasiewicz and Kleene semantics is exposed.
Definition 3.2.8. Let Ls(φ) be the result of evaluating a sentence φ under the strong  Lukasiewicz
semantics, that is to say, using & for ‘and’ and | for ‘or’, let Lw(φ) be similar for the weak
 Lukasiewicz semantics, Kls(φ) and Klw(φ) for Kleene’s strong and weak semantics respectively.
With these different methods of evaluating the truth of a sentence we have
Klw(φ) ≤I Kls(φ) = Lw(φ) ≤I Ls(φ), ∀φ
where φ ranges over sentences (3.1) Thus we can overload ≤I , and apply it to these logics
themselves. We say that L ≤I L′ where L and L′ are two three-valued propositional logics with
the same syntax, if we have that
L(φ) ≤I L′(φ) ∀φ
So even though the strong  Lukasiewicz operators are not regular, they are consistent with
Kleene’s idea of regular operators, they simply make even stronger assertions about the third
truth value.
3.2.5 Bruns and Godefroid
A final example of semantics for three-valued logic is that of Bruns and Godefroid [BG99], who
define two different but interdependent semantics, the pessimistic and optimistic semantics.
The interesting idea with these semantics, is that they evaluate any sentence to either true or
false. These semantics were developed with the idea of the third truth value representing an
unknown, or under-defined value. The semantics are also approximative. The value we would
like to calculate is not necessarily what is returned.
The optimistic semantics over-approximates the judgement that the variables with value 12 could
be revised to make the sentence true. That is to say the truth of optimistic semantics is implied
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by truth of the judgement, but not the other way around. The pessimistic semantics is the dual,
it underapproximates the judgement that all revisions of variables with value 12 will keep the
sentence true. That is, these semantics approximate the supervaluation semantics [vF66]. The
role of negation in mediating between these two semantics should be noted. The sentence ¬φ
is optimistically true, if and only if φ is pessimistically judged false. The optimistic semantics
wants to maximize truth, its dual, the pessimistic one, to maximize falsity.
Definition 3.2.9. The optimistic and pessimistic semantics are defined over sentences gener-
ated by the grammar of (3.1). These semantics are not simply defined by truth tables for each
operator, as negations change the mode of evaluation. The semantics are given in Table 3.4
where m = {o, p} and ¬o = p,¬p = o. The implication operator is derived from a→ b := ¬a∨b.
|=m φ1 ∧ φ2 ⇐⇒ |=m φ1 and |=m φ2
|=m φ1 ∨ φ2 ⇐⇒ |=m φ1 or |=m φ2




m = {o, p}, ¬o = p, ¬p = o
Table 3.4: The optimistic and pessimistic semantics of Bruns and Godefroid for three-valued
propositional logic.
The ‘and’ and ‘or’ in the semantics operate upon binary judgements, and so denote their usual
Boolean selves.
Example 3.2.10.  The sentence ‘(12 ∧ 12) → 12’ is optimistically true, this can be seen by
rewriting this to ‘¬(12∧12)∨12’, then the right operand is optimistically accepted, and hence
the sentence is.
 When evaluated pessimistically, the right operand is now not accepted. The left operand
‘¬(12 ∧ 12)’ is pessimistically accepted, if and only if ‘12 ∧ 12’ is not optimistically accepted,
but it is optimistically accepted, and so it is seen that the sentence itself is pessimistically
rejected.
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(a) Pessimistic ∧
operator
∧ 1 12 0
1 1 0 0
12 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
(b) Pessimistic ∨
operator
∨ 1 12 0
1 1 1 1
12 1 0 0
0 1 0 0
(c) Optimistic ∧
operator
∧ 1 12 0
1 1 1 0
12 1 1 0
0 0 0 0
(d) Optimistic ∨
operator
∨ 1 12 0
1 1 1 1
12 1 1 1
0 1 1 0
Table 3.5: Truth tables for optimistic and pessimistic operators in negation normal form
 However, this is not to say that the result of pessimistic evaluation is simply the negation
of the optimistic judgement. For instance, both semantics accept the sentence ‘0 → 12’.
The slightly unusual joint form of these semantics can be unravelled by noting that De Morgan
duality holds in this framework, and so one can place sentences into negation normal form,
that is to push down all negations though the operators down to the atomic level, without
affecting the judgements |=o and |=p. This fact will also apply to the temporal logics considered
subsequently. Having done this transformation the interrelation is no longer needed, and one
can construct truth tables for the ∧ and ∨ operators (the ¬ operator being now the same as
Kleene’s, operating only on atomic propositions). These modified truth tables are given in
Table 3.5. Note that these tables are now only valid for sentences in negation normal form, for
instance De Morgan duality is no longer observed.
3.2.6 Kripke - Revision theory of truth
In [Kri75], Kripke looks at how one may resolve paradoxes using three valued logic. From the
point of view of this thesis, the important idea that he introduces here is that of revision of a
valuation of propositional atoms.
Definition 3.2.11. A Kripke partial truth assignment, or valuation, is a pair 〈T ,F〉 of disjoint
subsets of the atomic propositions, where one thinks of those atoms in T as being true, and
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those in F as being false.
Note that the definition does not require the union of T and F to be the set of atomic propo-
sitions, there may be those which are neither true nor false, we can think of these as having a
third truth value.
Example 3.2.12. Let the set of atomic propositions AP be {w, x, y, z}, then let
T1 = {w, x}, F1 = {z}
The partial valuation 〈T1,F1〉 then corresponds to w and x being true, and z being false. The
atom y does not have a defined truth value, is neither true nor false.
Kripke shows how given two partial valuations 〈T1,F1〉, 〈T2,F2〉 it makes sense to consider
〈T2,F2〉 to be a revision of 〈T1,F1〉 containing more information, if T1 ⊆ T2 and F1 ⊆ F2. One
can in this manner define a partial order upon these partial valuations. The maximal elements
of this partial order correspond to full valuations, every atom is either true or false.
Kripke used the properties of this system of partial and full valuations and revision to show
that there exist fixed points for self-referential sentences.
Example 3.2.13. Let T1 be as in Example 3.2.12. Now let
T2 = {w, x, y}, F2 = {z}
Then 〈T2,F2〉 is a revision of 〈T1,F1〉, and 〈T2,F2〉 is a full valuation as the two truth sets form
a partition of the atomic propositions.
3.3 The many-worlds approach to models
The many worlds approach to modal logic is due to Kripke [Kri63]. The idea is that we have a
set of worlds, or states, and an accessibility relation, that describes how we may move between
these worlds.
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Definition 3.3.1. A Kripke structure can thus be described as a triple 〈S,R, L〉, where S is
the set of worlds, R ⊆ S × S a binary accessibility relation, and L ⊆ S × AP a binary relation
giving relating atoms to those states upon which they are true.
More complicated structures can be created by having a number of different accessibility rela-
tions, allowing for the modelling of several ‘actions’.
We usually like to have a starting point for these sorts of systems, an initial state.
Definition 3.3.2. Let M = 〈S,R, L〉 be a Kripke structure, and s some state in S. Then
(M, s) is a pointed Kripke structure with s its initial state.
Any sort of system which can be considered to be divisible into distinct, discrete states, upon
which we may define atomic propositions, can be modelled by the many worlds approach.
Having created a model, we may then ask if it obeys certain properties, and a large number of
temporal logics have been defined to allow different properties to be expressed.
To make life easier, all models will usually be considered to be finite, due to finite model
properties of the logics we shall consider, we shall see that this restriction to the finite is not
severe.
3.3.1 Bisimulation
An important concept for Kripke structures, and related models of systems, is that of bisimula-
tion. Bisimulation establishes a coinductivly defined equivalence relation on states. Equivalent
states do equivalent things from the point of view of a process [Par81].
Definition 3.3.3. Let M1 = 〈S1, R1, L1〉, M2 = 〈S2, R2, L2〉 be Kripke structures. A relation
B ⊆ S1 × S2 is called a bisimulation if for all (s1, s2) ∈ B it has the following properties.
(s1, p) ∈ L1 ⇐⇒ (s2, p) ∈ L2 ∀p ∈ AP
∃t1, (s1, t1) ∈ R1 ⇒ ∃t2, (s2, t2) ∈ R2 and (t1, t2) ∈ B
∃t2, (s2, t2) ∈ R2 ⇒ ∃t1, (s1, t1) ∈ R1 and (t1, t2) ∈ B
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It is easily seen that if B1 and B2 are bisimulations, then so is B1 ∪ B2. Hence for any two
models there is a greatest possible bisimulation.
Definition 3.3.4. Let (M1, s1) and (M2, s2) be pointed Kripke structures. We say (M1, s1)
and (M2, s2) are bisimilar, or bisimulation equivalent if (s1, s2) is in the greatest bisimulation
relation between M1 and M2.
3.3.2 Combining three-valued logic and Kripke structures
We shall consider here the structures introduced in Dams’ thesis [Dam96]. These structures
trivially subsume a range of other “multi-valued” or “modal” structures. We shall first define
and work with this general structure, and later show how this can be restricted to give other
common forms of structure.
In this thesis we shall consider models over a signature (AP, Act), where AP is a set of atomic
propositions, and Act a set of actions.
We shall call the models we are about to define transition systems, a name which is too vague
in itself, but we shall shortly prefix the term “transition system” with a number of different
adjectives to clearly indicate different subclasses of these models.
Definition 3.3.5. A transition system has a signature (S,Rc, Ra, Lc, La), where
 S is a non-empty set of states
 Ra and Rc are subsets of S × Act× S, labeled relations between states.
 La and Lc are subsets of S × AP.
We shall think of Ra as denoting what must be able to happen on a given state s in S, and
Rc as stating those things which may happen. We think of La and Lc as valuations. La states
which atoms must be true at a state, and Lc those which may be true.
We do not insist that Ra ⊆ Rc, that is to say we may have a transition that “must” happen to a
particular state, but no transition that “may” happen to the same state. This is not as strange
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as may seem at first if we think that some sort of bisimulation type property might apply to
these structure (and we shall see later that one does), thus we may have a “must” transition to a
state s, and a “may” transition to a state t, but if s and t are in some sense equivalent then this
can be seen to make sense. Note however that we also do not necessarily insist that La ⊆ Lc,
we may have a model where it is specified that an atom must be true, but not that it may be
true, giving rise to an inconsistent situation. We shall examine such inconsistent models later.
Definition 3.3.6. A pointed transition system (M, s) is a transition systemM = (S,Rc, Ra, Lc, La)
with a defined initial state s.
We saw with Kripke’s revision theory of truth, the idea that one model contains more infor-
mation than another, but which is also consistent with that other model. This idea can be
extended to these transition systems with the idea of refinement [LT88]. Assume for the mo-
ment that La ⊂ Lc, we can then identify the set T with Lc, and F with AP \Lc. We say that a
state s1 refines a state s2 for s1 and s2 in a model M if the truth values of propositional atoms
in s1 and s2 behave as they should for Kripke’s revision theory, and if an extra property holds
for successors. We require firstly that, at s2, for every must transition of a particular action to
a state t say, there should be a corresponding must transition from s1 to a state t
′ say, such
that t′ in turn refines t. Secondly, we require that every must or may transition from s1 has a
corresponding may transition in s2.
The intuition is that if s1 refines s2, then whatever s1 can do must be possible at s2 too, and
whatever s2 must be able to do also must be done at s1. Note that there is no need for a one-to-
one correspondence between states in a refinement, a collection of must or may transitions from
s1 could all correspond to a single may transition from s2. This idea gives rise to a coinductive
definition of refinement, which does not rely on La being a subset of Lc.
We call the information order applied to transition systems refinement, and now define it
formally:
Definition 3.3.7. Given two transition systems (M, s0) and (N, j0) with






































Figure 3.2: Example of refinement
we say that (N, j0) refines (M, s0), and write (M, s0)  (N, j0) if we can find a binary relation
v ⊆ SM × SN with s0 v j0, such that the following co-inductive properties hold.
For any s v j we have that
 (s, p) ∈ LaM ⇒ (j, p) ∈ LaN ∀p ∈ AP
 (j, p) ∈ LcN ⇒ (s, p) ∈ LcM ∀p ∈ AP
 ∀s′, (s, α, s′) ∈ RaM ⇒ ∃j′, (j, α, j′) ∈ RaN , s′ v j′ ∀α ∈ Act.
 ∀j′, (j, α, j′) ∈ RcN ⇒ ∃s′, (s, α, s′) ∈ RcM , s′ v j′ ∀α ∈ Act.
It is worth noting the “back-and-forth” nature of this definition, similar to that of bisimula-
tion [Par81], from which this notion is developed.
Notation 1. Throughout this thesis, except where specifically stated otherwise, we shall use
the following conventions to draw transition systems. Set elements are represented by •. A full
arrow • //• denotes that the first state is related to the second by a must relation. If there
is more than one action, the type will be specified by a superscript. A partial arrow • //•
denotes that the first state is related to the second by a may relation
Example 3.3.8. We illustrate an example of refinement between two models in Fig. 3.2. To
make illustration easier, we have not included propositional atoms, and have used a single
action. The model on the right in the figure is a refinement of the model on the left, where the
initial state is taken to be the top-most.
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We can consider a two-valued model that is a refinement of some other model to be an “imple-
mentation” of that model. The two-valued model fully specifies how the more abstract model
behaves in this given instance.
Definition 3.3.9. Let M = (S,Ra, Rc, La, Lc) be a model. Then we say that M is two-valued
if Rc = Ra and Lc = La.
Definition 3.3.10. Let M = (S,Ra, Rc, La, Lc) be a model. We say that M is partial if it is
not two-valued.
Example 3.3.11. In Fig. 3.2 the model on the left is a transition system, the model on the
right is two-valued.
The notion of bisimulation is now replaced by that of refinement equivalence.
Definition 3.3.12. Let (M, s) and (N, j) be partial models, we say that (M, s) and (N, j) are
refinement equivalent if each is a refinement of the other, that is to say
(M, s)  (N, j)  (M, s)
If we identify two-valued models with Kripke structures with labeled transitions in the obvious
way, we see that refinement equivalence reduces to bisimulation on two-valued models. Let ∼
denote the greatest bisimulation, then we have, for two-valued models (M, s) and (N, j), the
following three statements are equivalent
(M, s)  (N, j)
(N, j)  (M, s)
(M, s) ∼ (N, j)
Definition 3.3.13. Let (M, s) be a transition system. Denote by I(M, s) the set of all two-
valued models that are refinements of (M, s). Elements of I(M, s) are called the implementa-
tions of (M, s).
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Figure 3.4: A transition system with an isolated must transition, but which has an implemen-
tation.
Note that for a two-valued model (M, s), I(M, s) denotes the set of models bisimilar to (M, s).
Example 3.3.14. In Fig. 3.2, the model on the right is an implementation of the model on the
left, and is not refinement equivalent to the one on the left.
It should be noted that not every transition system has a non-empty implementation set.
Example 3.3.15. Illustrated in Fig. 3.3 a simplest transition system with no implementations,
it consists of two states, with a must transition from the first to the second. The lack of may
transitions means that no transition is allowed, but the must transition also insists that there
is a transition. This contradiction ensures that there is no implementation. However, we could
have isolated must transitions and still have implementation, due to the coinductive nature of
refinement. See Fig. 3.4 as an example.
Definition 3.3.16. Let (M, s) be a pointed transition system. We say that (M, s) is consistent
if I(M, s) is non-empty, and inconsistent if I(M, s) is empty.
3.3.3 Subclasses of transition systems
We give here the main types of transition system described in the literature, and the restrictions
these types impose upon R and L. As the names given in the literature are not entirely
consistent with each other, we shall first create a nomenclature for use in this thesis, and then
relate these names to the ones used in the literature.
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Figure 3.5: An example of a Modal Strictly-Kripke Transition System. Implementations of this
model are those models where every path is infinite, and p is true on the initial state, and false
on its immediate successor.
Definition 3.3.17. We call a transition system
 Modal if Ra ⊆ Rs and La ⊆ Lc,
 Mixed if either Ra 6⊆ Rc or La 6⊆ Lc,
 Kripke if AP 6= ∅,
 Strictly-Kripke if Act = {∗} and Ra = Rc,
 Labeled if AP = ∅ or Act 6= {∗},
where {∗} represents a singleton set. This gives us eight different potential types of system,
with the most general being the Mixed Kripke Labeled Transition System.
Modal Strictly Kripke Transition Systems
Bruns and Godefroid [BG99] define three-valued Kripke structures, those structures where
there is a single action, with Ra and Rc, and where the valuations of the atomic propositions
satisfy La ⊆ Lc. We write p = 1 on a state s to indicate that (s, p) ∈ La, p = 12 to indicate
(s, p) ∈ Lc, 6∈ La and p = 0 to indicate that (s, p) 6∈ Lc.
Example 3.3.18. In Fig. 3.5 we give an example of a three-valued Kripke structure. This
example is such that implementations of this model are those models where every path is infinite,
and p is true on the initial state, and false on its immediate successor.
The motivation for this idea is to reduce the number of states required to describe the behaviour
of some system, by allowing atoms to be unspecified at states. The under-specification states
that both possibilities of the atom being either true or false are consistent with the model
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at the given state. This method allows some unimportant information to be abstracted away
whilst still retaining the temporal structure of the model. Bruns and Godefroid give a notion
of refinement and it is the same as our  when restricted to such models.
Extending Kleene’s semantics to Kripke structures Bruns and Godefroid gave in [BG00]
a version of Kleene’s strong semantics for three-valued Kripke structures. This is a three-valued
semantics.
Definition 3.3.19. Bruns and Godefroid’s expansion of Kleene’s strong semantics to three-
valued Kripke structures is given by
[(M, s) |= p] = L(s, p)
[(M, s) |= ¬φ] = ¬[(M, s) |= φ]
[(M, s) |= φ1 ∧ φ2] = min ([(M, s) |= φ1], [(M, s) |= φ2])
[(M, s) |= AXφ] = min ({[(M, s′) |= φ] : (s, s′) ∈ R})
where AX dentoes a universal modality. This [(M, s) |= φ] semantics is different from that
defined in Def. 3.4.6.
Modal Labeled Transition Systems & Mixed Labeled Transition Systems
Larsen and Thomson [LT88] define modal and mixed transition systems. These have no propo-
sitional atoms, but can have may types of action. In a Modal Labeled Transition System
Ra ⊆ Rc, but in a mixed transition system there is no such restriction. Again, Larsen and
Thomson give a notion of refinement that corresponds to our notion restricted to this type of
model.
Definition 3.3.20. Denote by MAP,Act12
the abstract model of a single state upon which all
atoms of AP have value 12 and which has a may transition to itself for every action in Act.
Write M12 when the set of atoms AP and actions Act is clear from context.
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It is easily seen that for a given set of atoms AP and set of actions Act, every model over that
signature is a refinement of MAP,Act12
.
It is important to note that Modal Transition Systems are consistent, that is to say every Modal
Transition System of one of these types has at least one implementation.
s
For Modal Transition Systems, we have that La ⊆ Lc, and as a shorthand we will sometimes
talk about a valuation function L : S × AP→ {1, 0, 12}. We define L by
(s, p) ∈ La ⇒ L(s, p) = 1
(s, p) ∈ Lc, (s, p) 6∈ La ⇒ L(s, p) = 12
(s, p) 6∈ Lc ⇒ L(s, p) = 0
Remember that La states something that must happen, hence the identification with true. Lc
specifies things which might happen, and so “might” in the absence of “must” is identified with
12. Finally, if something neither must be able to happen nor might happen, then it is identified
with false.
When considering systems of one of these particular subclasses, we restrict the refinement
relation to models in the subclass.
3.4 Semantics over models
There are a number of approaches, of varying expressive power, that one can take to define a
logic over the models we have defined. The logics defined in this thesis are all modified versions
of modal logic for the usual Kripke structures.
It is important here to note the two types of modality now present. A Kripke structure, in its
usual form, is something about which we may ask modal questions, such as “for all possible
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next worlds there exists a next world such that p”, or whatever. The modality is in the logic.
The structure itself is simply a directed graph with labels attached. With our models, we
have also placed modality into the structure itself, and created two simple modal judgements
of SAT and VAL on the implementation set. The implementation set enumerates the modal
possibilities that retain consistency. Our interest, in the end, is in implementations of these
modal structures, where the modality of the structure has been resolved. As we shall see later,
we can in fact move nearly all the semantic modality into syntactic modality of the structure.
As just stated, we consider here modal temporal logics, whose fundamental idea is that of the
successor operator. We shall consider two types of successor operator, which are dual to each
other. The first is the “there exists a successor such that”, the second “for all successors, it is
the case that”. Here successor is understood to refer to a particular action. Thus our specific
logic depends upon the signature of the model. However, the complexity of the various decision
problems does not depend upon the number of actions, or propositional atoms, a fact we shall
prove later.
We now define the three modal temporal logics with which we shall concern ourselves in this
thesis. We shall give a number of different possible semantics for these logics, but with the
property that these will always evaluate to the same result over two-valued models.
Definition 3.4.1. The syntax of the propositional modal mu-calculus MC [Koz83] is given by
φ ::= q | Z | φ ∧ φ | ¬φ | 〈α〉φ | µZ.φ (3.8)
where q ranges over the set of propositional atoms AP, α ranges over the set of actions Act, Z
ranges over a set of recursion variables Rec, µZ.φ is understood to bind occurrences of Z within
its body φ, and all free occurrences of Z in that body are under an even scope of negations.
We use ∨, → and ↔ as syntactic sugar in the usual fashion, and write [α] for ¬〈α〉¬.
Definition 3.4.2. We say that a formula φ is a sentence if it has no free variables.
Definition 3.4.3. We denote by PML, propositional modal logic, the fixed-point free syntactic
restriction ofMC, that is to say, those sentences generated by (3.8) when the Z and µZ.φ clauses
3.4. Semantics over models 57
[| q |]ρ = {s | (s, q) ∈ L}
[| 〈α〉φ |]ρ = {s | ∃s′ ∈ [| φ |]ρ, (s, α, s′) ∈ R}
[| Z |]ρ = ρ(Z)
[| φ ∧ ψ |]ρ = [| φ |]ρ ∩ [| ψ |]ρ
[| ¬φ |]ρ = S \ [| φ |]ρ
[| µZ.φ |]ρ = lfpFφ,ρ
Figure 3.6: The semantics of the modal µ-calculus over two-valued models (S,R, L), where
L = La = Lc, and R = Ra = Rc. Fφ,ρ : (S,⊆) → (S,⊆) is Fφ,ρ(X) = [| φ |]ρ[Z 7→X], and lfpF is
the least fixed point of a monotone function F on the complete lattice (S, ⊆ ).
have been removed.
Definition 3.4.4. We denote by PL, propositional logic, the syntactic restriction of MC to
only the clauses for propositional atoms, negation and conjunction.
Many common temporal logics can be mapped into the modal µ-calculus, including CTL [EMCP99],
LTL [Sti01], CTL∗ [Sti01], and PDL [FL79]. It should be noted that in the cases of LTL and
CTL∗ the equivalent modal µ-calculus sentences can be exponential in the size of the original
sentence [Sti01], for CTL, the mapping is trivial. Hence in this thesis we shall use only CTL
connectives as syntactic sugar as it is no more concise then the modal µ-calculus, but easier to
understand.
Definition 3.4.5. The usual semantics for the modal µ-calculus on two-valued models for
this logic is given in Fig. 3.6. Here ρ maps recursion variables to sets of states. We say that
(M, s) |= φ if there exists some ρ such that s ∈ [| φ |]ρ.
3.4.1 Supervaluation semantics
The supervaluation semantics removes the modality of Mixed Transition Systems, by exhaus-
tively searching through all possible implementations. It thus provides a natural way to extend
our semantics to Mixed Transition Systems, as we apply the two-valued semantics to every
member of the implementation.
We consider two natural extensions, that of an existential search, and a universal one. We
can ask, is there any implementation that satisfies our sentence; or, does every implementation
58 Chapter 3. Background and Related Work
satisfy the sentence. These two judgements are reflected in the single 3-valued supervaluation
semantics of Bruns and Godefroid [BG99] given by:
Definition 3.4.6. Let (M, s) be a pointed model, and φ a sentence of MC.
[(M, s) |= φ] =

1 if all implementations of (M, s) satisfy φ
0 if no implementations of (M, s) satisfy φ
12 otherwise
It is easy to show that this judgement can decide validity and satisfiability, as, given a signature
of atomic propositions and actions, there exists a model that refines every two-valued model
with that signature, hence checking these properties is at least as hard as the relevant SAT or
VAL question. Bruns and Godefroid [BG00] show how, starting with a Modal Strictly Kripke
Transition System, one can construct an alternating tree automaton that accepts exactly those
two-valued models that are implementations of the original model. Since a sentence of the
modal µ-calculus can also be expressed as an alternating tree automaton that accepts those
models that the sentence accepts [GTW02], we can perform an intersection non-emptiness test
of the two automata. Also another non-empty intersection test between the model representing
the implementations (seen as an automaton) and an automata representing the negation of the
sentence is needed to get our result.
This three-valued semantics makes sense within the context of refining an abstract model up
to the point where we can properly conclude that either all implementations, or no implemen-
tations satisfy a property. This follows from the fact that for two pointed models (M, s), (N, j)
we have that
(M, s)  (N, j) ⇒ [(M, s) |= φ] ≤I [(N, j) |= φ]
Whilst a sensible idea, this sort of process is not the focus of this thesis, we shall avoid re-
introducing a third-truth value, and define here two different supervaluational semantics that
together contain the same information. The two judgments SAT((M, s), φ) and VAL((M, s), φ)
were introduced in [KV96].
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Definition 3.4.7. Let SAT((M, s), φ) be a value in {0, 1} given by
SAT((M, s), φ) =
 1 if ∃(M
′, s′) ∈ I(M, s) and (M ′, s′) |= φ
0 otherwise
Similarly, let VAL((M, s), φ) be given by
VAL((M, s), φ)] =
 1 ∀(M
′, s′) ∈ I(M, s) we have that (M ′, s′) |= φ
0 otherwise
Whilst the supervaluational semantics solve the problem of the third truth value fully, this
comes at a price, in that they are computationally expensive to compute. This is in part
inevitable, as they can be used to compute whether a given sentence of the MC is satisfiable,
or valid. However, on a two-valued model, one containing full information, the question of
SAT((M, s), φ) is just that of the model check (M, s) |= φ, so clearly exponential time is not
necessarily required. To better understand the complexity of this type of question, we will need
the idea of approximative semantics.
3.4.2 Approximative semantics
For the supervaluation semantics, when φ ranges over the propositional modal mu-calculus, both
judgments are EXPTIME-complete in the size of φ and quadratic in the size of M [BG00]. This
is a high cost to pay. For this reason the compositional semantics, |=p and |=o, of [BG99], which
trades off the precision of these judgments with their computational complexity, was introduced.
The approximative semantics returns to the idea of compositional semantics, rather than su-
pervaluational, but in a different way to others considered in this thesis. The semantics are
defined in two, interrelated parts, an optimistic semantics, and a pessimistic semantics. The
idea, presented before on page 43, is that under the optimistic semantics, 12 is evaluated as
1, and under the pessimistic semantics, 12 is evaluated as 0. The interrelatedness comes via
negation. If we are evaluating ¬φ under the optimistic semantics, we define the result as the
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negation of evaluating φ under the pessimistic semantics.
The important result is the way these semantics approximate our supervaluational semantics.
Specifically, as we have already noted, we have that, for (M, s) a Mixed Transition System, and
φ ∈ PL, then
SAT((M, s), φ) ⇒ (M, s) |=o φ
and
(M, s) |=p φ⇒ VAL((M, s), φ)
The pessimistic approximation can be used to certify that all implementation satisfy a property.
However, a negative result does not necessarily mean that the VAL judgement will fail. These
implications remain true for the modal µ-calculus, with a suitable optimistic and pessimistic
semantics defined, given below.
For each model M = (S,Ra, Rc, La, Lc) and each formula φ ∈MC we define in Figure 3.7 a set
[| φ |]mρ (for m ∈ {o, p}) of those states in S that satisfy φ, where ρ maps each recursion variable
Z to a set of states, ρ(Z) ⊆ S.
For a sentence φ ∈MC we define
(M, s) |=m φ def= s ∈ [| φ |]mρ for some ρ (3.9)
The cost of computing [| φ |]mρ is, up to a constant, essentially that of computing the standard
satisfaction relation on Kripke structures [BG00], which is in turn equivalent to determining the
winning positions for a given player in a parity game [GTW02]. The computational complexity
of this is known to be at most slightly higher that P, and lies in UP ∩ co-UP [Jur98], where UP
denotes the slightly strange class of non-deterministic Turing machines that halt in polynomial
time, with at most one computation path accepting. Parity game related problems are one of
only a few known natural members of UP.
An important property of these pessimistic and optimistic semantics is that the characterise
refinement [HJS04]. We have that the following conditions are equivalent
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[| q |]oρ = {s | (s, q) ∈ Lc} [| q |]pρ = {s | (s, q) ∈ La}
[| 〈α〉φ |]oρ = {s | ∃s′ ∈ [| φ |]oρ, (s, α, s′) ∈ Rc} [| 〈α〉φ |]pρ = {s | ∃s′ ∈ [| φ |]pρ, (s, α, s′) ∈ Ra}
[| Z |]oρ = ρ(Z) [| Z |]pρ = ρ(Z)
[| φ ∧ ψ |]oρ = [| φ |]oρ ∩ [| ψ |]oρ [| φ ∧ ψ |]pρ = [| φ |]pρ ∩ [| ψ |]pρ
[| ¬φ |]oρ = S \ [| φ |]pρ [| ¬φ |]pρ = S \ [| φ |]oρ
[| µZ.φ |]oρ = lfpF oφ,ρ [| µZ.φ |]pρ = lfpF pφ,ρ
Figure 3.7: Compositional approximative semantics of the propositional modal µ-calculus for-
mulae φ over a Mixed Transition System M = (S,Ra, Rc, La, Lc), Fmφ,ρ : (S,⊆) → (S,⊆) is
Fmφ,ρ(X) = [| φ |]mρ[Z 7→X] for m ∈ {o, p}, and lfpF is the least fixed point of a monotone function
F on the complete lattice (S,⊆).
 (M, s)  (N, t),
 (N, j) |=o φ⇒ (M, s) |=o φ for all φ in PML,
 (M, s) |=p φ⇒ (N, j) |=p φ for all φ in PML
3.5 Semantic minimization
In Blamey’s thesis, [Bla80], it is shown that a sentence of propositional logic can be transformed
into one whose evaluation by the optimistic semantics is equivalent to the result of the super-
valuation satisfiability semantics of the original semantics. That is to say, given a φ ∈ PL, we
can find a φo ∈ PL such that for all (M, s)
(M, s) |=o φo ⇐⇒ SAT((M, s), φ)
Given a φ, the resulting φo is called the semantic minimization of φ. Whilst the |=o semantics
over-approximates in general, for the sentence φo we have that it is exact. The semantic
minimization φo will be, in general, exponentially longer that φ.
We quickly give a demonstration as to how this sort of process is possible. Given a sentence
φ ∈ PL, over atomic propositions AP, we enumerate every possible valuation of AP, and check
if φ is satisfied by this valuation. Let V = {M | M |= φ} denote this set. If the sentence is
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and we claim that φo has the required properties.
Firstly we see that if M |=o φo, then there must exist a two-valued implementation M ′ with
M ′ |= φo. By the usual rules of deduction, we may conclude that one of the conjunctions
of φo is true. But this then implies that M ′ is one of the valuations that satisfies φ, and so
SAT((M, s), φ) holds. In the other direction, assume that SAT ((M, s), φ) holds, let M ′ be one
of the implementations of M which satisfies φ. Then M ′ corresponds to one of the conjunctions
in φo. It remains to show that then this conjunction is optimistically accepted by M , and this
is clearly the case.
Note that each conjunction of the φo thus generated is contradiction free, there never occurs a
conjunction of p ∧ ¬p. It is this lack of contradiction that gives us the required property.
From [GH05], which extends the idea presented above to alternating tree automata, we have
the following important result
Theorem 3.5.1. For each of the logics L ∈ {PL, PML, MC}, for every sentence φ ∈ L,
there exists sentences φp ∈ L and φo ∈ L such that for all pointed models (M, s) we have
SAT((M, s), φ) ⇐⇒ (M, s) |=o φo
and
(M, s) |=p φp ⇐⇒ VAL((M, s), φ)
The idea of semantic minimization can be extended to temporal logics. Note that the theorem
states that the logics PL, PML and MC are closed under semantic minimization, given a φ
we can find a φo in the same logic with the desired property. Thus, for any logic that can be
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expressed in terms of one of these logics we can also find a semantic minimization, but not
necessarily in the same logic. For example, in [GH05] it is proved that the logic CTL is not
closed under semantic minimization.
Since |=o and |=p equal |= over two-valued models, we infer that φ, φo and φp must be seman-
tically equivalent over two-valued models. Thus, in a two-valued sense they express the same
property, though they differ on partial models.
This surprising result shows that the supervaluational semantics can be mimicked by the ap-
proximate semantics, without reference to the model being considered.
Definition 3.5.2. We call φo the optimistic semantic minimization of φ, and φp the pessimistic
semantic minimization of φ.
In general, these minimizations required exponential time to compute, and thus, this does not
provide any short-cut. However, in practice, as we shall see, semantic minimizations do provide
a very useful way for reasoning about Mixed Transition Systems.
In this thesis we concern ourselves with those sentences φ ∈ MC which have the property
that at least one of the implications in Theorem 3.5.1 is in fact an ‘if-and-only-if’ for every
pointed model, that is to say, at least one of the approximations is in fact exact, we can obtain
the usually expensive result much more cheaply. This leads to the concept of semantic self-
minimization [Bla80, vF66, RLS02, GH05]. The semantic complexity which would make the
approximative semantics not exact, does not exist in the sentence considered. The initially
somewhat surprising fact is that at the cost of syntactic complexity, one can in fact fully
minimize the semantic complexity, one is always able to find a sentence equivalent over two-
valued models that has the nice, exact properties. That this is possible can be clearly seen from
automata-theoretic methods.
Definition 3.5.3. [GH05] A sentence φ ∈MC is
1. Pessimistically semantically self-minimizing iff for all pointed models (M, s) we have
(M, s) |=p φ ⇐⇒ VAL((M, s), φ)
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2. Optimistically semantically self-minimizing iff for all pointed models (M, s) we have
(M, s) |=o φ ⇐⇒ SAT((M, s), φ)
3. Semantically self-minimizing iff it is optimistically and pessimistically self-minimizing.
Given these three concepts, we write PSM, OSM, and PSM ∩ OSM for the sets of sentences of
MC that satisfy the respective concept in items (1), (2), and (3).
Example 3.5.4.  The formula q ∨¬q is optimistically self-minimizing but not pessimisti-
cally so – consider the case when L(s, q) = 12.
 The pattern “Precedence Chain: 2 stimuli, 1 response; Globally q and s precede r” as
documented at [pat], written in MC (using CTL operators as syntactic sugar) as
¬E[¬qU r] ∧ E[¬rU (q ∧ ¬r ∧ EX (E[¬sU (r ∧ ¬s)]))]
is pessimistically self-minimizing [AH06].
 The pattern “Absence of q, Before r”, written in MC as
φ = A[¬q ∨ AG(¬r)W r]
is not pessimistically self-minimizing but
φp = A[¬q ∨ AX (AG(¬r)W r]
is, and is logically equivalent to φ over Kripke structures [AH06]. We will study semantic
minimizations of such patterns in detail in Chapter 5.
3.6 Other many-valued logics
Whilst these logics are not used in this thesis, they form possibly relevant background.
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3.6.1 Dunn and Belnap’s logic
In [Bel75], Dunn and Belnap describe a system of 4-valued logic that can be thought of as
extending Kleene’s strong semantics of 3-valued logic, or as an extension of Kripke’s ideas
where the sets of true and false atomic propositions are no longer required to be disjoint.
The four truth values may be considered to be ∅, {>}, {⊥}, {⊥,>}, the interpretation of a
given truth value is given in Table 3.6. This logic was intended as a framework for database
queries, or for artificial intelligence work, where the system in question may know something to
be true, false, may have no information either way, or may have accumulated in some manner
conflicting information about the matter. Thus the values are not possible values of a semantics
of evaluation, but of reporting an evaluation, or evaluations that have been given, and then
using the logic we can reason about combinations of such propositions.
∅ The evaluator has no information about the proposition,
e.g. “The wine in that unopened bottle is corked.”
{⊥} The evaluator has information contradicting the proposition,
e.g. “Wine is a good breakfast beverage.”
{>} The evaluator has information confirming the proposition,
e.g. “Wine is tasty.”
{⊥,>} There is conflicting information about the proposition, e.g.
“Wine is good for you.”
Table 3.6: Interpretation of truth values for Dunn/Belnap’s 4-valued logic
An interesting feature of this logic is its making explicit of a second order present, but not
articulated, in Kripke’s system of revision. If we have two partial valuations that differ only
by the fact that p is true in one and false in the other, then these are incomparable under his
revision order. However, it seems a natural supposition that the one where p is true is ‘more
true’ than the one where p is false. In Dunn and Belnap’s four values of truth this is expressed
as one of two partial orders, an information order ≤I and a truth order ≤T which are illustrated
in Table 3.7, in which A is connected by an arrow → to B if and only if A ≤ B for that order.
Both of these orders induce a lattice structure upon the set of four truth values, and this double
structure can be combined to form an interlaced, distributive bilattice [Gin88].
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Table 3.7: Hasse diagrams for the two partial orderings upon Dunn and Belnap’s four truth
values. Left, truth ordering; right, information ordering.
3.6.2 Fitting
The bilattice structure of truth and information partial orderings allows sophisticated reasoning
about self-referential logics, extending Kripke’s ideas about fixed points. Much work on this
has been carried out by Fitting, and he gives an overview in [Fit02]. This thesis is not greatly
concerned with giving a semantics to self-referential logics, but the four-valued bilattice above is
of practical value in temporal reasoning [YS01] and it is for this reason this is mentioned here.
Work on self-referential logics is not without practical application itself though. In [RW05]
an infinitary valued logic of infinitesimal truth degrees is proposed for reasoning about logic
programs under the negation-as-failure paradigm. Logic programs are a useful way to represent
known interrelated information, and to then reason about it. If negation is not present, then
reasoning is straightforward, a series of implications can be followed through in a straightforward
manner. When the idea of negation is introduced, problems about reasoning can arise. One
common paradigm is that of negation-as-failure, that is to say that a negated query∼ φ succeeds
if the query φ fails finitely. In this system it is not possible to be directly self-referential, or to
quantify over sentences in such a way as to get the paradoxes of before, but the consequences of
such a sentence can be represented, and to reason about such complications the infinitary-valued
logic is introduced.
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A logic program may be written in the following form
p →
r → ∼ p
s → ∼ q
The argument can now be made that in some sense p is “more true” than s, as that p is true is
directly asserted, whereas the truth of s is only indirectly inferred from the fact that the truth
of q is not asserted. This is represented by giving a truth value of T1 to s, which is just below
the “real” truth value T = T0. A symmetric lesser truth value of F1 is created “just above” that
of F = F0.
Definition 3.6.1. Thus the negation operator ∼ is defined as
∼ Fi = Ti+1
∼ Ti = Fi+1
for all natural i. An extra truth value of 0 is introduced with ∼ 0 = 0.
Under this framework, the consequences of the self-denying sentence can now be represented as
s→ ∼ s, ∼ s→ s
which is to be read as, ‘s’ if ‘not s’, and ‘not s’ if ‘s’. These two statements cause a contradiction.
However, whatever truth value we choose for s, if we iterate infinitely the process of evaluating
the sentence, then the truth value of s converges to 0. The information for s being true is
equally balanced with the information for s being false. Hence the choice of a middle value to
represent the truth of this sentence seems to make some sense. However, this logic does more
complicated things in that it guarantees that it gives a canonical minimal model in some sense
[RW05].
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3.6.3 Personal thoughts
I am personally suspicious of introducing extra logic values, and this is reflected in this chapter,
although as this is the traditional way of constructing this type of structure, it is retained here.
However, in the transition systems that we define, three-valued-ness has been eliminated, in
favour of a modal structure, one that describes what must, and may happen. There is a clear
translation of this to three-valued logic in the case that what must happen is a subset of what
may happen, but it may also be of interest to consider models where this does not necessarily
hold. This is done in [Fit02] by use of four truth values, using Belnap’s system, but in this case
I am even less sure of the philosophical justification. The important point is that essentially
equivalent structures can be described in a number of different ways. The approach chosen here
was chosen not only to avoid three values, but to unite a number of slightly different types of
model (Modal Strictly Kripke Transition System, modal transition, etc)˙ and provide a cleaner
semantics. In fact, in Chapter 4 we shall return briefly to a three-valued structure for ease, but
remembering that this represents a special case, and is used as a syntactic sugar.
To my mind, Kripke structures solve the idea of representing modalities better than extra
truth values. It seems to me that introducing a number of judgements makes more sense than
trying to make a multi-valued one, a judgement that evaluates possibility, and a judgement
that evaluates certainty. The problem is a tendency to reuse the same three values within the
structure and also for the judgement, but these are different concepts.
Judgement assigns truth. True and False are natural and proper truth values, but meanings
proposed for a third value often seem not. Kleene’s strong semantics provide the sensible path
here.
One other use of three-valued logic, relates to the provability of a sentence relative to an axiom
system. There are three possibilities, it is true, there is a proof within the axiom system, it is
false, there is a proof of the contrapositive, or there is no proof of either, that is to say, the
statement is independent of the axiom system. This seems a natural and correct use of three




In this chapter we looked at a number of compositional and non-compositional semantics for
three-valued logic. We noted that the compositional semantics are interrelated, by an informa-
tion partial order.
 We described transition systems, an extension of Kripke systems with labeled transitions,
which provide modal information of must and may. We also described subclasses of these
models which correspond to similar approaches in the literature.
 We described a partial order on these model. This order is called refinement, and intu-
itively it represents an increase in consistent information. This partial order generalises
the information partial order to transition systems. If a model (N, j) refines a model
(M, s) then we consider (N, j) to contain more information about the system it describes
than (M, s), whilst still being consistent with (M, s).
 We have seen how models corresponding to the usual labeled transition systems fit into
refinement. Upon consistent models, the maximal elements of the refinement partial order
can be considered as labeled transition systems, as must and may transitions coincide.
We call these models implementations. These implementations correspond directly to the
usual, two-valued, notion of model. Hence, we may see a transition system as abstraction
of those two-valued models that correspond to models in the implementation set. Mixed
Transition systems, which are not necessarily consistent, can also have implementations in
the sense of models corresponding to a two-valued model, but these are not now maximal
elements in relation to refinement.
 With the idea of implementations of an abstract model, we looked at both compositional,
supervaluational, and approximative semantics over these structures. In this thesis we
consider the supervaluational semantics to be the “proper” interpretation of truth over
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these models, and consider the approximative semantics due to the high complexity of
supervaluational evaluation.
 Applying supervaluational exactness to compositional semantics, we have looked at the
idea of semantic minimization, where a sentence is transformed to a second that is equiv-
alent over two-valued models, but for which the approximative and supervaluational se-
mantics coincide. The sentence is in some sense transformed from being a property, to
simply describing a set of transition systems. We have seen that whilst this transfor-
mation is at worst exponential, it is possible for a sentence that corresponds to a useful
property to in fact be equal to its own semantic minimization. These sentences are called
semantically self-minimizing.
Chapter 4
The Computational Complexity of
Self-Minimization
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter introduced the idea of semantic minimization of sentences of a given logic.
We shall now look at the computational complexity of a number of decision problems relating
to self-minimizing sentences. The main questions are those of deciding whether a sentence lies
in OSM, PSM, or both, SSM. We shall find it useful later to divide these categories a little
further.
We are not able to report any progress for PML and MC on the upper bound, but we shall
give some lower bounds for these decision problems.
We begin by noting a couple of simple properties. We write VAL for the valid sentences of MC
and, dually, UNSAT for the unsatisfiable sentences of MC. The set MC is partitioned into VAL,
UNSAT, and MC − (VAL ∪ UNSAT). If we refine this partition with the sets PSM and OSM
under union, intersection, and complement we arrive at six equivalence classes, see Fig. 4.1.
Throughout, it will be clear from the context whether these sets are meant to be subsets of
MC, PML or PL, or whether statements apply to all three sets.
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Proposition 4.1.1. VAL is contained in OSM and disjoint from PSM. Dually, UNSAT is
contained in PSM and disjoint from OSM.
Proof. To see that VAL ⊆ OSM, let φ be valid and (M, s) some pointed Modal Transition
System. If (M, s) |=o φ, then let (N, j) be some implementation of (M, s). As φ is valid, we
must have that (N, j) |= φ is true, thus the condition for φ being optimistically self-minimizing
is satisfied.
The dual statement, that UNSAT is contained in PSM, is proved in the dual fashion.
Now consider the Modal Transition System M12 = ({s0}, Rc, {}, Lc, {}) where Rc = {(s0, α, s0)}
for all α ∈ Act, and Lc = {(s0, q)} for all q ∈ AP. Then every pointed Modal Transition System
(over AP and Act) is a refinement of (M12, s12). One shows that for all sentences φ ∈ MC we
have
(M12, s12) |=o φ and (M12, s12) 6|=p φ (4.1)
The first statement in (4.1) gives us that UNSAT and OSM are disjoint, and the second statement
implies that VAL is disjoint from PSM.
4.2 Induced partition of temporal logics
Given the interrelation between VAL, OSM, UNSAT, and PSM, then it is a simple combinatorial
truth that any repeated application of complementation, intersection, union, to these four sets
will result in a set that is the union of a number of a set of six, pairwise disjoint sets. Note
this holds whether we consider PL,PML or MC. We now list these sets that so partition
the space, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, and give a sentence of PL which lies in each, to show
non-emptiness for all three logics, as all contain PL:
I VAL
II UNSAT
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Figure 4.1: A partition of MC, PML, and PL into six equivalence classes, generated by
Boolean combinations of VAL and PSM.
III OSM \ (VAL ∪ PSM)
IV PSM \ (UNSAT ∪ OSM)
V L \ (PSM ∪ OSM)
VI PSM ∩ OSM
 q ∨ ¬q ∈ VAL
 q ∧ ¬q ∈ UNSAT
 (q ∨ ¬q) ∧ r ∈ OSM \ (VAL ∪ PSM)
 (q ∧ ¬q) ∨ r ∈ PSM \ (UNSAT ∪ OSM)
 [q ∧ (r ∨ ¬r)] ∨ [¬q ∧ (r ∧ ¬r)] ∈ PL \ (PSM ∪ OSM)
 q ∈ PSM ∩ OSM
We note that negation permutes these partitions.
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Lemma 4.2.1. Negation φ 7→ ¬φ maps the following pairs of sets into each other: OSM and
PSM, I and II, III and IV, V and itself, and VI and itself.
Proof. (Sketch) A sentence is in VAL iff its negation is in UNSAT, and it is in OSM iff its
negation is in PSM. Therefore a sentence is in set I iff its negation is in set II, and it is in
OSM \ (VAL ∪ PSM) iff its negation is in PSM \ (UNSAT ∪ OSM). This shows the claim for I
and II, and for III and IV. Sets V and VI are closed under negation, since φ 7→ ¬φ maps set
OSM into PSM, and vice versa.
4.3 Lower bounds
We now look at the complexity of deciding membership of each of these six sets.
4.3.1 Set I & Set II
Deciding membership of sets I and II has, of course, the same complexity as that of the
validity of the underlying logic – EXPTIME-complete for MC [Koz83], PSPACE-complete for
PML [Lad77], and coNP-complete for PL [Coo71].
4.3.2 Set OSM.
By Lemma 4.2.1 we have φ ∈ OSM⇔ ¬φ ∈ PSM. Thus the complexity of deciding OSM is the
same as that of deciding PSM. But deciding OSM is at least as hard as deciding validity of the
underlying logic. This can be seen by considering the function
E(φ) = φ ∨ (x ∧ ¬x) (4.2)
where x is a new propositional atom in AP, and so not contained in φ. If φ is valid, then so is
E(φ), and this implies that E(φ) is in OSM. If φ is not valid, then there is a two-valued model
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(K, t) in which φ is false. We extend the labelling function L of K so that (s, x) ∈ Lc and
(s, x) 6∈ La for all states s of K – making K into a partial model. Then (K, t) |=o E(φ) follows
for this extended K but there is no refinement of (K, t) that satisfies E(φ) as this formula is
semantically equivalent to φ over Kripke structures. Thus, φ is valid iff E(φ) is in OSM and so
we can reduce validity checks to checks of membership of OSM.
To summarize, deciding OSM is EXPTIME-hard, PSPACE-hard, and coNP-hard for MC,
PML, and PL respectively.
4.4 Upper bounds
We now set out the upper bounds for these three logics. All these upper bounds are generated
from an upper bound for deciding membership of OSM. For MC and PML our method is
unsatisfactory, but for PL it is, roughly optimal.
4.4.1 The logic MC.
We can decide in 2EXPTIME whether a sentence φ ∈MC is in OSM. This is implicit in [GH05],
where from φ two alternating tree automata are constructed – with exponential blowup in each
worst case – and membership of φ in OSM is then being reduced to a language inclusion check
for these automata, again, in EXPTIME but now in the size of these automata.
4.4.2 The logic PML
Consider a sentence φ ∈ PML. As just said for MC, in [GH05], two tree automata A3φ and
A3|=oφ were constructed such that φ is optimistically self-minimizing iff L(A3|=o) ⊆ L(A3φ). Since
PML ⊆ MC, such a language inclusion check is in EXPTIME in the size of these automata.
However, since both automata cannot distinguish trees at depths greater than the size of φ,
reflecting the shallow model property of PML, such a language inclusion check can be performed
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already in PSPACE. Since the underlying automata has size at most exponential in the size of
φ we conclude that the language inclusion check can be done in EXPSPACE in the size of φ.
However, if a sentence is not in OSM, then there must be a witness, a model which is opti-
mistically accepted, but none of whose implementations are. This model will be shallow, thus
it does seem possible that there might be a PSPACE algorithm for deciding OSM for the logic
PML.
4.4.3 The logic PL.
We now show that, for PL, deciding membership of OSM is in coNP, and so the above hardness
result is indeed exact. Let AP(φ) be the set of atomic propositions that occur in φ. The
evaluation of (M, s) |=o φ for φ ∈ PL depends only on the valuation of the atoms on the initial
state. Therefore, in this case we can think of the pointed model (M, s) simply as a function
M from atomic propositions to values in {0, 12, 1} and so we will write M(q) etc. below with
that interpretation. We write M [q 7→ v] for the model that is as M , except that it maps q to
value v ∈ {0, 1}. We will also use that M |=o φ will only depend on the behaviour of M on set
AP(φ).
If there are k > 0 atomic propositions in φ ∈ PL, we have just seen that we can decide semantic
self-minimization of φ by inspecting, for 3k models, whether the compositional model-checking
algorithm loses any precision. This observation leads to a non-deterministic algorithm, depicted
in Figure 4.2, for showing that PL \ OSM is in NP, and so OSM is in coNP.
Proposition 4.4.1. The NP algorithm in Figure 4.2 correctly decides membership of PL\OSM.
Proof. The proof relies on two points.
 A single state model can be written in polynomial space, and therefore guessed in NP.
 Given a single state model (M, s) we can find two models, (M1, s1) and (M2, s2) such that
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boolean NotInOSM(φ) {
**choose** model M such that M(x) = 12 for some x in AP(φ);
if (M |=o φ) {
for (all x in AP(φ) with M(x) = 12) {







Figure 4.2: NP algorithm that decides membership of PL\OSM. If at least one choice of model
leads to ACCEPT, the algorithm returns true; otherwise it returns false.
for all (N, t)
(M, s)  (N, t) ⇒ (M1, s1)  (N, t) or (M2, s2)  (N, t)
We get the two models in the second item by choosing one of the atoms in (M, s) which has
value 12, and setting it to true in (M1, s1), and false in (M2, s2), keeping other valuations the
same. We can think of single state models as thus having a “minimal refinement”, the smallest
refining step is that of changing a single 12-valued atom.
 Let φ ∈ PL be such that the algorithm accepts it. Then there is some model M and
some x ∈ AP(φ) such that
– M(x) = 12,
– M |=o φ, and
– M [x 7→ v] 6|=o φ for all v ∈ {0, 1}.
The last item along with the fact that if there is a satisfying implementation of (M, s),
then we must have that (M, s) |=o φ is true, implies that SAT (M [x 7→ v], φ) is false for
both v = 0, 1. Then it must also be that SAT (M,φ) is false. But then the second item
implies that φ is not in OSM.
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 Conversely, let φ 6∈ OSM. For this to be true there must be a model M such that
M |=o φ holds and SAT (M,φ) does not hold (4.3)
This can only be if there is some x ∈ AP(φ) with M(x) = 12. Let M be a model
satisfying (4.3) but where the set
{x ∈ AP(φ) |M(x) = 12}
is minimal amongst all models satisfying (4.3). Since there is some x with M(x) = 12,
the algorithm will encounter the first if-statement and its guard will be true. Therefore,
its for-statement will be executed and, for the first (indeed all) x it executes we can now
reason that the algorithm will accept.
Since SAT (M,φ) is false, we know that SAT (M [x 7→ v], φ) is false for all v ∈ {0, 1}. By
the minimality of model M with respect to (4.3), we infer that M [x 7→ v] |=o φ has to be
false for v = 0 and for v = 1. Thus the algorithm reaches ACCEPT.
4.4.4 Set III.
Deciding set III is at least as hard as deciding OSM, and therefore at least as hard as deciding
validity of the underlying logic. To see this, consider the function
F (φ) = (φ ∨ x) ∧ (y ∧ (z ∨ ¬z)) (4.4)
where x, y, and z are new elements of AP and so not contained in φ. The reduction is shown
through the composition F ◦ E if
F (φ) ∈ III ⇔ φ ∈ OSM (4.5)
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holds. We show (4.5):
 For no φ is F (φ) in PSM: consider a pointed model (M, s) with L(s, x) = L(s, y) = 1
and L(s, z) = 12. Then (M, s) 6|=p F (φ) holds but all pointed Kripke structures that refine
(M, s) satisfy φ.
 For no φ is F (φ) in VAL since there are, e.g., pointed models (M, s) for which L(s, y) = 0.
So F (φ) is in set III iff F (φ) is in OSM \ VAL iff F (φ) is in OSM. Thus it suffices to show
F (φ) ∈ OSM ⇔ φ ∈ OSM. In doing so, we appeal to the fact that φ, ψ ∈ OSM imply that
φ∧ ψ ∈ OSM whenever φ and ψ share no atomic propositions (see Section 5.3), and that OSM
is closed under disjunctions [GH05].
 Let φ ∈ OSM. Since y and z ∨ ¬z ∈ OSM we get y ∧ (z ∨ ¬z) ∈ OSM as both conjuncts
share no atomic propositions [GH05]. Since φ, x ∈ OSM, their disjunction φ∨x is in OSM
as well. Since φ ∧ x and y ∧ (z ∨ ¬z) share no atomic proposition and both are in OSM,
we get F (φ) ∈ OSM.
 Let φ 6∈ OSM. Then there is a pointed model (M, s) such that (M, s) |=o φ and
SAT((M, s), φ) is false. Extend the labelling function LM of (M, s) such that LM(s, y) =
LM(s, z) = 1 and LM(s, x) = 0. Then (M, s) |=o F (φ) holds for this extension but
SAT((M, s), F (φ)) is false, since SAT((M, s), φ) is false and all pointed Kripke structures
(K, t) that refine the extended (M, s) must satisfy LK(t, x) = 0 and LK(t, y) = 1. So
F (φ) 6∈ OSM.
Combining (4.5) with the reduction of OSM to validity checks, we infer that deciding set III is
EXPTIME-hard, PSPACE-hard, and coNP-hard for MC, PML and PL (respectively).
MC. We can decide PSM and OSM in 2EXPTIME, and decide VAL in EXPTIME. So we can
decide set III in 2EXPTIME.
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PML. We already have seen that OSM can be decided in EXPSPACE, so this applies to PSM
as well. Since VAL can be decided in PSPACE we can decide set III also in EXPSPACE.
PL. We have shown that OSM is in coNP. By Lemma 4.2.1 this implies that PSM is in
coNP as well. Since VAL is in coNP, the language PL \ (VAL ∪ PSM) is in NP. Set III equals
OSM ∩ (PL \ (VAL ∪ PSM)) and so is in DP [PY84] as the intersection of a language in coNP
with one in NP. We are presently unable to show DP-hardness of set III, despite having made
a considerable effort to that end.
4.4.5 Set V.
Sentences in set V lose precision in both the pessimistic and in the optimistic compositional
semantics. Since unsatisfiable sentences are in PSM, sentences in set V must be satisfiable.
Dually, sentences in V can not be valid, as in that case they would be in OSM, every sentence
in V thus has at least one valuation for which it is true, and for which it is false. Deciding
membership of set V is also at least as hard as the satisfiability check of the relevant logic. To
see this, consider
G(φ) = (φ ∧ (x ∨ ¬x) ∧ y) ∨ (z ∧ ¬z) (4.6)
where x, y and z are in AP and again not appearing in φ.
 For no φ is G(φ) in OSM. To see this, consider a pointed model (M, s) with LM(s, z) = 12
and LM(s, y) = 0. Then (M, s) |=o G(φ) holds but no pointed Kripke structure that
refines (M, s) satisfies φ. Thus G(φ) is in set V iff G(φ) is not in PSM.
 Now if φ is unsatisfiable, then G(φ) is also unsatisfiable, so G(φ) will be in PSM. Con-
versely, if φ is satisfiable (on some pointed Kripke structure (K, t)) we claim that G(φ)
is not in PSM. To see this we make K into a partial Kripke structure by extending its
labelling function L with L(t, x) = L(t, y) = 1 and L(t, z) = 12. Then all pointed Kripke
structures that refine this expanded (K, t) satisfy φ, yet (K, t) 6|=p G(φ).
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The combination of these two items shows
φ satisfiable ⇐⇒ G(φ) ∈ V (4.7)
To summarize, deciding set V is EXPTIME-hard, PSPACE-hard, and NP-hard for MC, PML,
and PL (respectively).
MC. It is easily seen that deciding set V is in 2EXPTIME as that complexity class is closed
under finite unions and complements.
PML. We can decide membership of set V by two checks, one for OSM and one for PSM –
both were shown to be in EXPSPACE. We therefore conclude that set V can be decided in
EXPSPACE as well.
PL. Since OSM and PSM are in coNP so is their union. But then set V is in NP as the
complement of a language in coNP. Since we already showed that set V is NP-hard, we get
that set V is NP-complete.
4.4.6 Set VI.
Sentences in VI are well behaved in that they lose precision neither for the pessimistic nor the
optimistic compositional semantics. So satisfiability and validity checks for all partial state
spaces are reducible to a single, simple verification for such sentences. The exact complexity of
deciding this set remains frustratingly unknown. Of course, deciding set VI is no harder than
deciding two instances of OSM:
(φ ∈ PSM ∩ OSM) ⇔ (φ ∈ OSM and ¬φ ∈ OSM)
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So deciding set VI is no harder than deciding validity of the respective logic. Alas, we are
unable to produce any hardness results for this class for any of the logics considered.
MC. Since OSM and PSM are in 2EXPTIME and the latter is closed under finite intersections,
set VI is in 2EXPTIME.
PML. We argue as for set V to see that deciding set VI is in EXPSPACE.
PL. Since OSM and PSM are in coNP and coNP is closed under finite intersections, set VI
is in coNP.
We summarize these results as follows
Theorem 4.4.2. The lower and upper bounds for the decision problems in Fig. 4.3 are all
correct.
4.5 Experimental data
With the decision problems and their lower bounds at hand, experimental data are probably
not obtainable with ease. Still, we wanted to get a feel for how many formulae of a given
size are in OSM and in the sets V and VI. We used Perl scripts to randomly generate “all”
formulae of PL in sizes ranging from 1 to 5 where “size” is the number of occurrences of logical
connectives in the formula. These scripts then performed a brute-force check for membership
of sets of interest. This showed that about 75% of those formulae are in OSM and about the
same percentage are in PSM, whereas about 50% of formulae were in PSM ∩ OSM. Of the
formulae generated, only about 2.45% were in the NP-complete set PL \ (PSM ∪ OSM). Our
results indicate that less formulae are in the latter set as the number of occurrences of logical
operators in these formulae increases.
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Number of operators
1 2 3 4 5
SSM 4 48 982 34154 1529388
OSM 5 68 1471 48867 2058138
total 6 88 1960 62736 2597832
Table 4.1: Experimental data on the distribution of sem. self. min. formulae
4.6 Summary
In this chapter we have looked at a number of different decision problems arising from the
concept of semantic minimization. We have seen that deciding if a sentence is optimistically
self-minimizing is at least as difficult as the satisfiability problem of the logic considered.
The complexity results proven in this chapter are summarized in Figure 4.3, where we list
the six classes of sentences discussed, along with the larger classes of OSM and PSM . There
are considerable gaps for most of these results between the upper and lower bounds. For one
problem, that of whether a sentence is both optimistically and pessimistically semantically self
minimizing, that is belonging to PSM ∩ OSM, we have not been able to give any lower bound
at all.
We conjecture that deciding membership of PSM and OSM for propositional modal logic is
in fact in PSPACE, due to the witness being shallow. Finding a suitable notion of “minimal-
refinement” for many state models should also give this result.
The exponential gap in the complexity results for determining optimistic or pessimistic self-
minimization suggests that the current approach misses something large. I conjecture that this
result should be the same as validity for all the logics concerned, as it is for PL.
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Results for MC:
2EXPTIME, EXPTIME-hard EXPTIME-complete 2EXPTIME
OSM VAL PSM ∩ OSM
PSM UNSAT
OSM \ (VAL ∪ PSM)
PSM \ (UNSAT ∪ OSM)
MC \ (PSM ∪ OSM)
Results for PML:
EXPSPACE, PSPACE-hard PSPACE-complete EXPSPACE
OSM VAL PSM ∩ OSM
PSM UNSAT
OSM \ (VAL ∪ PSM)
PSM \ (UNSAT ∪ OSM)
PML \ (PSM ∪ OSM)
Results for PL:
DP, coNP-hard NP-complete coNP-complete coNP
OSM \ (VAL ∪ PSM) PL \ (PSM ∪ OSM) VAL PSM ∩ OSM
PSM \ (UNSAT ∪ OSM) UNSAT
OSM
PSM
Figure 4.3: Complexity results for PSM, OSM, and for the partition induced by VAL and PSM;




In this chapter we shall consider Modal Strictly-Kripke Transition System, that is to say struc-
tures over a single, two-valued transition, Ra = Rc, with consistent labelings La ⊆ Lc. The
reason for not considering models where Rc is not equal to Ra, is that in that case even simple
sentences like AXp∧EXq are then not semantically self-minimizing, and nearly every commonly
used sentence needs to be made exponentially long to be semantically self-minimizing. Restrict-
ing ourselves to the case where Ra = Rc gives a large class of commonly used sentences that
are already pessimistically semantically self-minimizing.
As Ra = Rc, we shall, in this chapter, refer to a single transition function R.
Since we are assuming that La ⊆ Lc, we can use the following shorthand:
At every state s

p = 1 ⇒ (s, p) ∈ La
p = 0 ⇒ (s, p) 6∈ Lc
p = 12 ⇒ (s, p) ∈ Lc, 6∈ La
The previous chapter illustrated that deciding if a sentence is in OSM has high complexity. This
motivates the idea explored in this chapter, which is that of under-approximating a decision
85
86 Chapter 5. Generating self-minimizing formulae
procedure, of giving a way to certify some subset of sentences as being in OSM. This idea of
trying to identify a tractable class of sentences was given in [GH05].
5.2 A grammar generating sem. self min. formulae
In [GH05] a grammar was presented that generated optimistically and pessimistically self-
minimizing sentences. We present here this grammar, where we have here removed a clause
that was later found to be unsound.
ps ::= M | ¬os | ps ∧ ps | ps# ∨ ps# | EXps | AXps
EGps | AGps | AFps∀ | A[ps#Ups∀#]
os ::= M | ¬ps | os ∨ os | os# ∧ os# | EGos∃ | AXos
EXos | EFos | AFos | EFos∃ | E[os∃Uos] | ref(OS) (5.1)
Notational conventions used in the grammar are as follows
 We denote by pspl (ospl) those pessimistically (optimistically) self-minimizing sentences
which are in PL, i.e. contain no temporal connectives.
 A sentence of the MC is existential (universal) — denoted by a subscript ∃ (∀) — if when
placed into negation normal form the sentence contains only the modal connective EX
(AX). For example, EX(p) ∧ µX.(q ∨ EX(X ∧ ¬p)) is existential AX(q) is universal, and
EX(q) ∧ AX(p) is neither.
 We write φ#ψ to indicate that the sentences φ and ψ share no atoms; in the grammar the
subscript # indicates that the sentences which take this place must have this property.
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 M is the set of all monotone sentences of the MC, that is to say when placed in negation
normal form no atom will appear in mixed polarity, as both p and ¬p say, in the same
sentence.
 ref(Ω) is a sentence generated by the finite set Ω of sentences generated by the os grammar,








The sentences belonging to ps are pessimistically self-minimizing, and those in os are optimisti-
cally self-minimizing [GH05].
5.3 Expanding the grammar
The grammar above can certify a number of commonly used specification patterns to be pes-
simistically self-minimizing, but also fails on others. However, since we can test in PTIME
whether a sentence is generated by a grammar, from the previous section we see that it is
impossible for a grammar to generate all sentences which are optimistically or pessimistically
self-minimizing for MC, and in the case of PL and PML would imply unlikely complexity class
collapses. This being said, it is worthwhile trying to expand the grammar, as human designed
patterns tend to be simpler than the worst case examples.
5.3.1 A better grammar
The grammar (5.1) just given can been expanded to that below:
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ps ::= M | ¬os | ps ∧ ps | ps# ∨ ps# | EXps | pspl ∨
∨
AXps
EGps | AGps | AFps∀ | A[ps#Ups∀#] | A[ps#Wps∀#]
os ::= M | ¬ps | os ∨ os | os# ∧ os# | E[os∃Wos] | EGos∃ | AXos
ospl ∧
∧
EXos | EFos | AFos | EFos∃ | E[os∃Uos] | ref(OS) (5.2)
The connectives EW and AW are syntactic sugar for the following formulae.
E[φWψ] = E[φUψ] ∨ EG(φ ∧ ¬ψ) = ¬A[¬ψU¬ψ ∧ ¬φ]
A[φWψ] = ¬E[¬ψU¬φ ∧ ¬ψ]
that capture the notion of ‘weak-until’, φWψ, for which it is not necessary that the second
clause ψ ever actually becomes true, as long as the first is then always true. In these grammars
the above conventions are used, as is that OS denotes finite subsets of os, pspl and ospl are
respective instances of propositional logic:
All clauses in these grammars can not only be interpreted in the conventional sense of parsing as
the soundness results are stronger; e.g. clause AX(os) says“if φ is any optimistically semantically
self-minimizing, independent of whether the grammar certifies it to be, then so is AX(φ)”.
Here three of the original clauses in [GH05] have been expanded, from os∃#∧os∃# to os#∧os#,
and EXos to ospl ∧
∧
EX(OS), and similarly for the pessimistic grammar, and modified the AU
clause in the pessimistic grammar (such that the first argument of AU is less constrained).
Cases have also been added for the EW and AW clauses. These extensions were needed for the
classification of patterns developed in the remainder of this chapter.
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5.3.2 The expanded grammar is correct
To show that the expanded grammar is correct we first need to note that the trick of tree
unwinding can be used in the context of approximative semantics.
Remark 5.3.1. In this proof we shall use the fact that sentences evaluate, under both the
optimistic and pessimistic semantics, to the same result on a model and on its infinite tree-
unwinding. We can do this as the tree-unwinding is refinement equivalent to the original model,
as we can define refinements as follows
Let (M, si) be a modal transition system, and let (N, s
1
i ) be the infinite tree unwinding of
(M, si), where the labelling of the state s
k
j in N indicates that the state is an unwinding of sj
is M , with k being some distinguishing index. We have that si  ski for all k where ski exists.
We also have that for every relevent k the relation skj  sj holds. Thus (M, si)  (N, s1i ), and
(N, s1i )  (M, s), the model and its infinite tree unwinding are refinement equivalent.
As noted earlier, refinement is characterised by the both the optimistic and pessimistic seman-
tics, this is to say that for every φ of either PMLor MCwe have that
(N, t) |=o φ and (M, s)  (N, t) ⇒ (M, s) |=o φ
Thus we see that if two models are refinement equivalent then choosing either the optimistic or
pessimistic semantics, either model is accepted by a sentence of the MCif and only if the other
is. Thus we may consider infinite tree unwindings to be equivalent to the original model.
Theorem 5.3.2. If φ is generated by the grammar as being an optimistically (pessimistically)
self-minimizing formula, then it is.
Proof. We shall prove that each individual clause added is correct. We note that because the
original clauses were proved to hold even when applied to subformula that were optimistically
self-minimizing, but not generated by the grammar, we do not have to reprove the correctness
of those terms.
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 os# ∧ os#. First we note that if we have an implementation (M, s) |=o φ, with φ opti-
mistically self-minimizing, we may assume that (M, s) is serial, that is to say each state
has an outgoing transition. We have this as any sentence is optimistically satisfied on the
model M12 consisting of a single state, where all atoms are valued
12, and with a transition
to itself. Thus, if (M, s) has any non-serial state, those without an outgoing transition,
we may add a transition from this state to the state in M12, to form a new model (M
′, s)
which will still have the property that (M ′, s) |=o φ. As we have assumed that φ is op-
timistically self-minimizing, we know that there exists an implementation of (M ′, s), call
it (X, s) say, which satisfies φ, but which is now serial. So, assume that the model (M, s)
has the property (M, s) |=o φ ∧ ψ with the property that φ#ψ, i.e. they share no atomic
variables. Then we know we can find serial implementations (X, t) and (Y, u) such that
(X, t) |= φ and (Y, u) |= ψ, we shall now combine these into a single implementation
that satisfies both. The important property we need is that of bisimulation equivalence
on implementations. This allows us to duplicate states, and thus branches. If there is a
transition from a state a to b, then if we can a state b′ such that if there is a transition
from b to a state c, then we mirror this with a transition from b′ to c, and add a transition
from a to b. This model with this extra b′ added will be bisimulation equivalent to the
previous model. Thus we assume that in the models X and Y each state has exactly k
transitions to further states, for some fixed k. We now take the infinite tree unwindings of
(X, t) and (Y, u), these will both be infinite, k-branching trees. We may now superimpose
one tree upon the other. We create a model (Z, v) which is an infinite k-branching tree,
and we drawing its atomic labeling from both X and Y . Those atoms appearing in φ are
read from X, those in ψ from Y . Thus we find an infinite implementation which satisfies
both φ and ψ. From the finite model theorem we know that there thus must also be
a finite implementation which also satisfies both φ and ψ. The result for ps# ∨ ps# is
obtained simply by negation.
 ospl ∧
∧
EX(OS): Let {φi} be a finite set of optimistically self-minimizing sentences and
ψpl optimistically self-minimizing in propositional logic. Then EX(φi) is also optimistically
self-minimizing, by the grammar in [GH05]. Hence, if (M, s) |=o ψpl ∧
∧
EX(φi), then
5.3. Expanding the grammar 91
for all i there exists some implementations (Mi, si) of (M, s), with (Mi, si) |= EX(φi) and
state set Si. By considering these models as trees, we can ensure that no sentence EX(φi)
depends upon the atoms of the initial state. We can hence create an implementation
(N, k) of (M, s) that satisfies ψpl ∧
∧
EX(φi) by gluing together the (Mi, si) as familiar
from the sum construct in process algebra: the state space is the disjoint union of {k}
and all Si \ {si}. Since (M, s) |=o ψpl the labeling at k can be chosen so that k satisfies
ψpl; this does not interfere with the rest of the tree structure as only the evaluation of ψpl
refers to k, and it refers to no other state. The transition relation is
{(k, b) | ∃i : (si, b) ∈ Ri} ∪
⋃
i
Ri \ {(si, b) | b ∈ Si}
For any p ∈ AP and s ∈ Si \ {si}, set L(s, p) = Li(s, p).
 E[os∃Wos]: This proof is just a slight modification of that in [GH05], simply without the
requirement that the second clause actually happens.
 A[ps#Wps∀#]: Let φ#ψ, ψ be universal, and both φ and ψ pessimistically self-minimizing.
By the definition of AW one has that A[φWψ] = ¬E[¬ψU¬ψ ∧ ¬φ] and so A[φWψ] is
pessimistically self-minimizing if E[¬ψU¬ψ ∧ ¬φ] is optimistically self-minimizing. Since
ψ is universal and pessimistically self-minimizing, ¬ψ is existential and optimistically self-
minimizing. Similarly, ¬φ is optimistically self-minimizing so ¬ψ ∧ ¬φ is optimistically
self-minimizing, too, as φ#ψ implies ¬ψ#¬φ. Apply the EU clause of our os grammar,
and the correctness of our AW clause is shown.
 A[ps#Ups∀#]: Note simply that A[φUψ] = A[φWψ] ∧ AF(ψ) and apply already proven
parts of the grammar.
Things which can’t be added. We mention some negative results here, about invalid
generalizations of the grammar. We would like to show that expanding the context-free clauses
in the grammar further without the use of contexts, as done in ospl ∧
∧
EXos, is difficult. The
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 
 p = 1 //
 
 p = 12 //
 
 p = 0 AB?? EDoo
Figure 5.1: A model that is optimistically accepted by AG(p→ EX(p)), but has no implemen-
tation which is also accepted.
only CTL connective the os grammar lacks is an AG clause; would it not be possible to add an
AGos, or perhaps just an AGos∃ or AGos∀ clause?
The sentence p∨EX(¬p) is in os, it is generated by the grammar, however AG(p→ EX(p)) is not,
as can be seen in Fig. 5.1. Similarly, AG(p→ AX(p)) is also not optimistically self-minimizing.
That EG(os∃) cannot be expanded to an EG(os) or changed to an EG(os∀) can be seen by
considering EG(p→ AX(p)) over the model in Fig. 5.1, as this sentence also requires an infinite
path where p holds if p is true upon the first state, and similarly one can show that the EU
clause cannot be expanded, and an AG(os∀) will not work either. The only other restriction in
the os grammar is that of the disjointness condition for the conjunction, removing this would
allow sentences like p ∧ ¬p which is unsatisfiable and so not in os.
All these results transfer over to the ps grammar, however the ps grammar also has additional
restrictions on the AU clause. The hash cannot be removed here else it would allow A[pU¬p],
which is valid, and so not in ps.
5.3.3 Expanding the grammar to the modal µ-calculus
We now give an addition to our improved grammar which expands it to include terms of the
modal µ-calculus not restricted just to CTL. This extension simplifies the grammar by allowing
the generation of all but one of the CTL connective terms.
Theorem 5.3.3. Let φ∃ and ψ be optimistically self-minimizing sentences, with φ∃ having an
atom p that occurs only positively in the sentence, then α is optimistically self-minimizing,
where
α = σX.(φ∃[p 7→ X] ∨ ψ) (5.3)
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for σ = µ or ν. For φ ∈ MC where the variable X does not occur, the notation φ[p 7→ X]
represents the syntactic operation of replacing all occurrences of p with X.
Similarly, the sentence
α = σX.(φ∀[p 7→ X] ∧ ψ) (5.4)
is pessimistically self-minimizing if φ and ψ are in PSM, and φ contains only universal modal-
ities.
Proof. Let (M, s) be some pointed model that optimistically accepts α, then considering (M, s)
as a (possibly infinite) tree with root s, let S be the set of states which are the corresponding
fixed point for α. Then, for each state in S which optimistically satisfies ψ one can find an
implementation of the tree from that point on which will satisfy ψ, so use that. For those which
satisfy φ∃, decorate this state with some refinement so that φ∃ is satisfied, as it is an existential
sentence, and the necessity of states which satisfy EX(p) in the sentence is now guaranteed by
the fixed-point construction.
The process described above is in some sense a dual to the devectorisation process given in
Chapter 6.2.
These terms allow the generation of many of the CTL terms in the original grammar except
for AF(os) and EG(ps) in the optimistic and pessimistic grammars respectively.
5.4 Using the grammar
In this section, an analysis of popular specification patterns, as documented in the community-
driven web repository at [pat] is given.
The repository [pat] gives formal specifications of common “design patterns”. It also offers
mappings of these patterns into various back-end formalisms such as LTL, CTL, and regular
expressions. It is the CTL mappings which will concern us in this section. The question we
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wish to ask is “Is a given specification pattern pessimistically self minimizing? If not can we
easily make it so?”
First we will show how the grammar can be used to certify certain patterns, and then give a
list of all those that can be certified by this means.
We shall then analyse the remaining patterns, and give a specific witness to their non-pessimistic
self-minimization. Thus we show that our grammar is exact for these patterns. We then provide
a pessimistic semantic self-minimization for each of these patterns.
It should be noted that, subsequently, we consider variables P and Q as distinct propositional
atoms.
5.4.1 Certification of self-minimization
Those patterns which are pessimistically self-minimizing can all be proved by our grammar
above. Below we give a worked example of applying the grammar.
Example 5.4.1. We demonstrate a use of the grammar to prove that “Constrained chain after
Q” is pessimistically self-minimizing, where “Constrained chain after Q” is equal to
¬E[¬QU(Q ∧ EF(P ∧ (EG(¬S) ∨ EF(S ∧ (E[¬TUZ] ∨ EX(EG(¬T )))))))]
This formula references five variables P,Q, S, T, Z, and describes the specification that on any
path, after the event Q then when P occurs we must have that S and then T occur before Z
occurs. The “chain” part of the description refers to the occurrence of P implies that S and
then T must occurs, the “constrained” the the constrain that Z must not occur before both S
and T have.
This formula can be shown to be in ps by the following application of grammar rules
¬T ∈ os∃ ⇒ EG(¬T ) ∈ os ⇒ EXEG(¬T ) ∈ os
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¬T ∈ os∃, Z ∈ os ⇒ E[¬TUZ] ∈ os
E[¬TUZ] ∈ os, EX(EG(¬T )) ∈ os ⇒ E[¬TUZ] ∨ EX(EG(¬T )) ∈ os
S,E[¬TUZ]∨EX(EG(¬T )) ∈ os, S#E[¬TUZ]∨EX(EG(¬T )) ⇒ S∧E[¬TUZ]∨EXEG(¬T ) ∈
os
S ∧ E[¬TUZ] ∨ EXEG(¬T ) ∈ os ⇒ EF(S ∧ E[¬TUZ] ∨ EXEG(¬T )) ∈ os
¬S ∈ os∃ ⇒ EG(¬S) ∈ os ⇒ EG(¬S) ∨ EF(S ∧ E[¬TUZ] ∨ EXEG(¬T )) ∈ os
P#EG(¬S) ∨ EF(S ∧ E[¬TUZ] ∨ EXEG(¬T )) ⇒ P ∧ (EG(¬S) ∨ EF(S ∧ E[¬TUZ] ∨
EXEG(¬T ))) ∈ os
P∧(EG(¬S)∨EF(S∧E[¬TUZ]∨EXEG(¬T ))) ∈ os ⇒ EF(P∧(EG(¬S)∨EF(S∧E[¬TUZ]∨
EXEG(¬T )))) ∈ os
Q,EF(P ∧ (EG(¬S)∨EF(S ∧E[¬TUZ]∨EXEG(¬T )))) ∈ os, Q#EF(P ∧ (EG(¬S)∨EF(S ∧
E[¬TUZ]∨EXEG(¬T )))) ⇒ Q∧EF(P ∧ (EG(¬S)∨EF(S ∧E[¬TUZ]∨EXEG(¬T )))) ∈ os
¬Q ∈ os∃, Q ∧ EF(P ∧ (EG(¬S) ∨ EF(S ∧ E[¬TUZ] ∨ EXEG(¬T )))) ∈ os
Q ∧ EF(P ∧ (EG(¬S) ∨ EF(S ∧ E[¬TUZ] ∨ EXEG(¬T )))) ∈ os
¬Q ∈ os∃, Q ∧ EF(P ∧ (EG(¬S) ∨ EF(S ∧ E[¬TUZ] ∨ EXEG(¬T )))) ∈ os
⇒ E[¬QU(Q ∧ EF(P ∧ (EG(¬S) ∨ EF(S ∧ E[¬TUZ] ∨ EXEG(¬T )))))] ∈ os
⇒ ¬E[¬QU(Q ∧ EF(P ∧ (EG(¬S) ∨ EF(S ∧ E[¬TUZ] ∨ EXEG(¬T )))))] ∈ ps
The pattern “Absence of P After Q until R”, on the other hand, is monotone as a conversion
of AG(Q ∧ ¬R → A[¬PWR]) into negation normal form of the MC shows. Table 5.1 lists
those patterns of the above specification repository that are pessimistically self-minimizing.
Our grammar allows us to prove this for all these patterns, proofs are easy but take some space
(as seen in Example 5.4.1) and are therefore omitted.
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Pattern Category Name Definition
Absence of P
Globally AG(¬P )
After Q AG(Q→ AG(¬P ))




After Q AG(Q→ AG(P ))
After Q until R AG(Q ∧ ¬R→ A[PWR])




After Q until R AG(Q→ E[¬S ∧ ¬RUP ∧ ¬S ∧ ¬R])
Response of S
to P





Globally ¬E[¬SUP ] ∧ E[¬PU(S ∧ ¬P ∧ EX(E[¬TU(P ∧ ¬T )]))]
Before R ¬E[(¬S ∧ ¬R)U(P ∧ ¬R)] ∧ ¬E[(¬P ∧ ¬R)U
(S ∧ ¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(E[(¬T ∧ ¬R)U(P ∧ ¬T ∧R)]))]
After Q until R AG(Q→ ¬E[(¬S ∧ ¬R)U(P ∧ ¬R)] ∧ ¬E[(¬P ∧ ¬R)U





Globally ¬E[¬PU(S ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(EF(T )))]
Before R ¬E[(¬P ∧ ¬R)U(S ∧ ¬P ∧ ¬R∧
EX(E[¬RU(T ∧ ¬R)]))]
After Q ¬E[¬QU(Q ∧ E[¬PU(S ∧ ¬P ∧ EX(EF(T )))])]
After Q until R AG(Q→ ¬E[(¬P ∧ ¬R)U




Globally ¬EF(S ∧ EX(EF(T ∧ EG(¬P ))))




Globally AG(P → AF(S ∧ AX(AF(T ))))
After Q ¬E[¬QU(Q ∧ EF(P ∧ (EF(¬S)∨
EF(S ∧ EX(EG(¬T ))))))]
Constrained
chain
Globally AG(P → AF(S ∧ ¬Z ∧ AX(A[¬ZUT ])))
After Q ¬E[¬QU(Q ∧ EF(P ∧ (EG(¬S)∨
EF(S ∧ (E[¬TUZ] ∨ EX(EG(¬T )))))))]
Table 5.1: Popular specification patterns (in CTL∩LTL), documented at [pat], shown by our
grammar to be pessimistically self-minimizing.
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5.4.2 Minimizing the other patterns
For those patterns that are not pessimistically self-minimizing, a counter-example in the form
of a Modal Strictly Kripke Transition System which satisfies optimistically the negation of
the pattern, but for which no implementation satisfies this property, is given. Since all these
patterns are in the intersection of CTL and LTL, counter-examples can be chosen to have linear
form, a finite path followed by a finite cycle. In all cases a final state having itself as successor
suffices for the cycle.
Notation 2. To write these linear structures, the following notation will be used
[Q 1
2
] → [P,Q] 	
to denote a partial Kripke structure of two states, taking the left-most state to be the initial
state, for which atom Q has value 1
2
; this state has one successor state where P and Q are true;
atoms not mentioned have value 0.
In this example the only possible paths in any implementation have the form
[] → [P,Q] 	 and [Q] → [P,Q] 	
both of these paths satisfy A[¬QWQ ∧ AF(P )], however, interpreted pessimistically over the
above Modal Kripke Transition System, both the ¬Q and Q ∧ AF(P ) are under-approximated
to 0, and so the above structure does not pessimistically accept the sentence, which is hence
not pessimistically self-minimizing.
In Tables 5.2-5.6 are those patterns of the pattern specification library that are not pessimisti-
cally self-minimizing. In all patterns of that table there is but a single atom which occurs in
mixed polarity. If this atom is never mapped to 1
2
, then the sentence will be pessimistically
self-minimizing, i.e. precise, over this model as it is then monotone as far as that model is
concerned: this atom is the sole source for the pattern not to be pessimistically self-minimizing.
Due to their simple nature, many of these patterns have pessimistic semantic minimizations in
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AG(Q ∧ ¬R→ A[(¬P ∨ AG(¬R))WR])
[Q] → [P,R⊥] → [] 	








AG(Q ∧ ¬R→ A[(P ∨ AG(¬R))WR])
[Q] → [R⊥] → [] 	
AG(Q ∧ ¬R→ A[(P ∨ AX(AG(¬R)))WR])
Existence
After Q
A[¬QW(Q ∧ AF(P )]
[Q⊥] → [Q,P ] 	
¬E[¬Q ∨ EG(¬P )UQ ∧ EG(¬P )]
Between Q
and R
AG(Q ∧ ¬R→ A[¬RW(P ∧ ¬R)])
[Q,R⊥] → [P ] 	
AG(R ∨ (Q→ (P ∨ AX(A[¬RW(P ∧ ¬R)])))
After Q
until R
AG(Q ∧ ¬R→ A[¬RUP ∧ ¬R])
[Q,R⊥] → [P ] 	
AG(R ∨ (Q→ (P ∨ AX(A[¬RU(P ∧ ¬R)])))
Between Q
and R
AG(Q→ A[(P → A[¬RUS ∧ ¬R])∨
AG(¬R)WR])
[P,Q, S,R⊥] → [R] 	




AG(Q→ A[(P → A[¬RUS ∧ ¬R])WR])
[S, P,Q,R⊥] → [R] 	
AG(Q→ A[(P ∧ S) → AX(A[¬RUS ∧ ¬R])WR])
Table 5.2: Patterns (in CTL∩LTL) from [pat] that are not pessimistically self-minimizing. In
each case, a sole atom of mixed polarity occurs and is responsible for this; the second line shows
a counterexample for pessimistic self-minimization, the third line shows a pessimistic semantic
minimization




¬EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ∧ EF(¬P ∧ EX(P∧
EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ))))))
[] → [P ] → [] → [P⊥] → [P ] → [] 	
¬EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ∧ EX(EF(¬P∧
EX(P ∧ EX(EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ))))))))
Before R
¬E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P ∧ E[¬RU
(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P ∧ E[¬RU
(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P ∧ ¬R))]))]))]
[] → [P ] → [] → [P⊥] → [P ] → [] 	
¬E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(
P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(E[¬RU(
¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P ∧ ¬R))])))])))]
After Q
¬E[¬QU¬EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ∧ EF(¬P∧
EX(P ∧ EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ))))))]
[Q] → [P ] → [] → [P⊥] → [P ] → [] 	
¬E[¬QU¬EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ∧ EX(EF(¬P∧
EX(P ∧ EX(EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ))))))))]
Between Q
and R
AF(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P∧
E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P ∧ E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R∧
EX(P ∧ ¬R ∧ EF(R)))]))]))])
[Q] → [P ] → [] → [P⊥] → [P,R⊥] → [] 	
AF(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(
E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(E[¬RU(
¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(EF(R))))])))])))])
After Q
until R
AF(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P∧
E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P ∧ E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R∧
EX(P ∧ ¬R))]))]))])
[Q] → [P ] → [] → [P⊥] → [P ] → [] 	
AF(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(
E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(P ∧ ∧¬R ∧ EX(E[¬RU(¬P ∧ ¬R∧
EX(P ∧ ¬R))])))])))])
Table 5.3: More patterns (in CTL∩LTL) from [pat] that are not pessimistically self-minimizing.
In each case, a sole atom of mixed polarity occurs and is responsible for this; the second line
shows a counterexample for pessimistic self-minimization, the third line shows a pessimistic
semantic minimization






¬E[¬RU(P ∧ ¬R ∧ (E[¬SUR]∨
E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(E[¬TUR]))]))]
[S,R⊥] → [T,R] 	
¬E[¬RU(P ∧ ¬R ∧ (¬S ∧ EX(E[¬SUR])∨
E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(E[¬TUR]))]))]
After Q
until R
AG(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(P ∧ ¬R ∧ (E[¬SUR]
∨EG(¬S ∧ ¬R) ∨ E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R∧
EX(E[¬TUR] ∨ EG(¬T ∧ ¬R)))]))])
[Q,P, S,R⊥] → [R, S] 	
AG(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(P ∧ ¬R ∧ (¬S ∧ EX(E[¬SUR])
∨EG(¬S ∧ ¬R) ∨ E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R∧






¬E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(E[¬RU(T ∧ ¬R ∧ E[¬PUR])]))]
[S] → [R⊥, T, P ] → [] 	




AG(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R∧
EX(E[¬RU(T ∧ ¬R ∧ E[¬PUR])]))])
[Q,S] → [P,R⊥, T ] → [] 	
AG(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R∧
EX(E[¬RU(T ∧ ¬R ∧ ¬P ∧ EX(E[¬PUR])]))])
After Q
until R
AG(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(E[¬RU(T ∧ ¬R∧
(E[¬PUR] ∨ EG(¬P ∧ ¬R)))]))])
[S,Q] → [R⊥, T, P ] → [] 	
AG(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(E[¬RU(T ∧ ¬R∧
(¬P ∧ EX(E[¬PUR]) ∨ EG(¬P ∧ ¬R)))]))])
Table 5.4: More patterns (in CTL∩LTL) from [pat] that are not pessimistically self-minimizing.
In each case, a sole atom of mixed polarity occurs and is responsible for this; the second line
shows a counterexample for pessimistic self-minimization, the semantic minimization is on the
last line
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Precedence
Before R
A[(¬P ∨ AG(¬R))W(S ∨R)]




[S,Q⊥] → [] 	
¬E[¬Q ∨ E[¬SUP ∧ ¬S]UQ ∧ E[¬SUP ∧ ¬S]]
Between Q
and R
AG(Q ∧ ¬R→ A[(¬P ∨ AG(¬R))W(S ∨R)])
[Q,P,R⊥] → [] 	







AG(Q→ ¬E[(¬P ∧ ¬R)U(S ∧ ¬P ∧ ¬R∧
EX(E[¬RU(T ∧ ¬R ∧ EF(R))])])
[Q,S] → [T,R⊥] → [] 	
AG(Q→ ¬E[(¬P ∧ ¬R)U(S ∧ ¬P ∧ ¬R∧






¬E[¬QU(Q ∧ E[¬SUP ] ∧ E[¬PU(S ∧ ¬P∧
EX(E[¬TU(P ∧ ¬T )]))])]
[Q,S, P⊥] → [P ] → [] 	
¬E[¬QU(Q ∧ ¬P ∧ ¬S ∧ EX(E[¬SUP ]) ∧ E[¬PU(S ∧ ¬P∧
EX(E[¬TU(P ∧ ¬T )]))])]
Between Q
and R
AG(Q→ ¬E[(¬S ∧ ¬R)U(P ∧ ¬R ∧ EF(R))]∧
¬E[(¬P ∧ ¬R)U(S ∧ ¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(
E[(¬T ∧ ¬R)U(P ∧ ¬T ∧R ∧ EF(R))]))])
[Q,P,R⊥] → [] 	
AG(Q→ ¬E[(¬S ∧ ¬R)U(P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(EF(R)))]∧
¬E[(¬P ∧ ¬R)U(S ∧ ¬P ∧ ¬R ∧ EX(
E[(¬T ∧ ¬R)U(P ∧ ¬T ∧R ∧ EX(EF(R)))]))])
Table 5.5: More patterns (in CTL∩LTL) from [pat] that are not pessimistically self-minimizing.
In each case, a sole atom of mixed polarity occurs and is responsible for this; the second line
shows a counterexample for pessimistic self-minimization, the semantic minimization is on the
last line
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Response
Before R
A[((P → A[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R)]) ∨ AG(¬R))WR]
[S, P,R⊥] → [] 	
A[(((P ∧ ¬S) → AX(A[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R)])) ∨ AX(AG(¬R)))WR]
After Q
A[¬QW(Q ∧ AG(P → AF(S))]
[Q⊥] → [] 	
¬E[¬Q ∨ EF(∧EF (S))UQ ∧ EF(P ∧ EG(S))]
Between Q
and R
AG(Q→ A[((P → A[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R)]) ∨ AG(¬R))WR])
[Q,P,R⊥] 	




AG(Q→ A[(P → A[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R)])WR])
[S, P,Q,R⊥] → [] 	





¬E[¬RU(P ∧ ¬R ∧ (E[¬SUR] ∨ E[¬RU
(S ∧ ¬R ∧ (E[¬TUZ] ∨ EX(E[¬TUR])))]))]
[P,R⊥] → [] 	
¬E[¬RU(P ∧ ¬R ∧ (¬S ∧ EX(E[¬SUR]) ∨ E[¬RU
(S ∧ ¬R ∧ (E[¬TUZ] ∨ EX(E[¬TUR])))]))]
Between Q
and R
AG(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(P ∧ ¬R ∧ (E[¬SUR]∨
E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R ∧ (E[¬TUZ] ∨ EX(E[¬TUR])))]))])
[Q,P,R⊥] → [] 	
AG(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(P ∧ ¬R ∧ (¬S ∧ EX(E[¬SUR])∨
E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R ∧ (E[¬TUZ] ∨ EX(E[¬TUR])))]))])
After Q
until R
AG(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(P ∧ ¬R ∧ (E[¬SUR]∨
EG(¬S ∧ ¬R) ∨ E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R ∧ (E[¬TUZ]∨
EX(E[¬TUR] ∨ EG(¬T ∧ ¬R))))]))])
[P,Q,R⊥, S, R] → [] 	
AG(Q→ ¬E[¬RU(P ∧ ¬R ∧ (¬S ∧ EX(E[¬SUR])∨
EG(¬S ∧ ¬R) ∨ E[¬RU(S ∧ ¬R ∧ (E[¬TUZ]∨
EX(E[¬TUR] ∨ EG(¬T ∧ ¬R))))]))])
Table 5.6: Remaining patterns (in CTL∩LTL) from [pat] that are not pessimistically self-
minimizing. In each case, a sole atom of mixed polarity occurs and is responsible for this; the
second line shows a counterexample for pessimistic self-minimization, the semantic minimization
is on the last line
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CTL, with only linear blowup, that are not hard to compute. We prove the correctness of these
pessimistic semantic minimizations. Consider the pattern
A[¬P ∨ AG(¬R)WR],
by the definition of the AW construct one has that its negation is equal to
E[¬RU(¬R ∧ ¬(¬P ∨ AG(¬R)))] (5.5)
and by the grammar it is seen that if an optimistic semantic minimization for ¬R ∧ ¬(¬P ∨
AG(¬R)) can be found, and placed in (5.5), the result will be semantically equivalent and
optimistically self-minimizing. Using equational reasoning and unfolding the fixed point once,
one gets
¬R ∧ ¬(¬P ∨ AG(¬R)) = ¬R ∧ P ∧ (R ∨ EX(EFR))
= ¬R ∧ P ∧ EX(EFR))
but by our grammar this is optimistically self-minimizing. Hence, by the EU clause of os,
E[¬RU¬R ∧ ¬(¬P ∨ AG(¬R))]o = E[¬RU¬R ∧ P ∧ EX(EFR)]
is optimistically self-minimizing, which, by folding the definition of AW, gives
¬A[¬P ∨ AX(AG(¬R))WR] (5.6)
which is optimistically self-minimizing. Finally, negate (5.6) to get the pessimistic semantic
minimization of our original pattern:
A[¬P ∨ AG(¬R)WR]p = A[¬P ∨ AX(AG(¬R))WR]
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The minimization forbids the AG to refer to the present state, eliminating the contradiction
that caused the non-minimization of the pattern. A number of patterns can be minimized in
such a fashion, such as the bounded existence pattern
¬EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ∧ EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ∧ EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ))))))
with pessimistic semantic minimization
¬EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ∧ EX(EF(¬P ∧ EX(P ∧ EXEF(¬P ∧ EX(P ))))))))
In other cases, the problem can be corrected by a simple rearrangement of the sentence and
logical reduction, for instance the existence pattern
A[¬QW(Q ∧ AF(P )] = ¬E[(¬Q ∨ EG(¬P ))U(Q ∧ (¬Q ∨ EG(¬P )))]
From the grammar (5.2), we see that this can be pessimistically minimized by optimistically
minimizing Q ∧ (¬Q ∨ EG(¬P )). The logical equivalence Q ∧ (¬Q ∨ EG(¬P )) = Q ∧ EG(¬P ))
holds, and the sentence upon the right is optimistically self-minimizing. Hence
A[¬QW(Q ∧ AF(P )]p = ¬E[(¬Q ∨ EG(¬P ))U(Q ∧ EG(¬P ))]
For some of the more complicated patterns, both methods need to be applied. Note that these
minimizations are only valid if all variables are treated as atoms.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we have proved the correctness of a grammar that generates sentences which are
semantically self-minimizing, this was motivated by the high complexity of deciding if a sentence
is in OSM, shown in the previous chapter. This grammar extends that given in [GH05]. The
practical results are:
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 Using this grammar, we have shown that many common specification patterns listed at
[pat] are pessimistically self-minimizing.
 For those that were not, we have given pessimistic semantic minimization which involved




The work up to this point in this thesis has been concerned with performing a supervaluation of
a sentence upon a Modal Kripke Transition System. When dealing with such abstract models,
it is natural that one might wish to abstractly describe a system using a number of different
partial models, which perhaps deal with different parts of a system. If we can then find a
two-valued model that is an implementation of each of the models, then it must inherit those
properties specified in both.
To return to that most ancient of examples, the vending machine, we might have a Mixed or
Modal Transition System that specifies fully the circuitry that counts the amount of money
deposited, but is rather vague on how the rest of the machine works, and a second transition
system that occupies itself with the situation where the total deposited is known, allows a
selection and vends if the sufficent money has been inserted.
The reason why one might care for this approach is that it allows a far more natural way of
describing the interaction of the system, using a single model can require a massive enumeration.
The question arises, what is the expressiveness and complexity of expressing systems using
multiple models, rather than the MC.
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The main natural problem that occurs here is that of common implementation. The common
implementation problem asks, given a set of models, is there a single two-valued model that is
an implementation for every model in the set?
In this chapter we investigate the computational complexity of the problem of common imple-
mentation, and a related one of implementation inclusion, by constructing complicated systems
of interlocking Modal Labeled Transition Systems.
In the introduction we gave an objective of evaluating sentences efficiently over many models,
to ask questions like “do all common implementations of a finite set S of partial models satisfy
a property φ”, where φ is a sentence of some temporal logic. We shall not explore this in great
depth in this chapter, besides giving a general upper bound. We do however lay the foundations
for these questions to be addressed later, as we will give lower complexity bounds which give a
general idea of the landscape we find ourselves here.
The question of evaluating SAT((M, s), φ) does not specify the size of implementations con-
sidered, specifically whether they are finite or infinite. From [Hut05] we have the following
correspondence: that for every finite-state Modal Kripke Labeled Transition System (M, s),
there exists a sentence Ψ(M,s) of the modal µ-calculus, such that for all (finite or infinite-state)
Modal Kripke Labeled Transitions Systems (N, j) we have that
(M, s)  (N, j) ⇐⇒ (N, j) |= Ψ(M,s)
Thus we have, for the predicates SAT ((M, s), φ) and VAL ((M, s), φ), that the following holds
SAT ((M, s), φ) ⇐⇒ SAT (φ ∧Ψ(M,s))
VAL ((M, s), φ) ⇐⇒ VAL (Ψ(M,s) → φ)
where the SAT and VAL on the right-hand side correspond to the usual satisfiability and validity
checking the modal µ-calculus. The well-known result of [Koz88] states that a sentence of the
modal µ-calculus being satisfiable implies that it is satisfied by a finite model, that is to say
the modal µ-calculus has the finite model property. Thus the predicates SAT ((M, s), φ) and
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VAL ((M, s), φ) are the same regardless of whether we are considering infinite, or only finite
models.
In this chapter we shall consider questions of the form
Given a set of pointed models, and for each model a desired property of refinement,
or non-refinement; does there exist a two-valued model which has the required
property with respect to every model in the set?
We shall also look at the additional complications introduced when nominals are allowed. A
nominal is a special atomic proposition that must be true on exactly one state in an implemen-
tation, but on a partial model may be valued like any other atomic proposition.
In this chapter we shall prove lower bounds for Modal Kripke Labeled Transition Systems.
These results can be easily modified to get lower bounds for Modal Strictly-Kripke Transition
System, or Modal Labeled Transition Systems. The choice of Modal Kripke Labeled Transition
Systems is made simply for the convenience of conveying the idea.
We shall be considering the computational complexity of decision problems about sets of models.
It will thus be necessary to have some notion of size for such sets.
Definition 6.1.1. Let S = {(M1, s1), . . . (Mn, sn)}, where Mi = (Si, Ra, Rc, La, Lc), be a set of
partial models over actions Act and atomic propositions AP. Then we define ‖S‖, the size of






This provides a O(1) approximation of how much space is required to write down in binary a
description of the partial models.
Notation 3. For diagrams in this chapter, we shall adopt the notation that atomic propositions
not mentioned in any state are valued as 12, rather than false.
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6.2 Devectorizing Characteristic equations
In this section we provide an EXPTIME upper-bound to the questions considered in this chap-
ter.
Definition 6.2.1. A system of (greatest fixed-point) modal µ-calculus equations is a set of
terms of the form
Xi = ψi
where ψi is written as a formula PMLenriched with the variables Xi, which may occur only
under an even number of negations.
Example 6.2.2. The two equations
X1 = p ∧ EF(q ∧X2)
X2 = ¬p ∧ AX(X2)
form a system of MC equations.
To evaluate a system of equations upon a given model, we apply a greatest fixed point operator
to the system. We can then reduce the system to a single sentence of MC.
Example 6.2.3. Let X1 and X2 be as in the previous example. The greatest fixed point of
X2 is νX.¬p ∧ AX(X), which is equal to AG(¬p). The greatest fixed point of X1 is thus p ∧
EF(q ∧ AG(¬p)). Hence we consider X1 = p ∧ EF(q ∧ X2) to be true on a state in a model if
p ∧ EFAG(¬p)) is true.
Definition 6.2.4. A pointed system of equations is a system of equations, plus an index. We
write this as ({Xi = Ψi}, j), where i ranges over some index set I and j ∈ I.
From a pointed system of equations, we can always apply the above procedure to get a single
sentence of MC that is equivalent to the indicated equation.
The important application of these systems of equations, in terms of this thesis, is that of
characteristic equations of Mixed and Modal Transition Systems. Given explicitly in [Hut05],


























X1 = 〈α〉X2 ∧ [α]X2 ∧ [β]false Y1 = [α]Y1 ∧ [β]Y2
X2 = 〈β〉X3 ∧ [β]X3 ∧ [α]false Y2 = [α]Y3 ∧ [β]Y2
X3 = [α]X4 ∧ [β]X5 Y3 = [β] (Y3 ∨ Y2) ∧ [α]false
X4 = 〈β〉X1 ∧ [β]X1 ∧ [α]false
X5 = 〈β〉X2 ∧ [β]X2 ∧ [α]false
Figure 6.1: Two models with their characteristic equations
we have that for every pointed Mixed Labeled Transition system (M, s) there exists a system
of equations, {Xs = Ψs}, indexed by states s in M , with the property that if Xs is true upon
a state t in a model N , then (M, s)  (N, t).















Note that empty conjunctions are considered to be false. If we do not specifically admit logical
values in our definition of the syntax of the MCthen we must write false using a logically invalid
formula, p ∧ ¬p for instance. We can trivially modify this system with propositional atoms, to





















Example 6.2.5. In Fig. 6.1 we illustrate two Modal Labeled Transition Systems, and give set
of characteristic equations of each.
It is easy to see that there exists a common implementation of models (M, s) and (N, t),
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with system of equations {Xi = Ψi} and {Yj = Ψj} if and only if the system of equations
{Z = Ψs ∧Ψt} ∪ {Xi = Ψi} ∪ {Yj = Ψj} has a solution.
The problem with this approach is that the size of the resulting sentence of MC will be, in
general, exponentially large in the size of the system of equations. Note this is a worst-case
scenario that occurs very often in practice. A linear series of n states connected by both may
and must transitions will produce a sentence of size 2n. Since the SAT and VAL problems for the
modal µ-calculus are themselves EXPTIME, we have a worst case complexity of 2EXPTIME.
There are two ways around this problem, which allow us to solve systems of equations in
EXPTIME.
The first is simply to note that we can use a system of equations to construct an alternating
tree-automaton. This automaton will not be planar, and thus not correspond to a MC sentence
of a similar length, but it will accept exactly the same models as Ψ(M,s).
A second idea, and one we will explore more deeply, is that of “de-vectorization”. The idea here
is that we introduce a new set of propositional atoms qi to replace the Xi. We can then express
the idea that Xi is true on a state by stating that qi is true, assuming that the model satisfies
AG(qi ↔ ψi)
Hence, if in each ψi we replace all the Xi with qi to get ψ
′
i, then we have that the original series
of equations is satisfiable if ∧
i
AG(qi ↔ ψ′i)
is satisfiable. This restriction to reachable states via the AG term does not affect our result, due
to the fact that we can phrase this as an exponentially long sentence of the modal µ-calculus,
thus it is impossible for the system of equations to reason about non-reachable states. This
sentence is polynomial in the size of the original model. Hence we can again perform consistency
checks in EXPTIME. The advantage of this method is that it gives an actual sentence of MC
(or, CTL, if every ψ consists of CTL), this can be then fed into the usual satisfiability algorithm.
We shall later be able to use this method to prove some useful results. This idea seems to be
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known, see [Sch03], but we shall give a more detailed explanation.
Theorem 6.2.6. Let {Xi = ψi} be a system of equations. Then there is a two-valued model





is satisfiable, where ψ′i is the result of the syntactic operation of replacing every occurrence of
Xk by qk. Clearly we assume that the atoms qk are disjoint from propositional atoms referenced
by the individual ψi.
Proof. Given a model, we may determine, for any single state, which of the Xi are true. We
may then add to this model atoms qi. These atoms are not referred to by the ψi, and so will
not change on which states the Xi are true. If we set the atom qi to be true on a state if and
only if the equation Xi is true on that state then have that
ψi ↔ qi
is true upon every state in this model.
We may now choose one of the φi, and start to replace the Xj by qj. As Xj is true on a state
if and only if qj is, we see that ψi ↔ ψ′i holds on every reachable state in this model. Thus we
can find a model upon which ∧
AG(ψ′i ↔ qi)
holds.
In the other direction consider a model on which
∧
AG(ψ′i ↔ qi)
holds. We can then proceed in the other direction, step-by-step replacing qi with Xi. At each
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step we identify the Xi with the states upon which qi is true. At the end of the process, no φi
refer to qi, and the atoms can be removed from the witness.
Hence we see that determining the existence of a solution to the greatest fixed point of a system
of equations of PML can be solved in EXPTIME. However, in certain cases we can do better.
Given a system of equations {Xi = ψi}, we can create a dependency graph with vertices for
each Xi, and a directed edge from Xi to Xj if ψi contains a reference to Xj.
Definition 6.2.7. We say that a system of equations is self-referential if its dependency graph
contains a cycle.
Lemma 6.2.8. If a system of equations is not self-referential, the existence of a solution to its
greatest fixed point can be determined in PSPACE.
Proof. If the dependency graph is a DAG, then only states up to the length of the maximal path
in a satisfying model need to have the qi ↔ ψ′i condition hold on them. If we were to simply
expand this into a sentence of MC in the usual way, it would not contain any fixed-points, this
is simply a compressed sentence of PML.






where AXj denotes the jth application of AX to itself.
Thus, in this case, we have to decide if an equation of PML is satisfiable, this can be done in
PSPACE.
Example 6.2.9. Suppose we wish to know if the two models illustrated in Fig. 6.1 have a
common implementation. We shall use the devectorization method to decide this question.
The systems of equations describing the two models are also given in Fig. 6.1. As we are
searching for a common implementation of pointed models, we are looking for a single model
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K that satisfies both systems of equations, and has a state k which satisfies X1 and Y1. This
state is then our initial state. We may thus combine the two systems into a single system and
apply the devectorization procedure. We get that there is a common implementation if and only
if there is a model that satisfies Z with the system of equations:
X1 = 〈α〉X2 ∧ [α]X2
X2 = 〈β〉X3 ∧ [β]X3
X3 = 〈α〉X4 ∧ 〈β〉X5
X4 = 〈β〉X1 ∧ [β]X1
X5 = 〈β〉X2 ∧ [β]X2
Y1 = 〈α〉Y1 ∧ 〈β〉Y2
Y2 = 〈α〉Y3 ∧ 〈β〉Y2
Y3 = 〈β〉 (Y3 ∨ Y2)
Z = X1 ∧ Y1 (6.1)
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 
 
p1 = 1, p2 = 0, p3 = 1
p4 = 0, p5 = 0




p1 = 0, p2 = 1, p3 = 0
p4 = 1, p5 = 1
q1 = 1, q2 = 1, q3 = 1
β
QQ
Figure 6.2: A satisfiability witness to the combined system of equations (6.1), showing the two






Figure 6.3: A common implementation of the two models in Fig. 6.1, constructed from Fig. 6.2
We apply devectorisation to see that this is possible if and only if the sentence
φ = AG(p1 ↔ 〈α〉p2 ∧ [α]p2)
∧AG(p2 ↔ 〈β〉p3 ∧ [β]p3)
∧AG(p3 ↔ 〈α〉p4 ∧ 〈β〉p5)
∧AG(p4 ↔ 〈β〉p1 ∧ [β]p1)
∧AG(p5 ↔ 〈β〉p2 ∧ [β]p2)
∧AG(q1 ↔ 〈α〉q1 ∧ 〈β〉q2)
∧AG(q2 ↔ 〈α〉q3 ∧ 〈β〉q2)
∧AG(q3 ↔ 〈β〉 (q3 ∨ q2))
∧(p1 ∧ q1)
of the MC is satisfiable. A satisfiability witness is shown in Fig. 6.2. We apply the trans-
formation given in the correctness proof to conclude that the model in Fig. 6.3 is a common
implementation of the original two models.
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6.3 Common implementation
6.3.1 Introduction
An important property for partial models is that of common implementation. This corresponds
to a number of real-life type decision procedures, for instance determining if a set of specifica-
tions can be reconciled, or are mutually contradictory.
Definition 6.3.1. Let S = {(Mi, si)} be a finite set of pointed models. Then CI(S) is defined
as the set of all two-valued models such that
(N, j) ∈ CI(S) ⇐⇒ (Mi, si)  (N, j) ∀(Mi, si) ∈ S
We say that CI(S) is the set of common implementations of S, that is those models which are
simultaneously implementations of every model in S.
We shall consider in this section the complexity of determining common implementation of
consistent models. If the cardinality of S is fixed, and all the models of S are consistent, then
the problem of deciding if there is a common implementation lies in PTIME [HH06]. However,
when we consider only ‖S‖, the space it takes to write down the set, then we shall see that the
problem becomes EXPTIME-complete.
In a later section of this chapter we shall show that when we allow a common implementation
of mixed models, the problem is EXPTIME-complete even when the cardinality of S is fixed.
The main result of this section will be a simulation of an Alternating Turing Machine by a
common implementation problem. Such machines can be guaranteed to halt in a number of
steps that is exponential in the input size. We shall simulate this machine by a common
implementation problem of a set of Modal Labeled Transition Systems, where the cardinalities
of the set, and of all its members are bounded by a polynomial in the size of the input of the
Alternating Turing Machine. The problem we encounter when trying to encode this is of how
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one creates a set of models which allows exponentially long paths, but does not allow infinite
paths, as we do not want our machine to loop.
We shall first demonstrate that the smallest possible common implementation can be exponen-
tially large in the size of the set S. This, with the branching nature of models, suggests that
an EXPTIME algorithm is necessary, as traversing such a structure in PSPACE does not seem
possible.
Exponential depth from a polynomial sized set
We shall describe here a set of models, whose smallest common implementation is exponential
in the size of S. Importantly, we can compute the members of S in PTIME in the desired final
size of S.
This construction is not absolutely necessary for the simulation of an Alternating Turing Ma-
chine, [AHL+08b], but I feel that it makes the construction clearer and provides a simple
demonstration of the emergent complexity possible with common implementation.
Lemma 6.3.2. Choose some positive c. Then for any integer n, we can find, in PTIME in n,
a set S of Modal Kripke Transition Systems such that any common implementations of S are
bisimilar to a finite linear implementation of some constant length greater than cn. We have
that ‖S‖ ∈ O(n3), and S contains no more than n models.
The proof of Lemma 6.3.2 relies on constructing models in such a way that states in a common
implementation have a nice property. We shall demonstrate a construction where the values of
the atomic propositions on a state can be calculated from the states’ distance from the initial
state.
Given some number of atomic propositions, there are exponentially many different valuations for
them on a single state. We can thus potentially identify exponentially many different distances
from the initial state. If this is indeed the case, and we know that a particular assignment of
truth values vi to the atomic propositions pi implies exponential depth, then taking a common
implementation with a model where this valuation must occur will complete this proof.
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 s12 p2 = 0
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 
 s13 p3 = 0

 
 s15 p5 = 0
 
 s22 p2 = 1
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 
 s23 p3 = 0

 
 s25 p5 = 0
 
 s33 p3 = 1
YY
 
 s35 p5 = 0
 
 s45 p5 = 0
 
 s55 p5 = 1
WW
M2 M3 M5
Figure 6.4: The models M2,M3 and M5
There are a number of different ways in which this could be achieved. One obvious method
would be to use n atomic propositions to count up to 2n, giving in binary the state’s depth in
the tree. This approach seems simple, but requires more complicated models than the idea we
present here.
We shall use atomic propositions to represent whether the depth of the state in the model is
divisible by some prime numbers, fixed for each atomic proposition. A simple estimation of size
of the least common multiple of a series of primes will give the exponential depth result.
Throughout this proof we will use a small example to try to make things a bit clearer.
Example 6.3.3. Let M2, M3,M5 be the models in Fig. 6.4.
These models are cycles of states, where the number of states has been chosen to be different
prime numbers, in this case 2, 3 and 5. These models have the property that in Mi, on every
state where pi is false there must be a successor, but not necessarily when pi is true.
We now ask what properties any common implementation of these models {(Mi, si) : i = 2, 3, 5}
would have.
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We claim that any common implementation must have at least 30 states. We see this by noting
that the valuations of the atomic propositions mean that the length of any cycle must be divisible
by 2,3 and 5, and that if the model is acyclic, then the length of any path must also be divisible
by 2,3 and 5. Note that a path can only end in a common implementation if all the atoms pi
are true, and that on every path, p2 is true every two states, p3 every three states, and p5 every
five states.
We shall now prove Lemma 6.3.2 by constructing models in a similar manner to the previous
example.
Proof. Let S be a set of n consistent models, S = {(Mi, s1i )} where i ranges over the first n
primes, and where models in S have AP = {pi}. These models are constructed in the manner
of Example 6.3.3.
For each (Mi, s
1




i , Li) consists of i states. We
shall call these states s1i , s
2
i , . . . , s
i
i.
We shall connect these states together in a large cycle, as in the example. We put
(sji , s
j+1
i ) ∈ Rai , Rci 1 ≤ j < i
(sii, s
1
i ) ∈ Rc
We value these states again in the same manner as the example
L(sji , pk) =
12 1 ≤ j ≤ i, k 6= i
L(sji , pi) =
12 1 ≤ j < i
L(sii, pi) = 1
That is to say, on the model Mi, all the atoms pj where j 6= i are valued at 12 everywhere. The
atom pi is false all the way until the last state of the cycle, when it is true.
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We start our proof with the characteristic equations of these models. Let Xji be the name of
the characteristic equation that holds at sji . The system of characteristic equations is
Xji = ¬pj ∧ AX(Xj+1) ∧ EX(Xj+1) 1 ≤ j < i
X ii = pi ∧ AX(X1i )
We can derive, by induction, that the following must hold. On any implementation (I, x) with
(I, x) |= Ψ(Mi,s1i ) we must have
(I, x) |= EXkpi =⇒ k ≡ 0 (mod i)
(I, x) |= EXk¬pi =⇒ k 6≡ 0 (mod i) (6.2)




We may also derive that on any implementation of (Mi, s
1
i ) we must have that
AG(¬pi → EX(true))
is true, that is to say, if pi is false on a state, then that state has a successor.
Now, if (Z, z) is a common implementation of S, then it must be an implementation of all the
(Mi, s
1
i ), and then we have from (6.2) that a common implementation must satisfy
(Z, z) |= AXk (p2 ∧ p3 ∧ p5) ⇒ k ≡ 0 (mod 2 · 3 · 5)
and
(C, s) |= (¬p2 ∨ ¬p3 ∨ ¬p5) → EX(true)
for every s in C.
We now consider the common implementations of these models with an extra model J , which
we illustrate for this case of three cyclic models, in Fig. 6.5.


















 p2 = p3 = p5 = 1
Figure 6.5: The model J for the case of three cyclic models
We see that any implementation of J has the property that
(p2 ∧ p3 ∧ p5) → AX(false)
is true on every state. This is to say, if all of the atoms p2, p3 and p5 are true on a state, then
there is no successor.
Hence in a common implementation (Z, z) of {(Mk, sk) : k = 2, 3, 5} ∪ {(J, in)} we can derive
that
(Z, s) |= EX(true) ↔ (¬p2 ∧ ¬p3 ∧ ¬p5)
for every state s in Z, and thus that
(Z, z) |= EXk(EX(true)) ⇐⇒ k < 30
Now, as 2, 3 and 5 are distinct primes, they are thus co-prime with each other, thus any
common implementation of {(Mi, si) : i = 2, 3, 5} ∪ {(J, in)} will be bisimilar to a linear model
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of 2 · 3 · 5 = 30 states, as each path must be of 2 · 3 · 5 states, and the valuation of the atoms
depends only upon the distance from the origin, all are bisimilar to a linear model. Thus, up
to bisimulation, there is only one common implementation, and it is deterministic, even though
the model J is highly non-deterministic. This causes no contradiction, the other models contain
enough information to fully specify behaviour in J .
We can construct a model (J, in) for any n, the construction in Fig. 6.5 is obviously extendable.
If we wish to find a set of models whose implementation is a linear model of length greater
than kn, for some fixed k, then it suffices to consider the set Mpq , . . . ,Mpq+n , where pq is the
smallest prime larger than k. Then the size of the common implementation will be Πi=q+ni=q pi >
Πi=q+ni=q pq ≥ Πi=q+ni=q k = kn.
The question remains as to how many states the models Mpq , . . . ,Mpq+n contain. By a theorem
of Chebychev [Che52], we have that there exists a constant θ such that the number of primes
less than a given k is at least θ · k/ log(k). A suitable θ is 0.5. Since for sufficiently large k we
have that log k < k
1
2 , we have that the number of primes is greater than θ · k 12 . From this it
is seen that to ensure we have at least n + c primes in the range [0, x], it suffices to make x
larger than (n+c
θ
)2. Since we take the sum of the number of states of n models, then the total
number of states is thus in O(n · (n+c
θ
)2) = O(n3). We thus see that the total size of the models
is polynomial in n, but produces common implementations of depth exponential in n.
To see that this construction is in PTIME, we can simply note that PRIMES, the problem of
deciding if a given number is prime, is in PTIME [AKS02], this gives us the result immediately.
6.3.2 Alternating Turing Machines
Definition
Alternating Turing machines (ATM) were defined in [CKS81] as a generalisation of the idea
of non-determinism. An ATM contains states which are existential or universal and a non-
deterministic transition function. Existential states require at least one possible computation
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path through it to be accepting, whereas universal states require all to be. A machine composed
of entirely existential states corresponds thus to one that behaves in the manner of a non-
deterministic algorithm in the usual way, and one of universal states computes the complement
to these non-deterministic algorithms. The exact definition we use here is slightly different to
that given in [CKS81], but is easily seen to have the same properties for our purposes, whilst
resulting in a simplified construction. Complexity classes are defined in a similar way.
Definition 6.3.4. An Alternating Polynomial Space Turing Machine (APSTM), consists of a
5-tuple M = (Q,P, δ, q0, g), where
 Q consists of a finite, non-empty set of states of the machine
 P a polynomial that determines the length of the tape
 δ : Q × {0, 1} → P(Q × {0, 1} × {L,R}) is the transition relation encoded as a total
function
 q0 is an initial state and
 g : Q→ {∃,∀, accept, reject} specifies the type of each state.
An accepting or a rejecting state has an empty image under δ. The polynomial P determines,
once an input σ has been fixed, the length of the tape, P (|σ|). The machine is not allowed
to try to access tape cells to the left or right of this defined tape, such an attempt ends in a
rejecting state.
The initial set-up of the machine for an input σ is defined to be where σ is written to the tape,
starting at the first cell, the head points to the first cell, and the machine state is q0.
Without loss of generality we insist that all members of the image of δ have cardinality two.
That is to say any configuration can evolve into at most two successor configurations in each
step.
Note that δ does not take account of the head position, and thus may instruct the head to move
off the end of the tape, in either direction. In this case we consider that the head remains in
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place, and the state of the machine changes to a rejecting state. We do not allow the head to
move of the tape portion corresponding to the input word.
Our definition here is somewhat more restricted that the usual definition of an ATM, but it
is easy to see that for any language accepted by an ATM in polynomial space there is an
APSTM that accepts the same language. The class of languages accepted in polynomial space
by an ATM is known as APSPACE. This definition may be thought of as a “normal form” for
polynomial space ATMs which makes our construction simpler. It should be noted that our
definition does not include a ‘blank’ symbol for the tape. The machine can thus not be sure
when it has read the end of the input word. This does not make much difference in practice,
as we can encode the input word in some simple self-delimiting fashion. For instance we could
write w1w2 . . . wn as 0w10w2 . . . 0wn1.
Definition 6.3.5. Given some input σ, let n = P (|σ|), then a configuration C = (s, T, h)
consists of s, the current internal state of the machine, T = t1 . . . tn, the state of the tape, and
h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, an integer indicating the position of the head.
The initial configuration is the one the machine starts in, and is defined as (q0, σ, 1).
Example 6.3.6. We give here an example of an APSTM. This machine will accept the regular
language
{0, 1}∗11{0, 1}∗ ∪ {0, 1}∗101{0, 1}∗
using four states. The example does not truly show off the power of alternation, but this is
tricky to do whilst keeping the machine reasonably small.
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That is to say u is a universal machine state, e an existential machine state, a an accepting
machine state, and r a rejecting machine state. The transition function is defined by
δ(e, 0) = {(e, 0, R)}
δ(e, 1) = {(e, 1, R), (u, 1, R)}
δ(u, 0) = {(u, 0, L), (u, 0, R)}
δ(u, 1) = {(a, 1, R)}
δ(a, .) = ∅
The machine starts in the machine state e. It will now move rightwards, until, non-deterministically
whilst reading 1, deciding to enter machine state u, again whilst moving right. If the machine
now reads 1, it will enter the accepting state, otherwise the universal machine state forces it to
split itself into two copies, one which goes left, and one which goes right. The copy that goes
left will read 1, and accept. The copy that goes right will accept if it too reads 1. If it does not
read 1, it will split again, and one copy will move left. This creates an infinite loop, and implies
that the machine will not accept 100. Hence, if at any point in the word either of the subwords
11 or 101 occur, the machine accepts, otherwise it continues in an infinite fashion, which is
deemed rejecting. The rejecting state is not explicitly used here, but in the construction later
we shall use it, to deal with, for instance, cases where the head tries to move out of the work
tape.
We shall use this machine later to illustrate constructions.
Definition 6.3.7. A run of an ATM consists of a tree of configurations. Assume that Run is
a set of configurations, and ρ ⊆ Run × Run some binary relation on Run that makes Run a
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tree. Run is a run if the following conditions hold:
(s, T, h) ∈ Run, g(s) = ∃ ⇒ ∃(s′, w, d) ∈ δ(s, th, h),∃(s′, T ′, h′) (6.3)
such that (s, T, h)ρ(s′, T ′ = T [th 7→ w], h′)
(s, T, h) ∈ Run, g(s) = ∀ ⇒ ∀(s′, w, d) ∈ δ(s, th, h),∃(s′, T ′, h′) (6.4)
such that (s, T, h)ρ(s′, T ′ = T [th 7→ w], h′)
where h′ = h − 1 if d = 0, and h′ = h + 1 if d = 1, and at no time does h = 0 or h = n + 1.
The notation T [ti 7→ w] indicates the tape that results from changing the ith value of T to w,
that is to say T [ti 7→ w] = t1t2 . . . ti−1wti+1 . . . tn interpreted in the sensible fashion.
In (6.3) we have stated that if there is an existential configuration in a run, then there must
exist some successor configuration that corresponds to one of the possible actions of δ on the
tape, based upon the internal state and head position.
In (6.3) we have stated that if there is a universal configuration in a run, then every successor
configuration must be one of the at most two that correspond to the possible actions of δ on
the tape, based upon the internal state and head position.
A particular example of a run is shown in Example 3.6.9.
Definition 6.3.8. An accepting run is a run where every leaf is a configuration whose machine
state is accepting.
Example 6.3.9. We give here an example of an accepting run. Let our machine be as in the
previous example, and let the input be 101. As P (3) = 3 + 1 the tape will have four states,
the first three will be 101, the cell will be initialized to 0. The initial configuration is thus
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(a, 1010, 2) (a, 1010, 4)
It can be seen that this is an accepting run, and so our machine does indeed accept 101.
Definition 6.3.10. We say an ATM M accepts the word σ, and write M(σ) if there exists an
accepting run whose root configuration tape “reads” σ.
The important result in this context, again from [CKS81], is
APSPACE = EXPTIME.
That is, for any algorithm that runs on an ATM in space polynomial in the size of the input,
there is a corresponding algorithm for a usual Turing machine that runs in EXPTIME, and
vice-versa. As we have mentioned, languages accepted by an ATM in polynomial space are
accepted by a APSTM. Thus the problem of determining if an APSTM accepts a given word
is EXPTIME-hard.
Simulating an ATM
The proof of EXPTIME-hardness of the common implementation problem is done by construct-
ing a set of models that imitates an ATM with a polynomial large tape.
Lemma 6.3.11. [CKS81] For each APSPACE ATM, there is a positive real constant c such
that if the machine has an accepting run and accepts the word σ, then it has an accepting run
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for this word where every path in that run has length less than c|σ|. As the work tape is over an
alphabet of two letters, for sufficiently large n we have that c = 3 suffices.
This lemma follows from the fact that we can enumerate all possible configurations. As we
are working over a binary alphabet, there are 2n possible tape configurations, n possible head
positions, and some fixed number of internal state possibilities. Thus any path which is longer
that |Q| · n · 2n must contain a cycle.
The idea: Simulate an ATM with a common implementation
The idea for the simulation is that, given a machine M , and input σ, to find a set SσM of
pointed models such that the knowledge of the existence of a common implementation of SσM
will imply the existence of an accepting run for M given σ, and conversely that starting from
an accepting run of M(σ), we want to be able to deduce the existence of a model that is a
common implementation of SσM .
 First, we use the result from Lemma 6.3.2 that we may construct a set of models whose
common implementations all have the same, exponentially long, path length.
 We then introduce new propositional atoms, which are valued at 12 through the previously
constructed models. The interaction of these atoms, on successive states, is specified by
other sets of models.
 We have separate atoms to represent each tape cell. These are called ti for the ith cell
of the tape, from the left. There are also atoms to encode the head position. In this
construction, we shall encode the head position in unary, with one atom to represent
each possible position. This is wasteful, a base two encoding is also possible, but since
we are simulating machines using polynomial space, this is not a problem. We shall also
use a set of propositional atoms to encode the current internal state of the machine.
This is not really necessary for the simulation, but will make actually turning a common
implementation into an accepting run easier to follow. We shall also introduce two atoms
to represent when a computation path has entered an accepting or rejecting state.
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Outline of the construction Taking a common implementation of all these models, we use
the first group to provide a “backbone” to the implementation, to allow us to know every path
terminates, and is of a specific length. Note that this does not imply every path must be the
same, whilst they are all bisimilar with respect to the first group of atomic propositions, the
values of the second group will be different. We are using the first group to specify information
about the frame of the Kripke structure that results. The addition of the atoms is necessary
for this, but not for the rest.
The Construction: Models to simulate an ATM
We shall construct Modal Kripke Transition Systems over atomic propositions
AP = {ppi1 , . . . ppiy , t1, . . . , tn, h1, . . . , hn, s1, . . . , sm, ACCEPT,REJECT}
and over a single action, so we shall refer to Ra and Rc as the transition relations.
The atoms ppi1 , . . . ppiy are those required to make the model exponentially deep, where (pii)
y
i=1 is
a sequence of primes, and will be calculated shortly. The atomic propositions t1, . . . , tn, where
n = P (|σ|), represent the tape, t1 = 1 is the first cell of the tape, and so on. The atomic
propositions h1, . . . , hn represent the position of the head upon the tape, only one should be
true upon a state, and it is then the index of the true hi that indicates the position. The
atomic propostions s1,. . . , sm are used to represent the internal machine state. This is in fact
not necessary for the construction, as tracking this implicitly is possible, it will however simplify
the concept. The atoms ACCEPT and REJECT are used to mark where the simulation of a
run has entered an accepting or rejection state, as appropriate.
We shall simulate a single step of the ATM as three steps in this model. These steps are, given
a head position and state:
 Read contents of tape cell.
 Write to cell, and shift head according to δ.
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 Change machine state according to δ.
The set of models that imitates the ATM consists of three different classes of models that look
after the behaviour of different parts of the machine. Fix some input word σ and let n = |σ|,
then these parts are
 Initial set up and finite run. These models come mostly unmodified from Lemma 6.3.2.
They are (Mpi1 , spi1), . . . , (Mpiy , spiy), (L, in). Less than n models total, with each model of
size O(n2)
 Behaviour of machine states. This is a single large model that describes what the machine
does on a local section of tape. This model is O(P (n))
 Consistency of machine tape. These models, one for each cell of the tape, ensure that when
the head is not pointing at a cell on the tape, the value it contains does not change. There
are P (n) of these models, each of constant size.
The total size of SσM , that is ‖SσM‖, can thus be seen to be
O(n ·O(n2))2 +O(P (n))2 + (P (n) ·O(1))2) = O(n6 + P (n)2)
Input, and finite runs
The models we shall create here will set up the tape with the input, ensure that our simulation
of the machine starts in the correct initial machine state, and specifies that the machine cannot
enter rejecting states. They also ensure that although the machine may run for more than cn
steps, it will eventually halt, it disallows cyclic behaviour in our simulation.
These models are taken from Lemma 6.3.2. Knowing the c such that the machine will finish in
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Construct models Mpiy as in Lemma 6.3.2, differing only in that the extra atoms
t1, . . . , tn, h1, . . . , hn, s1, . . . , sm, ACCEPT,REJECT
should all be valued at 12 at all states.
Upon in, the atoms t1, . . . tn are set to equal the values of the tape for the given input. The
atom h1 is set to true to indicate that the head is at the first cell, and all other hi are set to
false.
Upon every state of J other than the final one, we value the atoms t1, . . . tn, h1, . . . hn, s1, . . . sm
as 12.
Upon the final state of J , where all the prime propositions of Lemma 6.3.2 are true, we set
the atom ACCEPT to true, and value it at 12 on all other states. That the atom ACCEPT
is valued at 12 on these states means that our simulation can enter its representation of an
accepting state on a given branch of the posited common implementation before this branch
finishes, i.e. reaches a leaf.
Upon all states of J the atom REJECT is false. This is to restrict the common implementations
to simulating not just runs of the machine, but accepting runs.
We see that, using Lemma 6.3.2, any member of CI({(Mi, si)} ∪ {(J, in)}) must be a tree
of length
∏
pii − 1. Since the other atoms, those not defined in Lemma 6.3.2, are under-
defined (valued at 12) throughout, they may take any value in an implementation. The set
{(Mi, si)} ∪ {(J, in)} therefore ensures only that the initial state is as we want, and that any
path in any common implementation is exponentially long, where the atoms that represent the
simulation of the machine can change as they please.
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Notation 4. Given some set of indexed propositional atoms, {r1, r2, . . . rx}, then we write
r = [v1v2 . . . vx]
where vi ∈ {0, 1} is a binary value, to specify that
ri = vi 1 ≤ i ≤ x
Example 6.3.12. An example input model for a machine that uses a tape of three cells, and
three prime cycles, is shown in Fig. 6.6. The input tape that this model represents is “1010”,
and it puts the machine into its initial state s1. Since the machine will take no more than |σ|
steps to halt, and since the input size is 3, it is easy to see that, by choosing pi1 = 2, and pi2 = 3,





p2 = p3 = p5 = 0
 














 p2 = p3 = p5 = 1
Figure 6.6: The input model (J, in) for our example machine, with input 1010. The uppermost
state is in, the initial state
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State transition
We shall construct here a single large model, which will describe the local evolution of the
machine. We shall call this model S.
We shall construct the model out of a number of “components”, which will model “local config-
urations” of the machine, and how these may evolve. These local configurations do not worry
about the tape except for the part where the head is pointing.
Each component Chi,sj represents a head position hi, and a machine state sj, and there are thus
n · |Q| components, where n is the length of the tape and |Q| = m is the number of machine
states.
We have stated that each change of configuration in our ATM will be modelled by three suc-
cessive states in the . These steps are
 Read contents of tape cell.
 Write to cell, and shift head according to δ.
 Change machine state according to δ.
Accordingly, we want the components Chi,sj to have a structure of the form:
 The first state of the component has a may transition to a state where ti = 0 and a may
transition to a state where ti = 1.
 Having read the contents of ti, and knowing the current machine state, the value of δ is
now known. So we now have transitions to states where the head position and value of ti
have been updated following δ.
 It now remains to change the current state sj, since we know where we have put the head,
and to what we wish to change the state, which we achieve by a simple transition to
the local component that represents this. Thus machine state information is represented
implicitly, and its evolution is described entirely by transitions.
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Each component Chi,qj consists of 7 states. The index hi is to indicate the head position, and
qj the internal machine state. The components are defined as follows:
Definition For each hi, and qj ∈ Q, that is each local configuration, we construct state shi,qj ,
this is the initial state of our component Chi,qj . We now construct states sti=0,qj and sti=1,qj ,
these states represent the two possibilities for the tape at this location. These states are valued
as in Table 6.1.
The initial state fully specifies only the head position. The two successors give the two possible
cases for the value of the pointed to tape cell ti. Thus this component does not specify what is
on the tape, but deals with both possibilities. The atom change on these two states indicates
the value of ti may change at the successors of these states.
We shall detail the rest of the construction for the part of the component that describes what
happens when ti = 0, that is when the branch to sti=0,qj is taken, the construction for the other
side, where ti = 1, for sti=1,qj , is similar, and this is omitted.
The idea is that the machine now splits into a number of states that describe the transition
relation of the machine.
Let (q1, w1, d1) and (q2, w2, d2) be the two elements of δ(qj, 0). Where q
i represents the machine
state, wi the value to be written, and di the direction to move the head. We now create in
our model states s1ti=0,qj and s
2
ti=0,qj
. We value these states to reflect the element of δ which
generated them. The labelling of these states is given in Table 6.2. We connect these states
internally to reflect the type of machine state that qj is




) ∈ Ra, Rc n = 1, 2
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L(shi,qj , hi) = 1
L(shi,qj , hk) = 0 k 6= i
L(shi,qj , sj) = 1
L(shi,qj , sk) = 0 k 6= j
L(shi,qj , change) = 0
L(sti=0,qj , ti) = 0




L(sti=0,qj , hi) = 1
L(sti=0,qj , hk) = 0 k 6= i
L(shi,qj , sj) = 1
L(shi,qj , sk) = 0 k 6= j
L(sti=0,qj , change) = 1
L(sti=1,qj , ti) = 1




L(sti=1,qj , hi) = 1
L(sti=1,qj , hk) = 0 k 6= i
L(shi,qj , sj) = 1
L(shi,qj , sk) = 0 k 6= j
L(sti=1,qj , change) = 1
These states are connected in the following manner
(shi,qj , sti=0,qj) ∈ Rc
(shi,qj , sti=1,qj) ∈ Rc
Table 6.1: Valuations and transition relation for the states shi,qi , sti=0,qjsti=1,qj , in component
Chi,qj
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L(snti=0,qj , ti) = wn




L(snti=0,qj , hi−1) = 1 if dn = 0
L(snti=0,qj , hi+1) = 1 if dn = 1
L(snti=0,qj , hi+1) = 0 otherwise
L(snhi,qj , sj) = 1
L(snhi,qj , sk) = 0 k 6= j
L(snti=0,qj , change) = 0






















s1ti=0,qj• s2ti=0,qj• s1ti=1,qj• s2ti=1,qj•
Figure 6.7: An example universal component




) ∈ Rc n = 1, 2
We illustrate this construction in Fig. 6.7 for a universal component, and in Fig. 6.8 for an
existential component.






s1ti=0,qj• s2ti=0,qj• s1ti=1,qj• s2ti=1,qj•
Figure 6.8: An example existential component
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   REJECT = 1
  ACCEPT = 1
Figure 6.9: Left: the component Acc. Right: the component Rej.
relation must exist. For an existential component, we only require that those outcomes are
consistent with the transition relation. We do not need to worry about either option being
implemented, as, as we shall see later, other models in the common implementation will force
at least one to be implemented.
We must also construct a component Acc that represents an accepting state. This component
will be slightly different, as it will loop within itself, and not transition to other components. The
idea is that when this accepting component is reached, the path may continue on indefinitely
in this accepting state. The head is arbitrarily chosen to rest at the position 1, that is to say
h1 is true throughout this component. Now, we also want that our common implementation
represents an accepting run of an ATM, and thus all paths end in acceptance. To do this we
make the Acc component refer to the atom ACCEPT in a positive sense. The component Acc
consists of two states. The initial state has a may transition to itself, and a may transition to
the second. The second state has no outgoing transitions, and the atom ACCEPT valued as
1. The atom ACCEPT is valued as 0 on all other states of the model S. The first state has
h1 valued 1 and the other hi valued 0. The component is illustrated in Fig. 6.9.
Finally we construct a component Rej that represents a rejecting state. This will consist of a
single state with the atom REJECT being valued 1, with all other atoms being valued as 12.
This is illustrated in Fig. 6.9.
Connecting the components. It remains to define how these components are connected
together to model the evolution of local configurations. Assuming that we are on the state
snti=0,qj , and that xn = (qn, wn, dn), it remains to move to a component which represents the
local configuration of machine state qn and head position as determined by xn. If dn = 0 then







































Figure 6.10: The component Ch2,u
we connect snti=0,qj as follows
(snti=0,qj , sti−1=0,qn) ∈ Rc




(snti=0,qj , sti+1=1,qn) ∈ Rc
Example 6.3.13. Using the example machine from earlier, we illustrate the component Ch2,u
in Fig. 6.10, when the head is at the second position, and the internal machine state is u.
From the same machine, we also illustrate the component Ch2,e in Fig. 6.11.
This model fully describes the local operation of the machine, however it says nothing about
the global state, that is to say it abstracts away nearly all the tape information. This problem
is rectified by the next group of models, defined below.
Example 6.3.14. We illustrate in Fig. 6.12, for our example machine, how every component
is connected together in the model S. This overview does not show the fine details of the







































































































































Figure 6.12: An outline model of our example machine, showing how components are connected
connections within the components. In Fig. 6.13 we show the same outline, this time illustrating
the internal connections in the components, but omitting propositional information.
Tape preservation
The model S just presented specifies the value of atomic propositions concerning the head
position and the cell where it points. We now create a model that encodes the fact that the
tape cells where the head is not pointing to do not change their value, as this would ruin our
simulation.
To make sure that the data on the tape does not change where the head is not pointing to,
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Ch1,e Ch2,e Ch3,e Ch4,e
Figure 6.13: Global model of our model of the ATM. Propositional information not illustrated.
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we construct for each cell ti, a model Ti, which ensures that atomic proposition ti only changes
when the head points to it. In these models, states where the atom tk is true can transition
to states where tk is true when hk is false, similarly if tk is false, then if hk is false then it will
only transition to a state where tk is false. If hk is true, then transitions are possible to states
where tk is true and also those where tj is false. This is illustrated in Fig 6.14.
Example 6.3.15. In Fig. 6.14 we illustrate the component Ti. The important aspect of this
component is that the only states which have successors with a different value of ti are those
where the propositional atom change is true.
 
 s0 ti = 0, hi = 12 , change = 0

  




 ti = 0, hi = 1, change = 1
OO 44
 
 ti = 1, hi = 1, change = 1
OOjj
Figure 6.14: The model Ti. The state chosen to be the initial state is dependent upon the input
to the simulated machine. If when the machine is initialized the tape cell ti = 0 then the initial
state of this model is s0, otherwise, if the tape cell is initialized so ti = 1 then the initial state
is s1.
6.3.3 Simulating an ATM with a common implementation
We shall reason about the properties of various subsets of SσM , and use these results to reason
about a common implementation of the entire set SσM . That this is a valid thing to do is set
out in the next lemma.
Lemma 6.3.16. Let A,B be two sets of pointed mixed models. Then
A ⊆ B ⇒ CI(B) ⊆ CI(A)
Hence, a property of common implementations of A will also be a property of common imple-
mentations of B.
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We now use this lemma to conclude something about SσM from the set of the models Mi and J .
Lemma 6.3.17. A two-valued model that is a common implementation of the models (Mi, si)
and (L, in) has the property that there exists some k > 0 such that




is true upon the initial state of the common implementation.
This property gives us that any common implementation of SσM will be, up to bisimulation, a
tree where every path is of some fixed length, which is longer than the run time of the machine.
From now on the models Mi used to ensure this length can be assumed, and otherwise ignored,
as their atomic propositions, besides accept do not feature in the other models. The only
required conclusion is that a common implementation must satisfy equation (6.5) for some
k > c|σ|.
We now derive from the models Ti that they do in fact preserve that part of the tape where
the head is not pointing, as we would wish.




AG (((ti ∧ EX¬ti) ∨ (¬ti ∧ EXti)) → (change ∧ hi ∧ AX(¬change ∨ ¬hi))
Proof. We shall prove the property for an individual Ti, then expand the result to the entire
set using Lemma 6.3.16. We shall use the characteristic equations of Ti to derive the result in
one direction, and in the other show that the equation implies the truth of the characteristic
equations. Choose some model Ti ∈ T . Refer to Fig. 6.14. The characteristic formula of Ti, as
a system of equations, is
X1 = ¬ti ∧ (¬hi ∨ ¬change) ∧ AX(X1 ∨X3) X2 = ti ∧ (¬hi ∨ ¬change) ∧ AX(X2 ∨X4)
X3 = ¬ti ∧ hi ∧ change ∧ AX(X1 ∨X2) X4 = ti ∧ hi ∧ change ∧ AX(X1 ∨X2)
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We wish to show that the system, taken with a greatest fixed point, is equivalent to
AG (((ti ∧ EX¬ti) ∨ (¬ti ∧ EXti)) → (change ∧ hi ∧ AX(¬change ∨ ¬hi))) (6.6)
On any state on any implementation, there are 8 possible valuations of the triple ti, hi, change.
Each valuation implies exactly one of the Xi can be true. Thus a valuation of ti, hi and change
implies which valuations of these two may succeed it, by the definition of the Xi.
The equation (6.6) also, given values for ti, hi, change, specifies what valuations are possible on
successors.
If we enumerate these possibilities, we see that they are the same. For instance, if ti, hi, change
are all false, then considering either equation implies that on a successor, either again all are
false, or ti is false, and both hi and change are true.
Theorem 6.3.19. Given an ATM M , and input σ, then
CI(SσM) ⇐⇒ M(σ)
We shall prove each direction separately, although results we derive in the first proof (indepen-
dently of the assumption) will be used in the second.
Proof. To prove that CI(SσM) =⇒ M(σ) we show that from a common implementation of SσM
we demonstrate that M(σ) has an accepting run.
We now consider the model S. Given a component Chi,qj of S, let ΨChi,qj be equal to Ψshi,qj ,




¬hk ∧ hi ∧
∧
k 6=j
¬qk ∧ qj ∧ ¬change ∧ AX(Ψsti=0,qj ∨Ψsti=1,qj ) (6.7)
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If qj is a universal state then we have
Ψsti=0,qj = ¬ti ∧
∧
k 6=i
¬hk ∧ hi ∧
∧
k 6=j
¬qk ∧ qj ∧ change
∧AX(Ψs1ti=0,qj ∨Ψs2ti=0,qj ) ∧ EX(Ψs1ti=0,qj ) ∧ EX(Ψs2ti=0,qj ) (6.8)
Ψsti=1,qj = ti ∧
∧
k 6=i
¬hk ∧ hi ∧
∧
k 6=j
¬qk ∧ qj ∧ change
∧AX(Ψs1ti=1,qj ∨Ψs2ti=1,qj ) ∧ EX(Ψs1ti=1,qj ) ∧ EX(Ψs2ti=1,qj ) (6.9)
If qj is an existential state then
Ψsti=0,qj = ¬ti ∧
∧
k 6=i
¬hk ∧ hi ∧
∧
k 6=j
¬qk ∧ qj ∧ change ∧ AX(Ψs1ti=0,qj ∨Ψs2ti=0,qj )
Ψsti=1,qj = ti ∧
∧
k 6=i
¬hk ∧ hi ∧
∧
k 6=j
¬qk ∧ qj ∧ change ∧ AX(Ψs1ti=1,qj ∨Ψs2ti=1,qj )
Given a xn = (qn, wn, dn) from δ, we have, in both cases, that
Ψsnti=0,qj
= (ti ↔ wn) ∧
∧
k 6=i
¬hk ∧ hi ∧
∧
k 6=j
¬qk ∧ qj ∧ change ∧ AX(Ch,qn) ∧
∧
EX(Ch,qn)
Now, we know that for each configuration, δ produces two successors, let C1 and C2 be the
successors defined by δ if the tape value at the head is 0, and C3 and C4 those if it is 1.
Let φ be the conjunction of the characteristic formula of the Ti, along with EX(EX(EX(true))),
then we find that for each Chi,qj , if qj is existential then,
φ ∧ΨChi,qj →
(
ti → ∧AX(EX(AX(C1)) ∧ EX(AX(C2))) ∧
¬ti → ∧AX(EX(AX(C3)) ∧ EX(AX(C4)))
)
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is a valid sentence in the modal µ-calculus, which gives us in turn that
φ ∧ΨChi,qj →
(
(ti → ∧EX(EX(EX(C1))) ∧ EX(EX(EX(C2)))) ∧
(¬ti → ∧EX(EX(EX(C3))) ∧ EX(EX(EX(C4))))
)
is also a valid sentence.
If qj is universal we may conclude that
ΨChi,qj →
(
ti → ∧AX(AX(AX(C1 ∨ C2))) ∧
¬ti → ∧AX(AX(AX(C3 ∨ C4)))
)
is a valid sentence. Again, the correctness of these deductions can be proved formally.
Compare these results with equations (6.3) and (6.4), from the definition of an Alternating
Turing Machine. We see that the evolution of a path in a common implementation does in
fact exactly simulate the evolution of configurations of the ATM, assuming that there are the
required successor states. But we know from our construction that every path contains enough
states for the machine to finish its computation path if this is possible.
This is to say, in any common implementation, configurations are succeeded by configurations,
and the order in which, and the branching involved conforms exactly to the evolution of con-
figurations in the ATM we are simulating. A common implementation can be considered a run
of the ATM.
Combined with the fact that our common implementation insists that the property AF(ACCEPT )
holds, and that in S the atom ACCEPT is only true in the component Acc, we see that not
only does a common implementation follow δ, but must do so in such a way that every path
is finite and ends in an accepting state. This is precisely what we need for an accepting run.
Hence M(σ).
To make this proof easier to grasp, we have added extra propositional atoms representing the
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current machine internal state. These are not strictly required in the proof itself, but are useful
when trying to actually see how a common implementation can be turned into an accepting
run. An example, using the same ATM as before is given below, in Example 6.3.20.
We now show that the other direction also holds.
Proof. (Outline) Given that M(σ) holds, we wish to show that CI(SσM) is true, that there is a
common implementation.
The first thing to note is that M(σ) implies the existence of an accepting run where all paths
are less than some 3n, with n the length of input, |σ|. Taking such an accepting run, we shall
construct our common implementation.
The plan here is to simply run the previous proof in reverse. Taking the accepting run as a
guide, we construct a model A, by glueing together components of SσM with transitions between
the components, to represent the change in configurations of the machine, we refine these
components, choosing to implement the information we have, and those parts of the components
that are involved in the run, the rest is discarded. These connections, the transitions between
the components, will be ones possible in SσM , as we have encoded the transition relation in S
σ
M .
These chains of components will all end in the ACCEPT component, which we do not yet
refine in any way. This is easily seen to be a refinement of SσM .
The model so far constructed is also a refinement of the Ti, as the values for the ti, hi and
change are recorded from the head and tape information from the accepting run. They will
thus only change when the head is upon them, and the head is only ever in one position.
This model A is now a tree whose leaves, in the Acc components, consist of a single state return-
ing to itself. Every path length is less than or equal to the previously determined exponential
constant. Implement these Acc components, by extending them out to a make paths of length
k. We may then decorate A with the required values of the atoms pi, and we shall have a
common implementation of all the models.
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Example 6.3.20. To illustrate how this proof works, we shall construct a common implemen-
tation of the set SσM for our running example.
The first step is to find the basic structure of this implementation, we do this, as stated in the
proof, by gluing components of the model St together. We use the accepting run from Example
6.3.12. The result of this is illustrated in Fig. 6.15
We want to find an implementation of Fig. 6.15 that will be an implementation of all of SσM . To
do this we just need to find values for the atoms pi that work. We extend the paths by choosing
how to implement the Acc leafs so that all path lengths match the length of implementations of
the models (Mi, si) and (J, in). On the model in Fig. 6.3.12 the atoms pi are all valued as 12.
Thus we can, atom by atom, choose values on the model that will give us the implementation
properties required.
We shall now prove that the previous theorem does not depend on the number of proposi-
tional atoms, by giving a construction that eliminates atomic propositions, at the cost of a
(polynomially) larger set of states.
6.3.4 From Modal Kripke Labeled Transition Systems to Modal La-
beled Transition Systems
The EXPTIME-complete construction involved the use of introduction of a large number of
atomic propositions. The following lemma demonstrates that the expressiveness of common
implementation checks is not due to the number of atoms, or indeed to their presence at all, but
to the total size of the models. Hence we can consider Modal Kripke Labeled Transition Systems,
and the results apply equally to the simpler Modal Labeled Transition Systems themselves.
Lemma 6.3.21. Let S be a finite set of Modal Kripke Labeled Transition Systems with one
action, and k atomic propositions. Then we can find, in PTIME, a finite set of Modal Labeled
Transition Systems S ′ over two actions α, β such that
CI(S) = ∅ ⇐⇒ CI(S ′) = ∅









































































Acc • ZZ • ZZ Acc
Figure 6.15: An assembly of the components used in the model St, guided by the accept-
ing run shown in Example 6.3.9. From this model we can proceed to construct a common
implementation of SσM
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Ch1,e
  h = [1000], t = [1010], s = [1000], change = 0
  h = [1000], t = [1010], s = [1000], change = 1
  h = [0100], t = [1010], s = [1000], change = 0

Ch2,u
  h = [0100], t = [1010], s = [0100], change = 0






  h = [1000], t = [1010], s = [0100], change = 0

  h = [0010], t = [1010], s = [0100], change = 0

Ch1,u
  h = [1000], t = [1010], s = [0100], change = 0

  h = [0010], t = [1010], s = [0100], change = 0

Ch3,u
  h = [1000], t = [1010], s = [0100], change = 1

  h = [0010], t = [1010], s = [0100], change = 1
  h = [0100], t = [1010], s = [0100], change = 0

  h = [0001], t = [1010], s = [0100], change = 0

Acc
  h = [1000], t = [1010], s = [0010], change = 0





  h = [1000], t = [1010], s = [0010], change = 0













  h = [1000], t = [1010], s = [0010], change = 0





  h = [1000], t = [1010], s = [0010], change = 0   h = [0010], t = [1010], s = [0010], change = 0 Acc
Figure 6.16: Example implementation of SσM . Here the vector of atomic propositions s =
[v1v2v3v4] represents s = e, the existential machine state in our example if v1 = 1; s = u, the
universal machine state, if v2 = 1; s = Acc if v3 = 1; and s = Rej if v4 = 1. Note the repeated
states at the ends of each branch, these should be extended so every path in the tree is of length
30, needed to bring the length up to that required by the models (Mi, si)
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and with ‖S ′‖ = O(k · ‖S‖).
The proof of Lemma 6.3.21 is based upon refinement. We shall construct a series of Modal
Labeled Transition Systems, such that a common implementation C of the Modal Labeled
Transition Systems can be converted easily into a Modal Kripke Labeled Transition System D
over the original set of atomic propositions and original one action; and vice-versa. It is proved
that D is a common implementation of the original set of models. For the reverse implication
we show that a common implementation of the original set can be transformed into a common
implementation of the second.
To do this we define a transformation of Modal Kripke Labaled Transition Systems to Modal
Labeled Transition Systems.
Let S = {(M1, s1), . . . , (Mj, sj)} be a set of Modal Kripke Labeled Transition Systems over
atomic propositions {p1, . . . , pk}, and over one action α. Let Mi = (Si, Ra, Rc, L).
Definition 6.3.22. For each Modal Kripke Labeled Transition System (Mi, si), we define the







′a, R′c, L′). For each state s in Si we
create a state s′ in S ′i. That is to say
S ′i = {s′ : s ∈ Si}






i is such a way as so
(sa, sb) ∈ Raα ⇐⇒ (s′a, s′b) ∈ R′aα (6.10)
(sa, sb) ∈ Rcα ⇐⇒ (s′a, s′b) ∈ R′cα (6.11)
Since Mi is a Modal Kripke Labeled Transition System, it will have R
a
α ⊆ Rcα, and so it follows
that R′aα ⊆ R′cα . All we have done here is strip out the atomic propositions.
We now add back the information to M ′i that was lost by stripping out the atomic propositions.
For each state s′ in M ′i we construct k + 1 extra states, called s
′(l)
i for 1 ≤ l ≤ k + 1. We set
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i ) ∈ R′cα ⇐⇒ L(si, pm) = 12 (6.15)
Note the characteristic formulae for these states. Given a characteristic formula φ, denote by
φ¯ the formula created by deleting atomic proposition subformulae. We have that















































) if L(si, pm) = 0
The first equation states that the structure of the states written in the form s′ in M ′ has the
same overall shape as the original states in M .
What we have done is decorate each state that came from the original model with a “tail”,
within which the status of the atoms in the original model is encoded. The encoding, in unary
is simple, but robust under bisimulation. We shall refer to the state which corresponded directly
to the state in the original model as the “head” state.
Example 6.3.23. This construction is illustrated for a Modal Kripke Labeled Transition System
consisting of two states over three atoms in Fig. 6.17. The transformation is on the right. The
leftmost states represent the states in the original model.
Lemma 6.3.24.
(M, s)  (N, t) ⇒ (M ′, s′)  (N ′, t′) (6.16)
The transformation preserves refinement, and thus the property of common implementation.













































































Figure 6.18: A model whose transformation has implementations which are not transformed
models
We wish to show that we can reverse the transformation and find a model that is a common
implementation of the original set of models. This reversal of transformation is complicated
by the possibilities of implementation, as illustrated in Fig. 6.18. To ensure that common im-
plementations of the transformed models can be reversed into a common implementation of
the original models, we will take a common implementation of the transformed models with
consistency models C1, . . . , Ck. The idea behind these models is that any common implemen-
tation with Ci must have on each “tail” either pi true or pi false, and that both possibilities are
not allowed. The model consists of an initial state which has transitions to two states which
represent the frame of the model. These two states each have tails, one representing pi true, one
representing pi false. Clearly no “head” state can be an implementation of both, and hence in a
common implementation, all atomic propositions are determined. A common implementation




































Figure 6.19: The model C2, which encodes that the atomic proposition p2 must hold on only
one truth value on a “tail”, when we are encoding the removal of three propositional atoms
of the initial models can now be found by removing the tails and placing the information back
as atomic propositions.
Definition 6.3.25. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the model Ci consists of 2 ·k+3 states. Call the initial
state s, and the others x0, . . . xk and y0, . . . , yk. We set the relations as follows
(s, x0) ∈ Rcα (6.17)
(s, y0) ∈ Rcα (6.18)
(x0, y0) ∈ Rcα (6.19)
(y0, x0) ∈ Rcα (6.20)
(xj, xj+1) ∈ Raβ, Rcβ ∀0 ≤ j < k (6.21)
(yj, yj+1) ∈ Raβ, Rcβ ∀0 ≤ j < k (6.22)
(xj, xj+1) ∈ Rcα ∀0 ≤ j < k, i 6= j (6.23)
(yj, yj+1) ∈ Rcα ∀0 ≤ j < k, i 6= j (6.24)
(xi, xi+1) ∈ Raα, Rcα (6.25)
Example 6.3.26. For three atoms, the model C2 is illustrated in Fig. 6.19. This is the model
that insists that the atom p2 is always either true, or false, but never both.
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The result of taking a common implementation with the Ci is that this implies that a common
implementation of these models is “reversible”. If we were to take a set of pointed models S,
apply the transformation of Definition 6.3.22 to get S ′, and then look at common implementa-
tions of S ∪⋃Ci, then there is a natural way to transform any member of CI(S ∪⋃Ci) into
a member of CI(S). Taking common implementations with the Ci ensures that each “head”
state has only one “tail”, up to bisimulation. Hence, the reverse of the transformation of De-
finition 6.3.22 is obvious, we create a state for each “head” state, give it atomic propositions
informed by the “tail”, and connect these states together as the “head” states are.
Lemma 6.3.27. Given (M, s) and (N, t), there exists a finite set of models C, depending only
on the signature of M and N such that
CI({(M ′, s′), (N ′, t′)} ∪ C) ⇒ CI((M, s), (N, t)) (6.26)
A common implementation of the transformed models implies the existence of a common im-
plementation of the original, untransformed models.
Proof. From the characteristic formula of the model Ci we may deduce that
AG([β]i(〈α〉(true) ∨ [α](false)
must hold on any implementation. If we take the conjunction of these formula, as we would
have for a common implementation, then this implies that on a state which has a “tail” in the
implementation, that the tail is unique up to bisimulation. We know that this tail must consist
of a fixed number of β transitions, but the above formula gives that if after the ith β transition
there is an α transition, then this must hold on the path of i βs from the start of the tail.
As the “tail” is unique and fixed, we can meaningfully consider a reverse transformation, re-
moving the “tail”, and replacing the proposition atoms on the “head”.
We have now seen that we may eliminate propositional atoms from a set of models, creating a
new set that is only polynomially larger, but has the same common implementation properties.
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Note that this involves the creation of an extra action. With a more complicated construction
it is possible to reduce this to a single atom.
A set of Modal Labeled Transition Systems of a set of actions Act and atoms AP can be
transformed into a new set of Modal Labeled Transition Systems over a single action, that is
polynomial in the size of the original set, and has the same common implementation properties.
6.4 Implementation inclusion
We have so far considered the possibility of efficiently checking sentences of a logic over Modal
Labeled Transition Systems from the point of view of the semantics and syntax of the sentence.
Although the associated transformations and decision problems are in general no easier than
performing the original check, we have seen there is a useful subset of sentences where progress
can be made.
We now look at this problem from the other point of view, and ask if any progress, in terms of
efficiency, can be made by examining the model itself. In this chapter we examine the property
of implementation inclusion.
Definition 6.4.1. Let (M, s) and (N, t) be pointed models. If I(M, s) ⊆ I(N, t), then we say



































Figure 6.20: A pointed model (M, s) and its only implementation (N, t) (up to bisimulation)
Example 6.4.2. Fig. 6.20 shows an instance of two models which have the same set of imple-
mentations, a special case of implementation inclusion.
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Clearly, if all the implementations of N are included in the implementations of M , then if there
is an implementation of N with a specific property, then there is an implementation of M with
this property. If N has fewer states, or fewer may transitions, performing a general model check
will be easier.
Now, it is easily seen by the transitivity of the refinement relation, that the implementation
inclusion property holds for any two models where the second is a refinement of the first.
However, there exist models which are not refinement equivalent, even though their imple-
mentation sets coincide. This is illustrated in Fig 6.20, an example due to Harald Fecher
[AHL+08b], where the model upon the left has only one bisimulation distinct implementation,
which is precisely the implementation upon the right. Hence the implementations of the left-
hand model form a subset of those of the righthand model, and yet the lefthand model is not
a refinement of the righthand model. From this example one can construct models which have
the implementation inclusion property, but which are not refinements of each other in either
direction.
Now, consider the sentence
φ = AX(AXfalse ∨ AX(AXfalse))
This sentence is not optimistically self-minimizing over Modal Labeled Transition Systems, with
the left-hand model of Fig. 6.20 providing a counter-example. Suppose however we are given
φ and M of Fig. 6.20, and wished to check if any implementation of M satisfied φ. Then φ
can not be generated by our optimistically self-minimizing grammar, as the grammar is sound.
We may then ask ourselves, can we simplify M? Can that may transition be removed? In this
case it is easy to see that it can, but is there an efficient procedure in general? We have seen
that refinement is not enough to characterise implementation inclusion, but is there a “normal-
form”, or method of removing “redundant” transitions such as that in the model M , in such a
way that refinement does then characterise implementation inclusion? In this chapter we shall
answer this question in the negative by showing that the property of implementation inclusion
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for two models is PSPACE-hard in the number of states. There is therefore no efficient way to
simplify Modal Labeled Transition Systems so that refinement, or some related PTIME process
can characterise implementation inclusion.
6.4.1 QCNF, a PSPACE-complete problem
We do this by showing that a PSPACE-complete decision problem can be easily (that is to say,
in LOGSPACE and PTIME) embedded in an implementation inclusion check. The problem
we choose is that of determining the truth of Quantified Conjunctive Normal Form (QCNF)
sentences. A QCNF sentence ψ consists of a block of quantifiers Q1x1Q2x2 . . . Qnxn followed
by a formula K of propositional logic in Conjunctive Normal Form. We shall refer to K as
being the propositional kernel of the sentence. The problem of deciding if a QCNF sentence is
true is related to the more well-known problem of Quantified Boolean Formulae (QBF), where
no normal form is imposed upon the proposition kernel of the sentence. Both problems are
PSPACE-complete [BL99, SM73].
Definition 6.4.3. Let QCNF consist of those sentences of the form









and Q represents either of ∃ and ∀, and where both i, k and m range over finite index sets, and
jk, lm ∈ {1 . . . n}.
Definition 6.4.4. We now define a notion of truth for a QCNF. Whereas for a sentence of
propositional logic, the definition of a valuation is simple, for the QCNF we shall construct
what we call valuation trees, which define a number of different valuations, based upon the
quantifier block of the QCNF sentence.
Let φ be a QCNF sentence, then we define valuation trees for φ in an inductive manner upon
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([α], V ∪ {x}) ([α], V )






([α], V ∪ {x}) ([α], V )
([K], V ) → V
Figure 6.21: The grammar sending QCNF sentences to valuation trees. Given a sentence, φ,
its valuation trees are those generated from ([φ], {}). It should be noted that the sets labeled
here by V contain the atomic propositions chosen to be true upon that branch. We denote by
K the propositional kernel of φ
the quantifier block of φ. Let ψ be the quantifier block of φ, with the symbol K appended on
the end, to represent the propositional kernel. This is most easily done diagrammatically, and
is illustrated in Fig. 6.21.
We now define a semantics for QCNF sentences upon valuation trees. Let T be a valuation
tree. Let S be a set that labels one of the leaves of T . We define a propositional logic valuation
νS by valuing xi to be true if and only if xi ∈ S. Let νT now represent the set of all possible
propositional logic valuations derived from all leaves of T in this way. We say that a valuation
tree T satisfies φ, and write T |= φ if and only if
ν |= K
for all ν ∈ νT , where K is the propositional logic kernel of φ.
If there is a valuation tree T such that T |= φ, then we say that φ is true. If there exists no
such tree, then we say that φ is false.
Example 6.4.5. Let
φ = ∀x∃y.(¬x ∨ y) ∧ (¬y ∨ x)
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is a valuation tree that demonstrates that φ is true. This is obtained by first transforming φ to
ψ = ∀x∃yK. By applying the transformations of the previous definition, we can get:



















































([K], {x, y}) ([K], {}) {x, y} {}
Thus we see that the given tree is in fact a valuation tree for this given φ. It remains to show
that T |= φ. The tree T has two leaves. The one with label {x, y} we interpret as a valuation
where both x and y are mapped to true. The other leaf, with label {}, we interpret as a valuation
where both atoms are valued false. Hence T |= φ will be true if and only if
φ[x 7→ true, y 7→ true] = true and
φ[x 7→ false, y 7→ false] = true
As this is indeed the case, we see that T does demonstrate that φ is true.
































[α] [α] [α] [α]
K → S where S is some element of P({x1, . . . xn})
Potential valuation trees differ from valuation trees, as existential quantifiers may have branches
for both truth values, or none, and at the end of the transformation K is mapped to any subset
of {x1, . . . , xn}, it no longer depends upon which particular branch the K is on.
Figure 6.22: The grammar sending QCNF sentences to potential valuation trees
Definition 6.4.6. We shall also need a set of trees that includes these valuation trees, but also
other types of tree. We shall call this set the set of potential valuation trees. An element in this
set is called correct if it is a valuation tree, and flawed if it is not.
This set of potential valuations is again defined diagrammatically by structural induction. This
is illustrated in Fig. 6.22.




























This potential valuation tree is flawed in three ways. Starting at the top, on the left branch the y
node does not have a successor. The branch on the right has two successors, but was generated
by transforming an existential quantifier in the original φ. A leaf is labeled {x, y}, but is on the
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end of a path where x was chosen to be false.
6.4.2 Using QCNF to prove implementation inclusion is PSPACE-
hard
We have defined truth for QCNF sentences, and it is easy to see that this coincides with the
usual definition of truth. We shall now show how we can decide if a QCNF sentence φ is false
by generating two models from φ and performing an implementation inclusion check upon the
pair. The idea is that we shall construct two models that can be interpreted as statements
about possible valuation trees, and if they are flawed. We shall define two models
(Nφ, tφ) : implementations of which represent potential valuation trees, with the property that it
includes all those that are proper valuation trees and also satisfy φ.
(Mφ, sφ) : implementations of which represent flawed potential valuation trees.
The proof to be presented will show that if all the implementations of (Nφ, tφ) are included in
those of the (Mφ, sφ), then every potential valuation tree is flawed i.e. does not satisfy φ, and
so there is no valuation tree that shows that φ is true. That is to say
I((Nφ, tφ)) ⊆ I((Mφ, sφ)) ⇒ φ = false
We shall also show the converse, that if φ is false, then we must have that every potential
valuation tree is flawed and so
φ = false⇒ I((Nφ, tφ)) ⊆ I((Mφ, sφ))
We shall show that valuation trees that prove that sentence φ is true correspond to implemen-
tations of (Nφ, tφ) which are not implementations of (Mφ, sφ), and that these implementations
can in turn be transformed into valuation trees that witness the truth of φ. This will then give
the two implications above.
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Figure 6.23: The model Nφ, where φ = ∀x∃y.(¬x ∨ y) ∧ (¬y ∨ x)
PSPACE-hardness then follows as Mφ and Nφ will be seen to be constructible in LOGSPACE,
and deciding the truth of a QCNF sentence φ is PSPACE-hard in the length of φ.
The model Nφ
We shall construct Nφ by syntactic induction upon the sentence φ. We shall demonstrate the
construction on an example.
Example 6.4.8. Let φ = ∀x∃y.(¬x∨ y)∧ (¬y ∨x). Then φ is true. We shall demonstrate this
using our approach here. The model Nφ for this sentence is given in Fig. 6.23.
Definition 6.4.9. Given a QCNF φ, we define Nφ to be the Modal Labeled Transition System


































Figure 6.25: Structural induction rule for ∀x.φ
created by the following process of structural induction. The model is created over the actions
Act = {vα : α ∈ var} ∪ {v¬α : α ∈ var} ∪ {∗}
where var is the set of variables used in φ. All transitions in these diagrams without explicit
labels are ∗-transitions. The transformation is defined in the following manner.
We construct an initial state sφ, and from that let the rest be attached to that, illustrated in
Fig. 6.24-6.30.




















Figure 6.26: Structural induction rule for ∃x.φ
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Figure 6.27: Structural induction rule for φ ∧ ψ
φ ∨ ψ ⇒ •
 
φ ψ








Figure 6.30: Structural induction rule for ¬p



































Figure 6.31: Sole implementation possibility for ∀x.φ, at (Nθ, t∀x.φ)
defined, implies that every path through Nφ is finite, and so every implementation of Nφ will be
bisimilar to a finite tree. We shall examine the possible tree implementations of the syntactic
transformation. In these diagrams a boxed I(φ) represents, up to bisimulation, the possible
implementations of the syntactic transformation of φ in (Nφ, sφ). The element of choice in
how we make an implementation comes from the components ∃ and ∨, as one would expect, for
we have to choose, a value for x, or choose which operand of the ∨ we shall consider in the hope
that it is true. Due to the nature of Modal Labeled Transition Systems, there is no guarantee
that an implementation of an ∃ or ∨ component will make either of these choices, both may
transitions may not be implemented. The possibilities are illustrated in Figs. 6.31-6.35.
Examining Fig. 6.23, and considering how to implement or not the various may transitions, it
should be clear now how an implementation of Nφ corresponds to a potential valuation tree, at-
tempting to demonstrate the truth of φ. Considering an implementation as a tree, first consider
the initial part corresponding to the transformed quantifiers. Each branch represents a choice
of truth values for the variable. Moving down the branch, at the part of the implementation
corresponding to a transformed ∨, not every operand need be present, those that are present
are those that are asserted to be true. Just as we think of an existential quantifier as asking us
to pick one value, we think of a ∨ as asking us to pick one operand.





















































Figure 6.32: The four implementation possibilities for ∃x.φ, at (Nθ, t∃x.φ)

















Figure 6.33: Sole implementation possibility for φ ∧ ψ
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Figure 6.35: Sole implementation possibilities for atoms, at (Nθ, tp) or (Nθ, t¬p)








ww   ''
Figure 6.36: Diagrammatic outline of the model Mφ
The model Mφ
This model is supposed to abstract all flawed valuation trees that might be produced by Nφ,
without abstracting any of the unflawed valuation trees.
We shall first consider the way in which an implementation of Nφ might represent a flawed
valuation tree.
One possibility is that it fails to implement either of the choices for a ∃ or ∨ node.
The other possibility is that one branch first chooses a variable to be true (false), and then
later, in the same branch requires it to be false (true).
If none of the problems just mentioned are present, then the implementation, as we shall prove
later, can be converted into a valuation tree that proves that φ is true.
The model Mφ must thus contain within its implementations all the implementations of Nφ
that have one of these flaws listed, and in such a way that no valid arguments are included by
mistake.
We shall construct Mφ out of components, where each component represents a potential valu-
ation tree with one of the flaws already mentioned. The outline of the construction is given in
Fig. 6.36.
Each component will consist of a single path, a“backbone”, of must transitions, which leads to a
state which represents the flaw. However, a flawed potential valuation tree does not necessarily
consist of only this one flaw. Hence, along this series of must transitions leading up to the flaw,
there are may transitions to an entirely under-specified state, that is to say one which has no
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must transitions, and may transitions to itself for every action. In this manner we encompass
all flawed potential valuation trees. Any implementation of these components must include the
“backbone”, as it is constructed out of must transitions, and these must be present. Thus by
construction any implementation of the components will contain the flaw of the component.
It may contain other flaws, or be otherwise shaped in a bizarre fashion, or may correspond
to an otherwise entirely reasonable valuation tree, but it must contain at least the flaw of the
component.
We shall now describe these components fully. There are four different classes of components.
We list these, giving a description of the flaw they represent.
C∃,i Neither a true nor a false value is chosen for the ith quantifier, which is existential.
C∨ Neither operand of a ∨ is shown to be true.
Cxj The variable xj is, on some branch set to be true, but later, in the same branch, ¬xj is
asserted to be true.
C¬xj The variable ¬xj is, on some branch set to be true, but later, in the same branch, xj is
asserted to be true.
From this list we construct the model Mφ, seen schematically in Fig. 6.36. The model Mφ
consists of an initial state sφ which has may transitions into each member of the four groups
of components. Hence implementations of Mφ are flawed valuation trees. Any given flawed
valuation tree may have many flaws, but that implies that it has at least one.
Example 6.4.10. For the model Nφ from Fig. 6.23, the corresponding Mφ is given in Fig. 6.37.
We now explicitly define these components.
C∃,i Illustrated in Fig. 6.38. This component should represent the fact that upon some
path, the subcomponent corresponding to the ith quantifier has been implemented by a
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C∃,2 C∨ Cx C¬x Cy C¬y
Figure 6.37: The model Mφ for φ = ∀x∃y.(¬x ∨ y) ∧ (¬y ∨ x). In this diagram a dotted arrow
represents a plurality of may transitions for every action. Solid arrows are as usual
single state. This does imply that on this path, up to this point all the subcomponents
representing the other quantifiers have not been implemented by a single state. By the
definition of the subcomponents, we see that there are 3i states on the path leading up
to the final state. We shall hence define this component as consisting of 3i + 1 states
connected in a linear fashion by must ∗-transitions. This represents the essential feature
of this flaw. However, considering the model representing a flawed potential valuation tree,
there will be other paths through the model. To allow our subcomponent to represent
all of these models, as long as they have this flaw, we add an extra state, which we give
a may transition to itself for every action. For each of the first 3i states, and for every
action, we create a may transition of this action to this new state. This subcomponent
there has, as its implementations, every model over this action set where there exists a
path of 3i ∗-transitions ending in a leaf.
C∨ See Fig. 6.38. Syntactically, the ∨ operators in φ come after n quantifiers and one ∧






































































































Figure 6.38: Diagram of the components C∃,i,Cxi and C¬xi . The component C∨ differs from
C∃,i only by length, see definition. In this diagram a dotted arrow represents a plurality of may
transitions for every action. Solid arrows are as usual.
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operator, as φ is a QCNF sentence. The shape of this component reflects this.
A model which has an ∨ component whose implementation is a single state will thus have
a path of 3n transitions through it terminating in a leaf. We thus define this component
in a similar way to the previous component. Its implementations are all models with a
path of 3n ∗-transitions finishing in a leaf.
Cxi This component is illustrated in Fig. 6.38. This component represents the flaw of a
variable xi being chosen to be true on a path, and then later used as being false. From
the definition of the subcomponents, we see that this implies that there is a path of length
3i− 1 of ∗-transitions to a state from where there is a vxj -transition and another path of
∗-transitions, of length 3(n − i) ending in a state from which there is a v¬xi transition.
We may represent this again as a linear series of 3n+ 2 states, adding three extra states.
The first being the usual state with may transitions for every action, this is connected
like in the other components. The second state is connected from the 3i+ 1th state by a
vxi transition, and the third extra state is connected from the end of the linear series by
a v¬xi transition. This subcomponent’s implementations thus consist of all models where
there is a path that sees a vxj transition, but later passes through a v¬xj transition (and
is of the correct length).
C¬xj This component is the same as the previous one but with the transitions vxj and v¬xj
swapped. See Fig. 6.38.
In this manner, the model Mφ depends upon φ, but to a lesser extent than Nφ. The model Mφ
is more concerned about the “shape” of φ, so that it includes all false arguments of this “shape”.
Many different φ will have a common Mφ, if they have the same quantifier block.
Example 6.4.11. An implementation of the Nφ of Fig. 6.23 that is not an implementation of
Mφ is shown in Fig. 6.39.
Theorem 6.4.12. Let φ be a sentence of QCNF, then we can find, in PTIME, models (Nφ, tφ)
and (Mφ, sφ) such that
I((Nφ, tφ)) ⊆ I((Mφ, sφ)) ⇐⇒ φ = false
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Figure 6.39: Implementation of Nφ, but not of Mφ, hence ∀x.∃y.(¬x ∨ y) ∧ (¬y ∨ x) is true
Proof outline
We shall prove Theorem 6.4.12 in two parts. We first outline here how we shall prove the left
from right statement, that is to sayI((Nφ, tφ)) ⊆ I((Mφ, sφ)) ⇒ φ = false.
Given that I((Nφ, tφ)) ⊆ I((Mφ, sφ)), we shall assume for a contradiction that φ is true. The
truth of φ implies the existence of a valuation tree to show this, there exists a T with T |= φ. We
can find this valuation tree, and use it to guide us in picking implementations of the components
that make up Nφ in such a way as to create a tree that is an implementation of (Nφ, tφ), but
not of (Mφ, sφ), producing a contradiction, and thus showing that φ must be false.
This process of finding an implementation is a two-step process. We first make a partial model
which has the same shape as our tree, but upon which we have not yet chosen how to implement
174 Chapter 6. Many model problems
the propositional atoms. We shall call this model (D, d). We define the creation of this model
by structural induction, given in Fig. 6.40.
Example 6.4.13. We illustrate this part of the process with a valuation tree for the true
sentence ∀x∃y.(¬x ∨ y) ∧ (¬y ∨ x). See Fig. 6.41.
Given the (D, d) from above, we shall now complete the proof by finding a two-valued model
(E, e) that is an implementation of (D, d), by choosing which of the may transitions to imple-
ment, we shall make our choices so that we get an implementation which is also an implemen-
tation of (Nφ, tφ).
Each of the leaves of the valuation tree has a set which defines a valuation that satisfies the
propositional logic kernel of φ. We use these sets to guide the choice of which transitions
to implement, and which to delete. Given some propositional logic sentence in CNF, it is
clear that from each conjunction we may delete false atoms from the sentence to arrive at a
second sentence, where each conjunction is non-empty, and which is also true for that particular
valuation. We may do this exactly because this model has been constructed from the valuation
tree. In the model (D, d), may transitions correspond to choices in disjunctions. Implement
those may transitions that correspond to true atoms for the particular valuation defined by
the set, and do not implement those that correspond to false atoms. In this manner each
state corresponding to an ∨ in the propositional logic kernel must have at least one transition
implemented for every set of the valuation tree. Call the implementation achieved in this
manner (E, e).
Example 6.4.14. For the sentence ∀x∃y.(¬x∨ y)∧ (¬y ∨ x), the valuation tree witnessing the
truth of the sentence has two leaves, labeled {x, y} and {}. The propositional kernel for these
two cases can thus be reduced to y ∧ x and ¬x ∧ ¬y respectively.
In this case, the model (D, d) so constructed co-incides exactly with (Nφ, tφ), and we may thus
make any implementation choice upon the atoms. The only thing we must ensure is that we do
actually implement at least one atom from each group.

































































































Figure 6.40: Using the valuation tree that satisfies φ to guide choice of implementation com-
ponent. Here S represent a set of proposition atoms that is the propositional kernel of φ. The
box on the last line indicates the transformation from Figs. 6.24-6.30
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Figure 6.41: The transformation from valuation tree T to model (D, d) illustrated step-by-step.
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Having constructed this model (E, e), we need now to show that it is an implementation of
(Nφ, tφ), and not an implementation of (Mφ, sφ).
We shall first show that (E, e) is indeed an implementation of (Nφ, tφ). This in fact should be
reasonably clear. The order of quantifiers in φ is the same as in the valuation tree. (Nφ, tφ)
is built by syntactic induction upon φ, starting with the quantifiers. The model (E, e) is built
by structural induction upon the valuation tree, where quantifiers occur in the same order,
and the components used to build D are implementations of the components of N . For the
propositional logic part of Nφ, note that, considering this by itself, its implementations consist
of every possible choice of implementing or not each of the propositional atoms. Since the
propositional part of D consists of building a component by not implementing some of the
atoms, and implementing others, we see that (Nφ, tφ) ≺ (E, e).
We now show that (E, e) is not an implementation of (Mφ, sφ). Referring to the definition of
Mφ, we see that any implementation (considered as a tree) of (Mφ, sφ) must be a single state, or
a state with transitions to implementations of one or some of the components that make up Mφ.
We shall show that by the construction of (E, e), each of these components has a property that
(E, e) does not share. Suppose that the implementation of Mφ contains the implementation of
an C∃,i component. This component has a series of 3i must transitions terminating in a state
with no successors.
Proof of Theorem 6.4.12, left-to-right.
Proof. I((Nφ, tφ)) ⊆ I((Mφ, sφ)) ⇒ φ = false. Let
Ψ∃,i = EX
3i(AX(false))
where we write EX for 〈∗〉, and where
EXkφ = EX(EX(. . .EX(︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
φ) . . .))
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is the result of k applications of the operator. Then we have that
VAL((C∃,i, q),Ψ∃,i)
is true. Upon any implementation of Mφ in which the transition to the component C∃,i is






is true, since all implementations of (C∃,i, q) satisfy Ψ∃,i. This sentence is not true upon (E, e),
as by construction every path through D is of length 3n + 4. If an implementation of Mφ
contains an implementation of the component C∨, then the sentence
Ψ∨ = EX
3n+2(AX(false))
is true, again we see that this is not true in (E, e).






holds on the implementation. This is seen not to hold on (E, e) as we deleted, in every branch
all those atoms corresponding to those previously valued as false by the valuation tree.







is true, and we see that this sentence is not true on (E, e).
This gives us the required contradiction, proving this part of the theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 6.4.12, right-to-left.
Proof. φ = false⇒ I((Nφ, tφ)) ⊆ I((Mφ, sφ)).
Proof by contradiction. Let φ be false, and assume that I((Nφ)) 6⊆ I((Mφ, tφ)). Then there
must be an acyclic 2-valued model (I, i) such that (I, i) 6∈ I((Mφ, sφ)) but (I, i) ∈ I((Nφ, tφ)),
as every Modal Labeled Transition System is bisimilar to a (modal) tree. As (I, i) ∈ I((Nφ, tφ)),
we may assume that (I, i) is a finite tree, as (Nφ, tφ) is acyclic. We shall reverse the process of
the previous proof to turn (I, i) into a valuation tree that shows the truth of φ, this contradiction
giving us the proof.
We first note that from (I, i) 6∈ I(Mφ) we may conclude:
 I has more than one state
 (I, i) 6|= EX(Ψ∃,i)
 (I, i) 6|= EX(Ψ∨)
 (I, i) 6|= EX(Ψvx)
 (I, i) 6|= EX(Ψv¬x)
Reasoning from this, and from the construction of Nφ we may conclude that
 Every path through (I, i) is of length 2n+ 4.
 If a state r has a vx (v¬x) transition to another state, then on no path from r will there
be a v¬x (vx) transition. The representations of valuations of atomic propositions are
consistent along all paths in (I, i).
What we would now like to do, is run the transformation from the previous proof, that turned
valuation trees into implementations of Modal Labeled Transition Systems, in reverse, turning
this model into a valuation tree. We can not necessarily do this immediately. The problem
may arise in two different manners. Firstly, both existential choices may be implemented in





























































Figure 6.42: An example of a step of the pruning algorithm, where we go from an implementa-
tion inclusion counter-example to a model that is immediately transformable into a valuation
tree.
our model (I, i), but valuation trees only use one choice. Secondly, the bisimulation property
of Modal Labeled Transition Systems, allows a great multiplicity of duplication of branches.
The transformation produced models of a very specific shape. Both cases of the problem can
be treated in a very similar fashion.
In both cases the problem is one of too many branches, of having to remove not add. We
may therefore chop away branches that do not fit in with the output of the transformation.
As the important properties of (I, i) are path properties, we shall not loose these by pruning
the model. The only thing to pay attention to is that those parts of (I, i) that represent the
universal choice of a variable should always have one path leading to where it is true, and one
where it is false. Hence we can create a model (I ′, i), by removing parts of (I, i).
Example 6.4.15. We illustrate the process of branch pruning in Fig. 6.42. In this figure
the upper model is the implementation inclusion counter-example witness. However it has two
branches corresponding to the choice of x as false. Our pruning algorithm may make either
choice, and will result in one of the models given below. The process is then applied iteratively
to the sub-trees.
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The model I ′ consists of branches ending in implementations of the propositional logic kernel.
For each of these implementations of the propositional kernel, transform them to the set of
all the atoms in that particular implementation. We now reverse the transformation in the
previous proof, turning implementations of components of Nφ into parts of a valuation tree.
We see that this valuation tree is not flawed, as every existential component has a successor,
every leaf is labeled correctly. This follows from (I, i) 6∈ (Mφ, sφ).
Thus (I, i) provides a proof that φ is true, by demonstrating how to construct a correct valuation
tree.
Theorem 6.4.16. Implementation inclusion is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. From Theorem 6.4.12 we can conclude that implementation inclusion is PSPACE-hard.
Using the arguments of page 109 we see that implementation inclusion is in EXPTIME. There
is thus (probably) a gap between our lower and upper bounds.
Corollary 6.4.17. The strict implementation inclusion problem I((N, t)) ⊂ I((M, s)) is PSPACE-
hard.
Proof. We have this as we know that I(Nφ) 6= I(Mφ) for any QCNF φ, as Mφ has a single state
as an implementation, whereas Nφ does not.
6.5 Mixed Transition Systems
We shall now use these results on Modal Labeled Transition Systems to get results for mixed
transition systems. These systems have an extra problem, that of determining consistency,
that is to say, does a mixed transition system have any implementation? For Modal Labeled
Transition Systems, this problem is trivial, the answer is always yes. We shall see that in that
case of mixed transition systems the problem is in fact EXPTIME-complete.
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Figure 6.43: A mixed transition system whose consistency encodes common implementation
for a set of three models
We thus consider three problems: Common implementation, implementation inclusion, and
consistency. All these problems can be reduced to questions about alternating tree automata,
or sentences of the modal µ-calculus using devectorization, and so we see that they are all
solvable in EXPTIME. .
We may reduce the common implementation problem of a set of models to the consistency
problem of a single model. The idea is to force, progressively, pairs of states to be refined into
a single state. An illustration of the construction required, due to Larsen et al. [LNW07], is
shown in Fig. 6.43. The idea may be compared to the construction used to reduce common
implementation of a set of Modal Transitions Systems to that of a pair of Modal Transition
Systems with nominals (see next section). From this we see that the problems of common
implementation, consistency and implementation inclusion for Mixed Transition System are all
EXPTIME-complete.
Thus we may conclude that all three problems are EXPTIME-hard when we consider Mixed
Transition Systems, which are not necessarily consistent. We get EXPTIME upper bounds
from considering the questions in terms of systems of equations.
6.6 Models with nominals
In this section we quickly examine the consequences of having partially valued nominals. A
nominal is an atomic proposition which is true on exactly one state of an implementation. If we
allow partially valued nominals, then we can encode that problem of common implementation
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for an arbitrary set of consistent models without nominals as the common implementation of
two models with nominals. For simplicity, but without loss of generality, we shall assume that
all models in this section are over a single action.
Definition 6.6.1. Let NOM ⊆ AP. Then we define the subclass of Mixed Transition Systems
corresponding to NOM as those where
(N, t) ∈ I(M, s) ⇒ ∀n ∈ NOM.∃!t ∈ N.(t, n) ∈ La
where ∃! denotes the existence of a unique element.
Theorem 6.6.2. Let S = {(Mi, si)} be a set of Modal Labeled Kripke Transition Systems
without nominals, over atomic propositions AP. Then there exists consistent partial models
with nominal NOM = {n} 6∈ AP, over atomic propositions AP′ = AP ∪ NOM, called (N1, t1),
(N2, t2), such that





CI(S) ⇐⇒ CI((N1, t1), (N2, t2))
Proof. We first note that we may assume that for each (Mi, si), the state si has no incoming
transitions. If, for a given model (Q, q), the state q has incoming transitions, we may create a
model (Q′, q′) where Q′ is Q with an extra state q′. The state q′ has no incoming transitions,
but the same outgoing transitions as q. We see that
(Q, q)  (Q′, q′) and (Q′, q′)  (Q, q)
that is to say, they are refinement equivalent. Applying this process to a set of models, we see
that the properties of common implementation are preserved.
So, assuming that each si has no incoming transition, we add to each state si a valuation for
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Figure 6.44: The model (N1, t1), which uses partially valued nominals to combine a number of
nominal-less s   
  n = 1
 
 pi = 12QQ
Figure 6.45: The model (N2, t2), whose common implementation with (N1, t1) forces the states
si together. On the third state, every propositional atom is valued as 12
the nominal n, setting it at 12. We may now construct (N1, t1) as illustrated in Fig. 6.44. This
model thus consists of an initial state that has transitions to each of the si, upon which the
nominal n is valued at 12.
We then consider the common implementation of this model with that illustrated in Fig. 6.45.
In this model there is an initial state with a single outgoing transition to a state where the
nominal n is fully valued. From there, there is a transition to a state which abstracts any
model, as it has a may transition to itself, and has every atomic proposition valued as 12.
We thus see that a common implementation (R, r) must have the property that from the initial
state the next state has the atom n valued at 1. As n is a nominal, there can be only one
outgoing transition from the initial state of any common implementation. Hence we see that
this state r, where n is true on the common implementation must have that property that
(Mi, si)  (R, r) for each r. We have forced the states si to be refined together, thus producing
a common implementation.
Having given a lower bound for common implementation in the presence of nominals, we now
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give an upper bound.
Theorem 6.6.3. Let S = {(Mi, si)} be a finite set of Mixed Transition Systems with partially
valued nominals. Then CI(S) can be determined in EXPTIME.
Proof. The hybrid µ-calculus [SV01] extends the modal µ-calculus to models with nominals.
We may use our devectorization method with it in the same way as before. Doing so, we can
reduce the common implementation problem with partially valued nominals to that of checking
satisfiability of a sentence of the hybrid µ-calculus. From [SV01] we have that this problem is
in EXPTIME.
Corollary 6.6.4. CI(S) for Modal Kripke Labaled Transition Systems with nominals is EXPTIME-
complete, even for |S| = 2.
6.7 Evaluating sentences
We return now to the original research objective, to evaluate a sentence over multiple models.
As mentioned at the start of this chapter, this section will not give too many answers, but lay
out directions for future work.
We can define two new predicates
 CI(S, φ) is true iff there exists a single two-valued model that is accepted by φ and is
also an implementation of every member of S.
 II((M, s), (N, t), φ) is true iff every implementation of (M, s) that satisfies φ is also an
implementation of (N, t).
6.7.1 Common implementation
For common implementation, we get a number of quick, easy results. The EXPTIME lower
bound for CI(S, φ) follows from our ability to write a valid sentence in φ, no matter what
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temporal logic we choose, and CI(S, tt) = CI(S). The upper, EXPTIME bound can be
obtained from automata-theoretic considerations, we just perform a language intersection test
for the set of all the automata, one representing each model.
The interesting question here is what happens for the case of a set of Modal Labeled Transition
Systems, of fixed cardinality. Here there is an exponential sized gap in our knowledge, as CI(S)
with |S| = n, for some fixed n is in PTIME. Again we can perform the check “CI(S, φ)” in
EXPTIME, but is there some way to perform an approximate check in PTIME? If there is,
can we make it exact in some cases? That is to say, can we semantically minimize over many
models?
6.7.2 Implementation inclusion
In the case of implementation inclusion, the available scope for improvement is less. We have not
been able to establish a precise classification of the computational complexity of implementation
inclusion for Modal Labeled Transition Systems. It may be that it is EXPTIME-complete, in
which case the question is closed, as II((M, s), (N, t), φ) will also then be EXPTIME-complete.
If, however, implementation inclusion is PSPACE-complete, it raises the possibility that we may
be able to evalute II((M, s), (N, j), φ) in PSPACE for certain φ using approximate methods.
However, the practical benefit of this would seem to be rather limited, certainly no general
sub-exponential algorithm is known for a PSPACE-complete problem.
6.8 Summary
In this chapter we investigated the many model decision problems of
 Common implementation – Is there a single model that is an implementation of every
member of a set?





II PSPACE-hard, in EXPTIME EXPTIME-complete
Figure 6.46: Summary of many model decision problem complexities
We have investigated these questions for both sets of Modal Labeled Transition Systems, and
Mixed Transition Systems. The complexities of these problems that we have derived are shown
in Table 6.46.
We thus conclude that specifying behaviour through Mixed Transition Systems is no more
efficient than through equations of the MC.
The result for implementation inclusion for modal systems is not exact, assuming PSPACE 6=
EXPTIME. I conjecture that it is in fact PSPACE-complete, but this remains as future work.
We have also shown that when partially valued nominals are considered, the complexity of
common implementation for modal models rises to EXPTIME-complete, even when considering
sets of a fixed cardinality.
In showing these results, we have also given a proof of the folklore result that vectorization of
PL,PML and MC does not add to the complexity of the satisfiability problems.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Summary and Evaluation of Thesis Achievements
In the introduction to this thesis we gave the following list of research objectives:
1. Improve the grammar of [GH05]. This grammar produces sentences which are certified
to be semantically self-minimizing.
2. What can we say about the specification patterns of [pat] using this grammar? The
original grammar failed to correctly identify many semantically self-minimizing.
3. What is the general complexity of determining semantic self-minimization?
4. Can we evaluate semantically self-minimizing sentences over a conjunction of models?
This problem turned out to be more difficult than imagined, and so led to the revised
objective below.
4′ Investigate the computational complexity of the many-model problems of consistency,
common implementation, and thorough refinement. Also investigate what difference al-
lowing nominals, special propositional atoms true at only one state in a model, makes to
the complexity.
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Succeeding in understanding these objectives would give a good understanding of the usefulness
of Modal Labeled Transition Systems in model checking, in relation to other methods.
In this section we now evaluate the progress made in this thesis to these objectives.
What is the general complexity of determining semantic self-minimization?
We have given upper and lower bounds on the complexity of deciding if a sentence of PL, PML,
or the MC has a given semantic self-minimization property. We see that these questions are at
least as hard as the validity problem for the logic concerned. This suggests that it may be more
worthwhile to assume a sentence is not semantically self-minimizing in general, as computing
its minimization is of the same order of complexity.
Improve the grammar of [GH05]
For semantic minimization, we have improved upon the grammar of [GH05] by adding a number
of terms. Proofs have been given that adding these clauses is sound.
What can we say about the patterns of [pat] using this grammar?
With this improved grammar, we have been able to certify that many commonly used specifi-
cation patterns of [pat] are pessimistically self-minimizing. Those that were not certified were
found to fail the certification in a few, common, ways. These common problems have simple
pessimistic semantic minimizations. In this manner we have been able to give semantic self-
minimizations for all the patterns of [pat], and these are all of a similar size to the original
patterns, the complexity of model checking is not greatly impacted.
These results allow all these common safety patterns to be checked quickly over all implemen-
tations of an abstract model.
Can we evaluate semantically self-minimizing sentences over a conjunction of mod-
els?
In this thesis we have only partially looked at this question, we have looked at many model
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problems, but without the complications of evaluating sentences over models, a problem that
was itself still rather difficult. We have looked at common implementation of many models,
but not looked at whether, given a φ and a set S of Modal Labeled Transition Systems, there
is a common implementation of S which is accepted by φ. By automata theoretic arguments,
EXPTIME upper-bounds are easy to get here, but no work on approximative methods was
done here.
What we have achieved in this thesis is to give complexity bounds for the special case where
φ = tt , that is to say, for the simple existence questions.
In this thesis we have identified two many model problems:
 Common implementation
 Implementation Inclusion
Common implementation is the problem of determining if, given a set of models S, there is a
single model which is a pair-wise implementation of each member of S.
Implementation inclusion asks, given two models (M, s) and (N, t), are all implementations of
(M, s) also implementations of (N, t).
For common implementation, we considered sets of models of fixed, and unfixed cardinality,
as well of sets of only Modal Labeled Transition Systems, and sets of mixed systems. The
complexity of the case of fixed cardinality of Modal Labeled Transition Systems was known
from [HH06], and is in PTIME. We have shown in this thesis that in the other cases the
problem is EXPTIME-complete. We also looked at the difference that was made when nomials,
special propositional atoms, true in only one state, were allowed.
For the problem of implementation inclusion, we have given a reduction of QCNF, a variant of
the Quantified Boolean Formula problem, to the implementation inclusion problem. This gives
us that the problem is PSPACE-hard. An EXPTIME upper bound is easy to get, but no further
progress in narrowing this has been made. It seems difficult to embed an EXPTIME-complete
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CI of modal systems EXPTIME-complete
CI of mixed systems, fixed cardinality ≥ 1 EXPTIME-complete
CI of modal systems with nominals, fixed cardinality ≥ 2 EXPTIME-complete
Table 7.1: Exact complexity results established in this thesis, where CI denotes ‘common
implementation’
problem in implementation inclusion, but repeated attempts to design a PSPACE algorithm
have also not been successful.
To summarise, for the many model problems we have given firm complexity bounds in Table 7.1.
We have also given upper and lower bounds for implementation inclusion. We have shown that
this is in EXPTIME, and is PSPACE-hard.
7.2 Future Work
A number of different problems remain unsettled by this thesis.
The grammar for certifying sentences as optimistically or pessimistically self-minimizing can
certainly be further expanded.
The problem of thorough refinement for Modal Labeled Transition Systems has still to be
settled, either a PSPACE algorithm, or an EXPTIME-hardness result would be nice.
The problem of semantic minimization over a number of modal models also should be addressed.
The question of whether we can perform an approximative check of a sentence over a set of
modal transitions systems with fixed cardinality remains open.
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